Précurseur et outsider. Le ‘retour’ de Maïmonide dans l’historiographie philosophique et en philosophie aux XIXe et XXe siècles

La riscoperta dell'opera filosofica di Maimonide, la Guida dei Perplessi, da parte degli storici della filosofia ebraica all'interno del movimento della scienza dell'ebraismo durante il diciannovesimo secolo – riscoperta che è parallela alla creazione da parte degli stessi studiosi del mito dell' "epoca d'oro dell'ebraismo medievale" in Spagna – influenzò in maniera decisiva lo sviluppo della storiografia filosofica nella Germania e nella Francia del diciannovesimo secolo, così come anche l'opera e il pensiero di alcune delle maggiori figure della filosofia ebraica del ventesimo secolo: Hermann Cohen e Leo Strauss. Maimonide (1138-1204), copnosciuto anche come Rambam grazie all'acronimo ebraico, è uno dei filosofi medievali riconosciuti dalla storiografia filosofica moderna come precursori e allo stesso tempo "outsiders" della ragione moderna nella storia del suo sviluppo. Tale condizione fa di Maimonide un tassello fondamentale di questa storia, come l'articolo all'interno di questo volume ha ampiamente dimostrato.The rediscovery of Maimonides’ philosophical masterpiece, the Guide of the Perplexed, by the German-Jewish scholars of the Science of Judaism in the nineteenth century – a rediscovery which paralleled the creation, by those same scholars, of the myth of a “Golden Age of Judaism in Spain” – was to strongly influence the development of philosophical historiography in nineteenth-century Germany and France, as well as the work of major twentieth-century Jewish philosophers such as Hermann Cohen and Leo Strauss. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1138-1204), also known by his Hebrew acronym as the Rambam, is one of the medieval philosophers regarded by modern philosophical historiography as having been both forerunners of modern reason and, at the same time, “outsiders” in the history of its development

What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?

Translation from German to English by Daniel Fidel Ferrer What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? German title: "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" Published: October 1786, Königsberg in Prussia, Germany. By Immanuel Kant (Born in 1724 and died in 1804) Translation into English by Daniel Fidel Ferrer (March, 17, 2014). The day of Holi in India in 2014. From 1774 to about 1800, there were three intense philosophical and theological controversies underway in Germany, namely: Fragments Controversy, the Pantheism Controversy, and the Atheism Controversy. Kant’s essay translated here is Kant’s respond to the Pantheism Controversy. During this period (1770-1800), there was the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Urge (stress)) movement with thinkers like Johann Hamann, Johann Herder, Friedrich Schiller, and Johann Goethe; who were against the cultural movement of the Enlightenment (Aufklärung). Kant was on the side of Enlightenment (see his Answer the Question: What is Enlightenment? 1784). What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? / By Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). [Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? English]

Bibliografia sobre la història dels jueus de la Corona de Catalunya-Aragó i Provença: 1985-1994

Aquesta bibliografia pretén restablir per a d'investigador els lligams històrics que uniren l'antiga Provença amb les terres catalanes i aragoneses, unides en aquells temps per tota mena de lligams polítics, culturals i lingüístics. Provença i la Corona de Catalunya-Aragó tenien una població jueva des de temps antics, molt activa en el comerç i les finances, i que generà poderosos moviments culturals i religiosos. Aquesta bibliografia aplega tots els llibres i articles publicats entre 1985 i 1994 en els principals països on es conreen els estudis hebraics. La llista conté un miler de referències, ordenades per ordre alfabètic i numerades. Aquests números són utilitzats posteriorment en tres llistes que ofereixen aquest material bibliogràfic classificat per noms geogràfics, noms d'individus i temes

Philosophy and Exegesis in al-Fârâbî, Averroes, and Maimonides

À plusieurs égards, il est vrai d’avancer que Maïmonide et Averroès poursuivent le même projet philosophique et religieux. D’autant plus que tous deux ont été décrits comme des disciples d’al-Fârâbî, le fondateur de l’école de l’aristotélisme arabe (falsafa). Cependant, à première vue, leur oeuvre ne pouvait pas être moins ressemblante : Averroès n’a écrit presque exclusivement que des commentaires sur Aristote, cependant que Maïmonide n’est l’auteur d’aucune oeuvre qui appartienne à un genre philosophique dans le sens strict. Il est, d’un autre côté, un commentateur distingué lui aussi — sauf qu’il n’explique pas Aristote, mais commente et met de l’ordre dans la Loi de Moïse. La question principale dont je traite dans cet article, est celle de savoir si ce rapport tellement différent à la philosophie et à l’exégèse chez Averroès et Maïmonide peut être compris comme deux façons d’implémenter le cadre conceptuel établi par al-Fârâbî. Je commence par examiner le projet d’al-Fârâbî, que j’essaie d’expliquer par deux objectifs : reprendre et continuer le projet de la philosophie antique et définir sa place dans une société, dans laquelle l’autorité de la Loi divine n’est pas mise en question. Ensuite, je montre que, tandis que l’oeuvre d’Averroès peut être comprise, dans l’ensemble, comme une continuation du projet d’al-Fârâbî, cela n’est pas vrai de la même façon pour l’oeuvre de Maïmonide qui en partie transforme al-Fârâbî de manière créative et en partie utilise des prémisses dont on ne trouvera pas la source en al-Fârâbî. La position de Maïmonide en ce qui concerne la philosophie et l’exégèse se distingue significativement de la position habituelle adoptée par les falâsifa, ce qui a eu des conséquences importantes pour la philosophie juive médiévale après Maïmonide.Maimonides and Averroes shared in many respects a philosophical-religious outlook and have been described as disciples of al-Fârâbî, the founder of the school of Arabic Aristotelianism (falsafa). At first view, however, their legacy could hardly be more different : while Averroes wrote almost only commentaries on Aristotle, Maimonides did not write a single work that, strictly speaking, falls into a traditional philosophical genre. He is, on the other hand, a prominent commentator as well — only that instead of explicating Aristotle, he comments on the Law of Moses. The main question I address in this paper is whether this strikingly different relation to philosophy and exegesis in Averroes and Maimonides can be explained as two ways of implementing a conceptual framework established by al-Fârâbî. I first examine al-Fârâbî’s project, which I suggest is determined by a twofold task : to take up and continue the project of ancient philosophy and to define its place in a society in which the authority of the divine Law is undisputed. Then I argue that while Averroes’ work can on the whole be understood as continuing al-Fârâbî’s project, this is only in a qualified way true for Maimonides who in part creatively transforms al-Fârâbî and in part relies on premises that can clearly not be derived from al-Fârâbî. Maimonides’ position on philosophy and exegesis is in important respects different from the standard position of the falâsifa — and this had far-reaching implications for later medieval Jewish philosophy

On the Emotional Appeal of the Inorganic

What the Surrealists admired in commodity culture was its tendency to confuse the natural with the artificial, the animate with the in-animate - as in Walter Benjamin's notorious concept of the 'sex-appeal of the inorganic'. A futher corollary of this view - the shock value of kitsch - has been the potential for regarding kitsch as somehow morbid or anxiety-inducing; Mike Kelley proposed such a reading in his curatorial project on 'The Uncanny'. This paper will address Disney's cartoon films of the 1930s both in their immediate historical context (specifically in relation to the Surrealists' flirtation with commodity culture) and from the vantage-point of a contemporary epoch informed by post-modern convulsions of taste. The willfully eccentric proposition - Disney as anti-aesthetic- will provide the basis to interrogate the sublime dimension of a morbidly sentimental commodity form

Una tipología de las concepciones del intelecto en Kant y Maimon, así como su conexión con el problema del acosmismo

A partir de la idea kantiana de un tipo de entendimiento diferente al del ser humano en cuanto ente racional finito, se busca rastrear el impacto generado por la idea de “otros tipos de conocimiento” en el debate poskantiano. Para ello, se acude a la recepción que Maimon hace de Kant, la cual se proyecta en la idea de un “entendimiento infinito” en cuanto “otro tipo” de conocer. Con esto se busca, por un lado, atender a la posición filosófica de Maimon discutiendo con lo que, por una serie de malentendidos, se ha establecido como su posición “genuina”. Por otro lado, se analizan las consecuencias que obtiene Maimon en su apropiación de la filosofía trascendental, por lo que hace a la relación entre sensibilidad y entendimiento, justamente allí donde la idea de un entendimiento infinito se pone como idea regulativa

Fichte and Schelling: The Limitations of the Wissenschaftslehre?

In 1800 Fichte and Schelling began a correspondence in which they frankly addressed their philosophical differences,1 each alleging irreparable defects in the other's system and misunderstandings of their own. Their closing exchange in 1802, after which all direct communication between the two men ceased and mutual criticism became a feature of their published writings, brought to an end what had been originally and officially, ever since 1794, a relationship of philosophical cooperation, a common radical progressive front in the Kantian aftermath, confronting a single set of critics. Concerning one thing at least, they remained in agreement: the doctrine which defines in bold their philosophical opposition is that of the reality of Nature, denied by Fichte and affirmed by Schelling. The disagreement is however by no means self-explanatory, for what it means to grant or deny Nature's reality is not, after Kant, a straightforward matter – Fichte is no Berkeleyan idealist and Schelling no Lockeian realist – and a lengthy route needs to be taken in order to understand how it evolved from what had been, to all appearances, a common post-Kantian starting point. The first two parts of my discussion trace accordingly the history of their philosophical relationship, with close attention to Schelling's earliest published works, often referred to as comprising the 'Fichtean' period in his development. The third reviews the systematic ground of their disagreement