291 research outputs found
Logic of Negation-Complete Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Epistemic Deciders)
We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised
negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP)
from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive
proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are
negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for
example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like
Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are
ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of
being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive
internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself
is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not
have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness
of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for
singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a
standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on
LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function.
LDiiP's agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed as a
negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and
yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of
S4-provability.Comment: Expanded Introduction. Added Footnote 4. Corrected Corollary 3 and 4.
Continuation of arXiv:1208.184
Completeness of Flat Coalgebraic Fixpoint Logics
Modal fixpoint logics traditionally play a central role in computer science,
in particular in artificial intelligence and concurrency. The mu-calculus and
its relatives are among the most expressive logics of this type. However,
popular fixpoint logics tend to trade expressivity for simplicity and
readability, and in fact often live within the single variable fragment of the
mu-calculus. The family of such flat fixpoint logics includes, e.g., LTL, CTL,
and the logic of common knowledge. Extending this notion to the generic
semantic framework of coalgebraic logic enables covering a wide range of logics
beyond the standard mu-calculus including, e.g., flat fragments of the graded
mu-calculus and the alternating-time mu-calculus (such as alternating-time
temporal logic ATL), as well as probabilistic and monotone fixpoint logics. We
give a generic proof of completeness of the Kozen-Park axiomatization for such
flat coalgebraic fixpoint logics.Comment: Short version appeared in Proc. 21st International Conference on
Concurrency Theory, CONCUR 2010, Vol. 6269 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer, 2010, pp. 524-53
A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax
In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his
1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of
problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a
[standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be
created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and
problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative
extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical
predicate calculus QC.
The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a
pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying
posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation
translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto
QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal
propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment,
identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic
modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel -
and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type
theories.
The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the
axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual
interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation
(incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof
interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two
interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC
neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a
simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic
Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?
The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and
their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many
areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status,
and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic
view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical
and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about
their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering
complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic
absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of
logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the
impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep
logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open,
modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on
his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and
Alonso, E., 201
Complete Additivity and Modal Incompleteness
In this paper, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story
weaves together a paper of van Benthem, `Syntactic aspects of modal
incompleteness theorems,' and a longstanding open question: whether every
normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal
algebras, or as we call them, V-BAOs. Using a first-order reformulation of the
property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in
van Benthem's paper resolves the open question in the negative. In addition,
for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring
logic that is incomplete with respect to V-BAOs, namely the provability logic
GLB. We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such
algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional
calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a
syntactically defined logic is V-complete. After these results, we generalize
the Blok Dichotomy to degrees of V-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van
Benthem's theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness
Probabilistic justification logic
We present a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, as a framework for uncertain reasoning about rational belief, degrees of belief and justifications. We establish soundness and strong completeness for PPJ with respect to the class of so-called measurable Kripke-like models and show that the satisfiability problem is decidable. We discuss how PPJ provides insight into the well-known lottery paradox
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