Efficiency in Marriage

Economists usually assume that bargaining in marriage leads to efficient outcomes. The most convincing rationale for this assumption is the belief that efficient allocations are likely to emerge from repeated interactions in stationary environments, and that marriage provides such an environment. This paper argues that when a current decision affects future bargaining power, inefficient outcomes are plausible. If the spouses could make binding commitments -- in effect, commitments to refrain from exploiting the future bargaining advantage -- then the inefficiency would disappear. But spouses seldom can make binding commitments regarding allocation within marriage. To investigate the efficiency of bargaining within marriage when choices affect future bargaining power, we consider the location decisions of two-earner couples. These location decisions are transparent and analytically tractable examples of choices likely to affect future bargaining power, but the logic of our analysis applies to many other decisions. For example, decisions about education, fertility, and labor force participation are also potential sources of inefficiency.

External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars

This paper examines the effect of external intervention on civil war duration from the years 1946-2002. Based on the logic that intervention causes a distortion of the bargaining process in civil wars, it is hypothesized that intervention leads to increased civil war duration. This hypothesis is tested using linear regression analysis, which finds a positive, significant relationship between intervention and civil war duration. Considered in the context of previous literature, it is concluded that in addition to the distorting effect intervention appears to have on the bargaining process, this result may have been informed by the presence of competitive intervention, rival intervention, and interventions by states with an independent agenda. This research provides further evidence of the conflict lengthening effect of intervention, while tracing a common explanation based in the bargaining model of war throughout the various perspectives in the literature

Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

We study the framing effects of communication in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two experiments, we find that non-binding talk of fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on competitive reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that spontaneous within-game dialogue and manipulated pre-game talk lead to the same results.communication, fairness, bargaining

A fixed-point property of logic-based bargaining solution

Abstract. This paper presents a logic-based bargaining solution based on Zhang and Zhang’s framework. It is shown that if the demand sets of players are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point property, which says that the outcome of bargaining is the result of mutual belief revision. The result is interesting not only because it presents a desirable logical property of bargaining solution but also establishes a link between bargaining theory and multi-agent belief revision.

The Hybridization of National Collective Bargaining Systems: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Transformation of Collective Bargaining in the European Union

In this article it is argued that the economic crisis has made national collective bargaining systems increasingly multi-layered, perforated and dynamically unstable, i.e. hybrid. The authors explain these transformations in terms of the concomitance of two different sources of change which do not necessarily follow the same logics. The first source stems from national systems’ endogenous logic of path dependency and the second from pressure to reform in accordance with exogenously applied strategies and logics. It is argued that these sources act like a whipsaw, pushing and pulling national collective bargaining systems between the two logics, leading to hybrid collective bargaining systems

A Theory of Transactions Privacy

In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation with result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency.

Appropriation, violent enforcement and transaction costs : a critical survey

In this paper, I focus on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the "Political Coase Theorem" (PCT) lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.Appropriation, Hobbesian state, Political Coase Theorem, Property rights approach, transaction costs, violent enforcement