Metaphor in Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science

This article surveys theories of metaphor in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. In particular, it focuses on contemporary semantic, pragmatic and non-cognitivist theories of linguistic metaphor and on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory advanced by George Lakoff and his school. Special attention is given to the mechanisms that are shared by nearly all these approaches, i.e. mechanisms of interaction and mapping between conceptual domains. Finally, the article discusses several recent attempts to combine these theories of linguistic and conceptual metaphor into a unitary account

Metaphor, religious language and religious experience

Is it possible to talk about God without either misrepresentation or failing to assert anything of significance? The article begins by reviewing how, in attempting to answer this question, traditional theories of religious language have failed to sidestep both potential pitfalls adequately. After arguing that recently developed theories of metaphor seem better able to shed light on the nature of religious language, it considers the claim that huge areas of our language and, consequently, of our experience are shaped by metaphors. Finally, it considers some of the more significant implications of this claim for our understanding of both religious language and religious experience

Data, problems, heuristics and results in cognitive metaphor research

Cognitive metaphor research is characterised by the diversity of rival theories. Starting from this observation, the paper focuses on the problem of how the unity and diversity of cognitive theories of metaphor can be accounted for. The first part of the paper outlines a suitable metascientific approach which emerges as a modification of B. von Eckardt’s notion of research framework. In the second part, by the help of this approach, some aspects of the sophisticated relationship between Lakoff and Johnson’s, Glucksberg’s, and Gentner’s theories are discussed. The main finding is that the data, the problems, the heuristics and the hypotheses which have been partly shaped by the rivals contribute to the development of the particular theories to a considerable extent

Conceptual Metaphors: a review with implications for human understandings and systems practice

We provide an overview of metaphor theory and explore implications for systems practice by building on claims that metaphors are central to our ways of understanding. As stakeholders will have different understandings, each metaphor will reveal and conceal different aspects of their understandings. These differences need to be accommodated within systems practice. Our contribution in this paper is to show how metaphors can explain, appreciate and create different understandings. Further, new understandings can emerge from considering different metaphors

Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Classical Theory: Affinities Rather than Divergences

Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes some strong claims against so-called Classical Theory which spans the accounts of metaphors from Aristotle to Davidson. Most of these theories, because of their traditional literal-metaphorical distinction, fail to take into account the phenomenon of conceptual metaphor. I argue that the underlying mechanism for explaining metaphor bears some striking resemblances among all of these theories. A mapping between two structures is always expressed. Conceptual Metaphor Theory insists, however, that the literal-metaphorical distinction of Classical Theories is empirically wrong. I claim that this criticism is based rather on terminological decisions than on empirical issues. Conceptual Metaphor Theory focusses primarily on conventional metaphors and struggles to extend its mechanism to novel metaphors, whereas Classical Theories focus on novel metaphors and struggle to extend their mechanisms to conventional metaphors. Since all of these theories study metaphors from the synchronic point of view, they are unable to take into account any semantic change. A diachronic perspective is what we need here, one which would allow us to explain the role of metaphor in semantic change and the development of language in general

Introspective data and corpus data : combination instead of confrontation in the study of German metaphorical idioms of life

This paper examines the applicability of the combination of data types in a study of German idioms of life with the tools of cognitive metaphor theory. The data sources for conceptual metaphors were mainly metaphors found in the relevant literature. These metaphors are of introspective nature to a great extent. The primary data sources for metaphorical expressions were dictionaries that represent introspective data, too. These data have been complemented by corpus data. The paper discusses the problems of introspective and corpus data raised by the study of German idioms of life. Two case studies demonstrate the advantages of the combination of data and methods

Metaphor as categorisation: a connectionist implementation

A key issue for models of metaphor comprehension is to explain how in some metaphorical comparison , only some features of B are transferred to A. The features of B that are transferred to A depend both on A and on B. This is the central thrust of Black's well known interaction theory of metaphor comprehension (1979). However, this theory is somewhat abstract, and it is not obvious how it may be implemented in terms of mental representations and processes. In this paper we describe a simple computational model of on-line metaphor comprehension which combines Black's interaction theory with the idea that metaphor comprehension is a type of categorisation process (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990, 1993). The model is based on a distributed connectionist network depicting semantic memory (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). The network learns feature-based information about various concepts. A metaphor is comprehended by applying a representation of the first term A to the network storing knowledge of the second term B, in an attempt to categorise it as an exemplar of B. The output of this network is a representation of A transformed by the knowledge of B. We explain how this process embodies an interaction of knowledge between the two terms of the metaphor, how it accords with the contemporary theory of metaphor stating that comprehension for literal and metaphorical comparisons is carried out by identical mechanisms (Gibbs, 1994), and how it accounts for both existing empirical evidence (Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997) and generates new predictions. In this model, the distinction between literal and metaphorical language is one of degree, not of kind