Isabelle Modelchecking for insider threats

The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analysing Insider threats in infrastructures including physical and logical aspects. However, the abstract Isabelle models need some refinement to provide sufficient detail to explore attacks constructively and understand how the attacker proceeds. The introduction of mutable states into the model leads us to use the concepts of Modelchecking within Isabelle. Isabelle can simply accommodate classical CTL type Modelchecking. We integrate CTL Modelchecking into the Isabelle Insider framework. A running example of an IoT attack on privacy motivates the method throughout and illustrates how the enhanced framework fully supports realistic modeling and analysis of IoT Insiders

Representing Isabelle in LF

LF has been designed and successfully used as a meta-logical framework to represent and reason about object logics. Here we design a representation of the Isabelle logical framework in LF using the recently introduced module system for LF. The major novelty of our approach is that we can naturally represent the advanced Isabelle features of type classes and locales. Our representation of type classes relies on a feature so far lacking in the LF module system: morphism variables and abstraction over them. While conservative over the present system in terms of expressivity, this feature is needed for a representation of type classes that preserves the modular structure. Therefore, we also design the necessary extension of the LF module system.Comment: In Proceedings LFMTP 2010, arXiv:1009.218

Isabelle Modelchecking for insider threats

The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analysing Insider threats in infrastructures including physical and logical aspects. However, the abstract Isabelle models need some refinement to provide sufficient detail to explore attacks constructively and understand how the attacker proceeds. The introduction of mutable states into the model leads us to use the concepts of Modelchecking within Isabelle. Isabelle can simply accommodate classical CTL type Modelchecking. We integrate CTL Modelchecking into the Isabelle Insider framework. A running example of an IoT attack on privacy motivates the method throughout and illustrates how the enhanced framework fully supports realistic modeling and analysis of IoT Insiders

Isabelle Modelchecking for insider threats

The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analysing Insider threats in infrastructures including physical and logical aspects. However, the abstract Isabelle models need some refinement to provide sufficient detail to explore attacks constructively and understand how the attacker proceeds. The introduction of mutable states into the model leads us to use the concepts of Modelchecking within Isabelle. Isabelle can simply accommodate classical CTL type Modelchecking. We integrate CTL Modelchecking into the Isabelle Insider framework. A running example of an IoT attack on privacy motivates the method throughout and illustrates how the enhanced framework fully supports realistic modeling and analysis of IoT Insiders

Explanation by automated reasoning using the Isabelle Infrastructure framework

In this paper, we propose the use of interactive the- orem proving for explainable machine learning. After presenting our proposition, we illustrate it on the dedicated application of explaining security attacks using the Isabelle Infrastructure framework and its process of dependability engineering. This formal framework and process provides the logics for specifi- cation and modeling. Attacks on security of the system are ex- plained by specification and proofs in the Isabelle Infrastructure framework. Existing case studies of dependability engineering in Isabelle are used as feasibility studies to illustrate how different aspects of explanations are covered by the Isabelle Infrastructure framework

Using the isabelle ontology framework: Linking the formal with the informal

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this recordWhile Isabelle is mostly known as part of Isabelle/HOL (an interactive theorem prover), it actually provides a framework for developing a wide spectrum of applications. A particular strength of the Isabelle framework is the combination of text editing, formal verification, and code generation. Up to now, Isabelle’s document preparation system lacks a mechanism for ensuring the structure of different document types (as, e.g., required in certification processes) in general and, in particular, mechanism for linking informal and formal parts of a document. In this paper, we present Isabelle/DOF, a novel Document Ontology Framework on top of Isabelle. Isabelle/DOF allows for conventional typesetting as well as formal development. We show how to model document ontologies inside Isabelle/DOF, how to use the resulting meta-information for enforcing a certain document structure, and discuss ontology-specific IDE support

Formalization of the fundamental group in untyped set theory using auto2

We present a new framework for formalizing mathematics in untyped set theory using auto2. Using this framework, we formalize in Isabelle/FOL the entire chain of development from the axioms of set theory to the definition of the fundamental group for an arbitrary topological space. The auto2 prover is used as the sole automation tool, and enables succinct proof scripts throughout the project.Comment: 17 pages, accepted for ITP 201

Modeling and analyzing the Corona-virus warning app with the Isabelle infrastructure framework

We provide a model in the Isabelle Infrastructure framework of the recently published German Corona-virus warning app (CWA). The app supports breaking infection chains by informing users whether they have been in close contact to an infected person. The app has a decentralized architecture that supports anonymity of users. We provide a formal model of the existing app with the Isabelle Infrastructure framework to show up some natural attacks in a very abstract model. We then use the security refinement process of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework to highlight how the use of continuously changing Ephemeral Ids (EphIDs) improves the anonymity

Modeling and verification of insider threats using logical analysis

In this paper we combine formal modeling and analysis of infrastructures of organisations with sociological explanation to provide a framework for insider threat analysis. We use the Higher Order Logic proof assistant Isabelle/HOL to support this framework. In the formal model, we exhibit and use a common trick from the formal verification of security protocols showing that it is applicable to insider threats. We introduce briefly a three step process of social explanation illustrating that it can be applied fruitfully to the characterisation of insider threats. We introduce the Insider theory constructed in Isabelle that implements this process of social explanation. To validate that the social explanation is generally useful for the analysis of insider threats and to demonstrate our framework, we model and verify the insider threat patterns Entitled Independent and Ambitious Leader in our Isabelle/HOL framework