Legal Protection of Trade Secrets over the Potential Disposal of Trade Secrets Under the Re-Engineering Precautions

The Indonesian Trade Secrets Law Number 30/2000 (ITS Law) postulates exemptions for acts that are not considered infringements to protect trade secrets. One of them is the reverse engineering of other people’s trade secrets. The problem is that the ITS Law does not limit the extent to which reverse engineering can be justified. The absence of these limitations also allows attempts to disclose trade secrets under the pretext of reverse engineering. This problem ultimately results in the absence of legal certainty for the protection against trade secret disclosure, which is the sole responsibility of the trade secret owner. This article aims to re-analyze the protection provided by the ITS Law and examine the extent to which the limitations on reverse engineering can be justified in the ITS Law. This article used normative juridical research methods combined with statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. It revealed a paradox in the protection of trade secrets against the possibility of trade secret disclosure. This article concluded that changes are necessary to the ITS Law, specifically by adjusting to the basic principles of IPR protection, limiting the extent to which the reverse engineering of other people’s trade secrets can be justified, and adding a “Good Faith” clause in performing reverse engineering actions

Reverse Engineering Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: An Argument in Favor of a Value-Added Approach

The purpose of this note is to question whether the SCPA reverse engineering exception adequately protects the rights of chip owners while allowing competitors to develop compatible products. This note concludes that the SCPA reverse engineering exception falls short of providing meaningful protection. The note also concludes that a value-added approach to the reverse engineering exception is superior to the existing approach (which is too closely allied with copyright law and fosters lengthy and expensive litigation). Part III is a discussion of the practice of reverse engineering in general and under the SCPA. Part IV, using Atari v. Nintendo as a factual basis, analyzes reverse engineering in the compatible computer products industry. Subsection A of Part IV reviews the facts of Atari v. Nintendo, and Subsection B analyzes the decision which was argued and decided under copyright law. Subsection C of Part IV analyzes the Atari v. Nintendo fact situation under the SCPA reverse engineering exception. Part V reviews a proposed alternative to the existing SCPA and applies the alternative to the Atari v. Nintendo fact situation

Column: File Cabinet Forensics

Researchers can spend their time reverse engineering, performing reverse analysis, or making substantive contributions to digital forensics science. Although work in all of these areas is important, it is the scientific breakthroughs that are the most critical for addressing the challenges that we face. Reverse Engineering is the traditional bread-and-butter of digital forensics research. Companies like Microsoft and Apple deliver computational artifacts (operating systems, applications and phones) to the commercial market. These artifacts are bought and used by billions. Some have evil intent, and (if society is lucky), the computers end up in the hands of law enforcement. Unfortunately the original vendors rarely provide digital forensics tools that make their systems amenable to analysis by law enforcement. Hence the need for reverse engineering

UD School of Law Presents Symposium on Law and Technology

News release announces that the University of Dayton School of Law symposium on Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Software

Economic Espionage Act--Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, The

The publicity surrounding[...] incidents of industrial espionage resulted in a push for federal protections. In response to this pressure from U.S. industries, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ( EEA ). The EEA protects trade secrets through the use of federal criminal sanctions. The EEA\u27s provisions are introduced in Part I. Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property. Therefore, a basic understanding of intellectual property law is important to an analysis of the EEA. Part II of this Article provides an overview of the various forms of intellectual property. To be effective, the EEA must complement existing intellectual property jurisprudence. Yet, on its face the EEA prohibits practices that are otherwise lawful as part of a reverse engineering program. Part II of this Article also describes reverse engineering and examines its acceptance in each area of intellectual property law. Understanding the EEA in terms of the other forms of intellectual property protection and the practice of reverse engineering raises some concerns over the prudence of vigorous EEA enforcement. A strict reading of the EEA may prohibit reverse engineering. Since reverse engineering plays a significant role in the exploitation of knowledge committed to the public domain through the grant of patents and copyrights, prohibiting reverse engineering may stifle the drive to study and improve upon the existing knowledge base. Part III of this Article examines these concerns. The increasing importance of intellectual property in the world economy has created a trend toward criminalization of infringement. In addition to the acts covered by the EEA, some international agreements require criminal sanctions for infringement of various rights, certain acts of copyright infringement carry criminal penalties, and Congress is currently considering the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act. While these laws are designed to protect intellectual property, the inclusion of criminal sanctions means that they must be analyzed in light of criminal law theories such as notice, vagueness, and leniency. As this trend continues, and prosecutions under these new laws become more frequent, it will be important for criminal practitioners to have a firm grasp of intellectual property concepts and for intellectual property attorneys to understand the importance of criminal law. Finally, it is important for Congress to consider such criminal law issues when enacting new intellectual property legislation. A discussion of these issues with respect to the EEA provides a framework for developing this discussion with respect to other intellectual property laws. To assist in determining the legitimacy of these concerns, Part I also examines the legislative history of the EEA to ascertain congressional intent with respect to the identified problems. Based upon the issues raised in Part III, Part IV proposes a solution to address these concerns while maintaining the effectiveness of the EEA in fulfilling its intended purpose. Specifically, the Article proposes amending the EEA to explicitly allow reverse engineering and to limit its application to espionage activities similar to those Congress had in mind when drafting the Act

Economic Espionage Act--Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, The

The publicity surrounding[...] incidents of industrial espionage resulted in a push for federal protections. In response to this pressure from U.S. industries, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ( EEA ). The EEA protects trade secrets through the use of federal criminal sanctions. The EEA\u27s provisions are introduced in Part I. Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property. Therefore, a basic understanding of intellectual property law is important to an analysis of the EEA. Part II of this Article provides an overview of the various forms of intellectual property. To be effective, the EEA must complement existing intellectual property jurisprudence. Yet, on its face the EEA prohibits practices that are otherwise lawful as part of a reverse engineering program. Part II of this Article also describes reverse engineering and examines its acceptance in each area of intellectual property law. Understanding the EEA in terms of the other forms of intellectual property protection and the practice of reverse engineering raises some concerns over the prudence of vigorous EEA enforcement. A strict reading of the EEA may prohibit reverse engineering. Since reverse engineering plays a significant role in the exploitation of knowledge committed to the public domain through the grant of patents and copyrights, prohibiting reverse engineering may stifle the drive to study and improve upon the existing knowledge base. Part III of this Article examines these concerns. The increasing importance of intellectual property in the world economy has created a trend toward criminalization of infringement. In addition to the acts covered by the EEA, some international agreements require criminal sanctions for infringement of various rights, certain acts of copyright infringement carry criminal penalties, and Congress is currently considering the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act. While these laws are designed to protect intellectual property, the inclusion of criminal sanctions means that they must be analyzed in light of criminal law theories such as notice, vagueness, and leniency. As this trend continues, and prosecutions under these new laws become more frequent, it will be important for criminal practitioners to have a firm grasp of intellectual property concepts and for intellectual property attorneys to understand the importance of criminal law. Finally, it is important for Congress to consider such criminal law issues when enacting new intellectual property legislation. A discussion of these issues with respect to the EEA provides a framework for developing this discussion with respect to other intellectual property laws. To assist in determining the legitimacy of these concerns, Part I also examines the legislative history of the EEA to ascertain congressional intent with respect to the identified problems. Based upon the issues raised in Part III, Part IV proposes a solution to address these concerns while maintaining the effectiveness of the EEA in fulfilling its intended purpose. Specifically, the Article proposes amending the EEA to explicitly allow reverse engineering and to limit its application to espionage activities similar to those Congress had in mind when drafting the Act

Conspiracy Theory

Over one-quarter of all federal criminal prosecutions and a large number of state cases involve prosecutions for conspiracy. Yet, the major scholarly articles and the bulk of prominent jurists have roundly condemned the doctrine. This Article offers a functional justification for the legal prohibition against conspiracy, centering on psychological and economic accounts. Advances in psychology over the past thirty years have demonstrated that groups cultivate a special social identity. This identity often encourages risky behavior, leads individuals to behave against their self-interest, solidifies loyalty, and facilitates harm against non-members. So, too, economists have developed sophisticated explanations for why firms promote efficiency, leading to new theories in corporate law. These insights can be reverse-engineered to make conspiracies operate less efficiently. In reverse-engineering corporate-law principles and introducing lessons from psychology, a rich account of how government should approach conspiracy begins to unfold. In particular, law enforcement strives to prevent conspiracies from forming by imposing high up-front penalties for joiners but uses mechanisms to harvest information from those who have joined and decide to cooperate with the government. Traditional conspiracy doctrines such as Pinkerton liability and the exclusion from merger not only further cooperation agreements, they also make conspiracies more difficult to create and maintain by forcing them to adopt bundles of inefficient practices. The possibility of defection forces the syndicate to use expensive monitoring of its employees for evidence of possible collusion with the government. Mechanisms for defection also break down trust within the group and prime members to think that others are acting out of self-interest. The Article concludes by offering a variety of refinements to conspiracy law that will help destabilize trust within the conspiracy, cue the defection of conspirators, and permit law enforcement to extract more information from them