46,797 research outputs found
Belief as Willingness to Bet
We investigate modal logics of high probability having two unary modal
operators: an operator expressing probabilistic certainty and an operator
expressing probability exceeding a fixed rational threshold . Identifying knowledge with the former and belief with the latter, we may
think of as the agent's betting threshold, which leads to the motto "belief
is willingness to bet." The logic for has an
modality along with a sub-normal modality that extends
the minimal modal logic by way of four schemes relating
and , one of which is a complex scheme arising out of a theorem due to
Scott. Lenzen was the first to use Scott's theorem to show that a version of
this logic is sound and complete for the probability interpretation. We
reformulate Lenzen's results and present them here in a modern and accessible
form. In addition, we introduce a new epistemic neighborhood semantics that
will be more familiar to modern modal logicians. Using Scott's theorem, we
provide the Lenzen-derivative properties that must be imposed on finite
epistemic neighborhood models so as to guarantee the existence of a probability
measure respecting the neighborhood function in the appropriate way for
threshold . This yields a link between probabilistic and modal
neighborhood semantics that we hope will be of use in future work on modal
logics of qualitative probability. We leave open the question of which
properties must be imposed on finite epistemic neighborhood models so as to
guarantee existence of an appropriate probability measure for thresholds
.Comment: Removed date from v1 to avoid confusion on citation/reference,
otherwise identical to v
Toward a probability theory for product logic: states, integral representation and reasoning
The aim of this paper is to extend probability theory from the classical to
the product t-norm fuzzy logic setting. More precisely, we axiomatize a
generalized notion of finitely additive probability for product logic formulas,
called state, and show that every state is the Lebesgue integral with respect
to a unique regular Borel probability measure. Furthermore, the relation
between states and measures is shown to be one-one. In addition, we study
geometrical properties of the convex set of states and show that extremal
states, i.e., the extremal points of the state space, are the same as the
truth-value assignments of the logic. Finally, we axiomatize a two-tiered modal
logic for probabilistic reasoning on product logic events and prove soundness
and completeness with respect to probabilistic spaces, where the algebra is a
free product algebra and the measure is a state in the above sense.Comment: 27 pages, 1 figur
Probabilistic modal {\mu}-calculus with independent product
The probabilistic modal {\mu}-calculus is a fixed-point logic designed for
expressing properties of probabilistic labeled transition systems (PLTS's). Two
equivalent semantics have been studied for this logic, both assigning to each
state a value in the interval [0,1] representing the probability that the
property expressed by the formula holds at the state. One semantics is
denotational and the other is a game semantics, specified in terms of
two-player stochastic parity games. A shortcoming of the probabilistic modal
{\mu}-calculus is the lack of expressiveness required to encode other important
temporal logics for PLTS's such as Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL).
To address this limitation we extend the logic with a new pair of operators:
independent product and coproduct. The resulting logic, called probabilistic
modal {\mu}-calculus with independent product, can encode many properties of
interest and subsumes the qualitative fragment of PCTL. The main contribution
of this paper is the definition of an appropriate game semantics for this
extended probabilistic {\mu}-calculus. This relies on the definition of a new
class of games which generalize standard two-player stochastic (parity) games
by allowing a play to be split into concurrent subplays, each continuing their
evolution independently. Our main technical result is the equivalence of the
two semantics. The proof is carried out in ZFC set theory extended with
Martin's Axiom at an uncountable cardinal
Finite Jeffrey logic is not finitely axiomatizable
Bayes logics based on Bayes conditionalization as a probability updating mechanism have recently been introduced in [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136/]. It has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions or on a standard Borel space is not finitely axiomatizable [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136/]. Apart from Bayes conditionalization there are other methods, extensions of the standard one, of updating a probability measure. One such important method is Jeffrey's conditionalization. In this paper we consider the modal logic \JL_{<\omega} of probability updating based on Jeffrey's conditionalization where the underlying measurable space is finite. By relating this logic to the logic of absolute continuity and to Medvedev's logic of
finite problems, we show that \JL_{<\omega} is not finitely axiomatizable. The result is significant because it indicates that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited
Modal logic and philosophy
Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important to modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter. Limitations of space have ruled out any attempt at writing a survey of all the work going on in our field—a book would be needed for that. Instead, we have tried to select material that is of interest in its own right or exemplifies noteworthy features in interesting ways. Here are some themes that have guided us throughout the writing:
• The back-and-forth between philosophy and modal logic. There has been a good deal of give-and-take in the past. Carnap tried to use his modal logic to throw light on old philosophical questions, thereby inspiring others to continue his work and still others to criticise it. He certainly provoked Quine, who in his turn provided—and continues to provide—a healthy challenge to modal logicians. And Kripke’s and David Lewis’s philosophies are connected, in interesting ways, with their modal logic. Analytic philosophy would have been a lot different without modal logic!
• The interpretation problem. The problem of providing a certain modal logic with an intuitive interpretation should not be conflated with the problem of providing a formal system with a model-theoretic semantics. An intuitively appealing model-theoretic semantics may be an important step towards solving the interpretation problem, but only a step. One may compare this situation with that in probability theory, where definitions of concepts like ‘outcome space’ and ‘random variable’ are orthogonal to questions about “interpretations” of the concept of probability.
• The value of formalisation. Modal logic sets standards of precision, which are a challenge to—and sometimes a model for—philosophy. Classical philosophical questions can be sharpened and seen from a new perspective when formulated in a framework of modal logic. On the other hand, representing old questions in a formal garb has its dangers, such as simplification and distortion.
• Why modal logic rather than classical (first or higher order) logic? The idioms of modal logic—today there are many!—seem better to correspond to human ways of thinking than ordinary extensional logic. (Cf. Chomsky’s conjecture that the NP + VP pattern is wired into the human brain.)
In his An Essay in Modal Logic (1951) von Wright distinguished between four kinds of modalities: alethic (modes of truth: necessity, possibility and impossibility), epistemic (modes of being known: known to be true, known to be false, undecided), deontic (modes of obligation: obligatory, permitted, forbidden) and existential (modes of existence: universality, existence, emptiness). The existential modalities are not usually counted as modalities, but the other three categories are exemplified in three sections into which this chapter is divided. Section 1 is devoted to alethic modal logic and reviews some main themes at the heart of philosophical modal logic. Sections 2 and 3 deal with topics in epistemic logic and deontic logic, respectively, and are meant to illustrate two different uses that modal logic or indeed any logic can have: it may be applied to already existing (non-logical) theory, or it can be used to develop new theory
Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable
In the paper [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136] a hierarchy of modal logics have been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to Medvedev's logic of (in)finite problems it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case remained open. In this paper we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces (these cover probability spaces that occur in most of the applications) is also not finitely axiomatizable
Statistical Epistemic Logic
We introduce a modal logic for describing statistical knowledge, which we
call statistical epistemic logic. We propose a Kripke model dealing with
probability distributions and stochastic assignments, and show a stochastic
semantics for the logic. To our knowledge, this is the first semantics for
modal logic that can express the statistical knowledge dependent on
non-deterministic inputs and the statistical significance of observed results.
By using statistical epistemic logic, we express a notion of statistical
secrecy with a confidence level. We also show that this logic is useful to
formalize statistical hypothesis testing and differential privacy in a simple
and abstract manner
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