Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds. 403p (2000)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on W and on human behavior throughout the behavioral sciences and by the general public. As usual, nobody seems to grasp that philosophy is armchair psychology, and that W was (in my view) the greatest natural psychologist of all time. He laid out the general structure of how the mind works, which is often referred to as intentionality and is roughly equivalent to cognition or personality or thinking and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He can thus be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly anyone but me seems to realize it. W was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as the first to reject (though not entirely consistently) the blank slate or cultural view of human nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly the opposite of his overall thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). I provide my recent (2016) table of intentionality for a current frame of reference from the two systems point of view before remarking on each of the essays. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 403p (2000)(review revised 2019)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on W and on human behavior throughout the behavioral sciences and by the general public. As usual, nobody seems to grasp that philosophy is armchair psychology, and that W was (in my view) the greatest natural psychologist of all time. He laid out the general structure of how the mind works, which is often referred to as intentionality and is roughly equivalent to cognition or personality or thinking and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He can thus be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly anyone but me seems to realize it. W was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as the first to reject (though not entirely consistently) the blank slate or cultural view of human nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly the opposite of his overall thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). I provide a table of intentionality for a current frame of reference from the two systems point of view before remarking on each of the essays. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019)

CONVENTIONALISM AS A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE ENTERPRISE

The existence of different approaches for the understanding of the concept of economic security, taking into account its nominal nature as an economic and general scientific denotation, is actually, from the epistemological point of view, the basis for the application of conventionalism for explanation of the nature of the enterprise economic security, harmonization of such approaches and the links between them. It is shown, that nowadays the concept of economic security has a significant number of approaches for its interpretation.The purpose of the article is to study theoretical approaches to understanding the economic security of the enterprise and the formation of a certain unified theoretical and methodological basis for understanding the economic security of the enterprise.The methodological basis of the study, the results of which are presented in the article, is a set of methods of scientific research, general methods, techniques and principles, including comparison, monographic analysis, historical analysis, analysis and synthesis, abstract-logical analysis, classification, and systematization have been used.It is shown, that nowadays the concept of economic security has a significant number of approaches for its interpretation. The correlation between such approaches can be considered either based on the shift of scientific paradigm (scientific revolution) by T. Kuhn [1] from the imperative to the synthetic approach, or based on the approach of the competition of scientific research programs by I. Lakatos [2] “security-development” and “security-safety”. Each approach creates the preconditions for the formation of the understanding of economic security, which in the future serves as the basis for the development of the tools for its evaluation, provision and enhancement

Compositionality and Believing That

This paper is about compositionality, belief reports, and related issues. I begin by introducing Putnam’s proposal for understanding compositionality, namely that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (section 1). Both Church and Sellars think that Putnam’s move is superfluous or unnecessary since there is no relevant puzzle to begin with (section 2). I will urge that Putnam is right in thinking that there is indeed a puzzle with a discussion of translation and belief individuation (section 3). Later Salmon (2001/ 2007) reinforces Church’s position, but I will argue that it is still possible to make my case by clarifying the nature of my proposal, i.e., understanding explanations of action from the third-person point of view (section 4). Now, Fine (2007) agrees with Putnam that there is indeed a puzzle to be solved, but he argues that Putnam’s solution of it is problematic, and that his own semantic relationism is a better view. In response to this, I will recast the notion of compositionality based on a certain conception of belief individuation, namely that the semantic content of a sentence is a function of the semantic contents of its parts and of the structure of intensional discourses (sections 3 and 5). Finally the paper will end with a reconsideration of the recalcitrant Kripke’s puzzle about belief (1979/1988), since it might seem to put some pressure on my account. It turns out that my understanding of this puzzle is again different from Fine’s perspective (section 6)

Natura-myśl symboliczna-kultura

An Outlook on Lévi-Strauss structuralism from the point of the notions of “naturę” and “culture”, which the French ethnologist employs in his work, is suggested in this paper. It is the author’s thesis that the opposition nature-culture can be conceived as the main linę of the interpretation concerning the basie trends of Lévi-Strauss generał theoretical tbought. Some analysis concerning understanding of the relation between naturę and culture have been carried out to defend the above thesis, from the point of view of 1) the subject in question (naturę and culture as two distinct realities which are objectivized in people’s thinking), 2) the methodology (the ways of investigation of the relations that organize the two realities or link them together). It appears that symbolic thinking is always the factor which unites the orders of reality. This thinking uses both natural and social substance in order to make them into coherent logical systems. Lévi-Strauss analyses of totemism and mythologicai thinking excmplify this phenomenon (in the former case naturę is transformed into culture; in the latter – just the opposite occurs – culture is transformedinto nature). The paper presents an evolution of Lévi-Strauss point of view on the relation between naturę and culture. This evolution, however, has resulted in a clarification of the sense in which he uses both these notions. Duality of a possible understanding of these notions is best rendered by the following words of Lévi-Strauss: “nature is preculture and it is also subculture”.Przedruk artykułu Wojciecha J. Burszty, który był po raz pierwszy opublikowany w „Ludzie”, t. 71, 1987, s. 39-58

The figure of the narrator as an element of a strategy in the interpretation of hegel’s “the phenomenology of spirit”

The subject of the study is the influence that the narrator’s image has on the understanding of the specific content of the basic concepts of “The Phenomenology of Spirit” –“time,” “history,” “recollection.” The author establishes that the narrator in “The Phenomenology of Spirit” appears in the form of “our consciousness,” “consciousness itself” and “object,” which, from the formal point of view, follow the same path of constitution and sublation of objectivity. “Time,” “history” and “recollection” act as the objective equivalents of the mediation of consciousness and objectivity, corresponding to the models specified by the narrator. To adequately understand the development of the “experience of consciousness” one must consider the specifics of each image of the narrator expressed in the peculiarity of the vocabulary and style of the book fragments, corresponding to each of them. The need to recognize the dialogical nature of “The Phenomenology of Spirit” is due to the fact that the meaning of the narrative as a whole is built out of the correlation of the same “experience” plot lines told from different points of view. Ananalys is of Hegel’s consideration of “history” as an object of a “consciousness experience” leads to the conclusion that he had developed a peculiar “phenomenology of history,” which is fundamentally different from the subsequent “Philosophy of History.” In this phenomenology not the logical concept, but the images of consciousness are the core of the historical process. “Recollection,” sublating “time” and “history,” not only opens the way to the logical objectivity, but also allows us to imagine the completed “experience of consciousness” as a whole, which retains its significance at all subsequent stages of the evolution of Hegel’s philosophical and systematic thought. Based on the obtained results, the author suggests that the crisis of the Hegelian encyclopedic model was largely due to the oblivion of Phenomenology as its transcendental foundation, which retains its significance even after the development of Logic as a speculative justification of the system

The metaphysical interpretation of logical truth

The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. I wish to examine the apparent dual nature of logical truth (without dwelling on Davidson), and suggest that we are dealing with a distinction between a metaphysical and a linguistic interpretation of truth. I take my cue from John Etchemendy, who suggests that absolute truth could be considered as being equivalent to truth in the ‘right model’, i.e., the model that corresponds with the world. However, the notion of ‘model’ is not entirely appropriate here as it is closely associated with relative truth. Instead, I propose that the metaphysical interpretation of truth may be illustrated in modal terms, by metaphysical modality in particular. One of the tasks that I will undertake in this paper is to develop this modal interpretation, partly building on my previous work on the metaphysical interpretation of the law of non-contradiction (Tahko 2009). After an explication of the metaphysical interpretation of logical truth, a brief study of how this interpretation connects with some recent important themes in philosophical logic follows. In particular, I discuss logical pluralism and propose an understanding of pluralism from the point of view of the metaphysical interpretation