302,344 research outputs found

    To Work or Not? Simulating Inspection Game with Labor Unions

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    The model of social network is used to analyze the impact of the power of labor unions in the labor relations. We find that labor union capable to affect a pecuniary compensation of shirking employees lessens the motivation of employees to work and improve to the unionization rate. As a result, the performance of the firm is significantly deteriorated and its existence endangered. On the other hand, the inspection proved to be a successful method for “motivating” employees to work. By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the cost of that non-omniscience, which proved to be significant in all cases.social networks, inspection game, evolutionary games

    The Genesis and Self-Reliance of Indonesian Local Game Developers as the National Creative Workers in Contemporary Indonesia

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    This study examines the contemporary condition of Indonesian local game developers as a part of the national creative workers. The case study method is applied in parallel with the participant’s observation and the results were retrieved by exploring and comparing interviews and observation findings. The subjects of this study include state-related ministries (The Ministry of Manpower and The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy), 12 founders of the Indonesian first-generation local game developer studios, 10 experienced local game workers, and two representatives of the Indonesian Game Association as a labor union. The results figured out the characteristics of Indonesian local game developers as youth-subcultural movements and recent challenges of state patronage, incentives, and human resource issues. The situation forced them to survive and organize a supportive labor union as a major incubator platform and crowdfunding scheme in developing local games

    Analyzing the Determinants of the Matching Public School Teachers to Jobs: Estimating Compensating Differentials in Imperfect Labor Markets

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    Although there is growing recognition of the contribution of teachers to students' educational outcomes, there are large gaps in our understanding of how teacher labor markets function. Most research on teacher labor markets use models developed for the private sector. However, markets for public school teachers differ in fundamental ways from those in the private sector. Collective bargaining and public decision making processes set teacher salaries. Thus it is unlikely that wages adjust quickly to equilibrate the supply and demand for worker and job attributes. The objective of this paper is to develop and estimate a model that more accurately characterizes the institutional features of teacher labor markets. The approach is based on a game-theoretic two-sided matching model and the estimation strategy employs the method of simulated moments. With this combination, we are able to estimate how factors affect the choices of individual teachers and hiring authorities, as well as how these choices interact to determine the equilibrium allocation of teachers across jobs. Even though this paper focuses on worker-job match within teacher labor markets, many of the issues raised and the empirical framework employed are relevant in other settings where wages are set administratively or, more generally, do not clear the pertinent markets for job and worker attributes.

    Lyapunov Stability in an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market

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    In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided

    Lyapunov Stability in an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market

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    In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided

    Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market

    Get PDF
    In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided

    The Socratic Method and The Alienation of Women in Philosophy

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    The Socratic Method has been the choice way to do philosophy for as long as philosophy has existed as a discipline. This method is aggressive and hierarchical, two traits that due to the semantics of engendered language alienate and exclude women. This alienation happens inevitably when the choice is presented to play the “game” that is the argumentative discipline of philosophy or not. When women chose to play the game, they are alienated from themselves. Philosophy is a highly universal and analytical discipline, that often does not allow for first-person narrative or philosophy done through the body, which is something that empowers most women. This means that women must do work they may not value, and in a Marxist sense are alienated from the product of their labor. If women do not play “the game” they are often excluded from the discipline through a lack of interaction with others and diminished opportunities due to the nature of their work. I proffer that this can be solved by changing how we define philosophy and philosophical success within the discipline

    The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market

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    Online labor markets have great potential as platforms for conducting experiments, as they provide immediate access to a large and diverse subject pool and allow researchers to conduct randomized controlled trials. We argue that online experiments can be just as valid---both internally and externally---as laboratory and field experiments, while requiring far less money and time to design and to conduct. In this paper, we first describe the benefits of conducting experiments in online labor markets; we then use one such market to replicate three classic experiments and confirm their results. We confirm that subjects (1) reverse decisions in response to how a decision-problem is framed, (2) have pro-social preferences (value payoffs to others positively), and (3) respond to priming by altering their choices. We also conduct a labor supply field experiment in which we confirm that workers have upward sloping labor supply curves. In addition to reporting these results, we discuss the unique threats to validity in an online setting and propose methods for coping with these threats. We also discuss the external validity of results from online domains and explain why online results can have external validity equal to or even better than that of traditional methods, depending on the research question. We conclude with our views on the potential role that online experiments can play within the social sciences, and then recommend software development priorities and best practices
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