28,650 research outputs found
Logic in Opposition
It is claimed hereby that, against a current view of logic as a theory of consequence, opposition is a basic logical concept that can be used to define consequence itself. This requires some substantial changes in the underlying framework, including: a non-Fregean semantics of questions and answers, instead of the usual truth-conditional semantics; an extension of opposition as a relation between any structured objects; a definition of oppositions in terms of basic negation. Objections to this claim will be reviewed
Constant Domain Quantified Modal Logics Without Boolean Negation
his paper provides a sound and complete axiomatisation for constant domain modal logics without Boolean negation. This is a simpler case of the difficult problem of providing a sound and complete axiomatisation for constant-domain quantified relevant logics, which can be seen as a kind of modal logic with a two-place modal operator, the relevant conditional. The completeness proof is adapted from a proof for classical modal predicate logic (I follow James Garson’s 1984 presentation of the completeness proof quite closely), but with an important twist, to do with the absence of Boolean negation
A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists
I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator that marks implications that hold monotonically. Transitivity fails, but for good reasons. Intuitionism and classical logic can easily be recovered from the system
The Logical Web
Different logic systems are motivated by attempts to fix the counter-intuitive instances of classical argumentative forms, e.g., strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition and conditional negation. These counter-examples are regarded as evidence that classical logic should be rejected in favour of a new logic system in which these argumentative forms are considered invalid. It is argued that these logical revisions are ad hoc, because those controversial argumentative forms are implied by other argumentative forms we want to keep. It is impossible to remove an argumentative form from a logical system without getting entangled in an intricate logical web, since these revisions imply the removal of other parts of a system we want to maintain. Consequently, these revisions are incoherent and unwarranted. At the very least, the usual approach in the analysis of counter-examples of argumentative forms must be seriously reconsidered
From Many-Valued Consequence to Many-Valued Connectives
Given a consequence relation in many-valued logic, what connectives can be
defined? For instance, does there always exist a conditional operator
internalizing the consequence relation, and which form should it take? In this
paper, we pose this question in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting for
the class of so-called intersective mixed consequence relations, which extends
the class of Tarskian relations. Using computer-aided methods, we answer
extensively for 3-valued and 4-valued logics, focusing not only on conditional
operators, but on what we call Gentzen-regular connectives (including negation,
conjunction, and disjunction). For arbitrary N-valued logics, we state
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such connectives in a
multi-premise multi-conclusion setting. The results show that mixed consequence
relations admit all classical connectives, and among them pure consequence
relations are those that admit no other Gentzen-regular connectives.
Conditionals can also be found for a broader class of intersective mixed
consequence relations, but with the exclusion of order-theoretic consequence
relations.Comment: Updated version [corrections of an incorrect claim in first version;
two bib entries added
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