Intellectual property: the global spread of a legal concept

Although intellectual property law is a distinctively Western, modern, and relatively young body of law, it has spread all over the world, now encompassing all but a very few outsiders such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Vanuatu. This article presents three legal transfers that contributed to this development: first, from real property in land and movables to intellectual property in the late 18th century in Western Europe; second, from Western Europe, in particular from the United Kingdom and France to the rest of the world during the colonial era in the 19th and early 20th century; third, from the protection of new knowledge to the protection of traditional knowledge, held by indigenous communities in developing countries, on 5 August 1963. This story illuminates how legal transfers in a broad sense – including, but not limited to legal transplants - drive the evolution of law

Annoyancetech Vigilante Torts and Policy

The twenty-first century has ushered in demand by some Americans for annoyancetech devices—novel electronic gadgets that secretly fend off, punish, or comment upon perceived antisocial and annoying behaviors of others. Manufacturers, marketers, and users of certain annoyancetech devices, however, face potential tort liability for personal and property damages suffered by the targets of this “revenge by gadget.” Federal, state, and local policymakers should start the process of coming to pragmatic terms with the troubling rise in the popularity of annoyancetech devices. This is an area of social policy that cries out for thoughtful and creative legislative solutions

How Economies Grow: The CED Perspective on Raising the Long-Term Standard of Living

This report ties together CED's previous six decades of work on various policies that concern the nation's prospects for economic growth to outline how the economy grows and, more generally, what must be done to improve its long-term prospects

Analyzing the Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneurship Education

We review and synthesize the burgeoning literature on institutions and agents engaged in the commercialization of university-based intellectual property. These studies indicate that institutional incentives and organizational practices both play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of technology transfer. We conclude that university technology transfer should be considered from a strategic perspective. Institutions that choose to stress the entrepreneurial dimension of technology transfer need to address skill deficiencies in technology transfer offices (TTOs), reward systems that are inconsistent with enhanced entrepreneurial activity, and education/training for faculty members, post-docs, and graduate students relating to interactions with entrepreneurs. Business schools at these universities can play a major role in addressing these skill and educational deficiencies, through the delivery of targeted programs to technology licensing officers and members of the campus community wishing to launch startup firms.

You can patent that? Are patents on computer programs and business methods good for the new economy?

In other parts of the economy, firms are increasingly turning to patents to protect not just physical inventions but more abstract ones such as computer programs or ways of doing business. Just two decades ago such patents would have been impossible to obtain, let alone enforce. In "You Can Patent That? Are Patents on Computer Programs and Business Methods Good for the New Economy?" Bob Hunt describes the changes in patent law that have given rise to this phenomenon.Patents ; Computers

What\u27s It Worth to Keep a Secret?

This article is the first major study of protection and valuation of trade secrets under federal criminal law. Trade secrecy is more important than ever as an economic complement and substitute for other intellectual property protections, particularly patents. Accordingly, U.S. public policy correctly places a growing emphasis on characterizing the scope of trade secrets, creating incentives for their productive use, and imposing penalties for their theft. Yet amid this complex ecosystem of legal doctrine, economic policy, commercial strategy, and enforcement, there is little research or consensus on how to assign value to trade secrets. One reason for this gap is that intangible assets in general are notoriously difficult to value, and trade secrecy by its opaque nature is ill-suited to the market-signaling mechanisms that offer at least some traction in other forms of valuation. Another reason is that criminal trade secret law is relatively young, and the usual corrective approaches to valuation in civil trade secrecy are not synonymous with the greater distributive concerns of criminal law. To begin to fill this gap, we examine over a decade of trade secret protection and valuation under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act of 1996. From original data on EEA prosecutions, we show that trade secret valuations are lognormally distributed as predicted by Gibrat’s Law, with valuations typically low on the order of $5 million but reaching as high as$250 million. There is no notable difference among estimates from various valuation methods, but a difference between high and low estimates on one hand and the sentencing estimates on the other. These findings suggest that the EEA has not been used to its full capacity, a conclusion buttressed by recent Congressional actions to strengthen the EEA

What's it worth to keep a secret?

This article is the first major study of protection and valuation of trade secrets under federal criminal law. Trade secrecy is more important than ever as an economic complement and substitute for other intellectual property protections, particularly patents. Accordingly, U.S. public policy correctly places a growing emphasis on characterizing the scope of trade secrets, creating incentives for their productive use, and imposing penalties for their theft. Yet amid this complex ecosystem of legal doctrine, economic policy, commercial strategy, and enforcement, there is little research or consensus on how to assign value to trade secrets. One reason for this gap is that intangible assets in general are notoriously difficult to value, and trade secrecy by its opaque nature is ill-suited to the market-signaling mechanisms that offer at least some traction in other forms of valuation. Another reason is that criminal trade secret law is relatively young, and the usual corrective approaches to valuation in civil trade secrecy are not synonymous with the greater distributive concerns of criminal law. To begin to fill this gap, we examine over a decade of trade secret protection and valuation under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act of 1996. From original data on EEA prosecutions, we show that trade secret valuations are lognormally distributed as predicted by Gibrat’s Law, with valuations typically low on the order of $5 million but reaching as high as$250 million. There is no notable difference among estimates from various valuation methods, but a difference between high and low estimates on one hand and the sentencing estimates on the other. These findings suggest that the EEA has not been used to its full capacity, a conclusion buttressed by recent Congressional actions to strengthen the EEA

"Government Deficits, Liquidity Preference, and Schumpeterian Innovation"

Wray asserts that rigorous analyses of the role played by innovation in economic development must acknowledge the contribution of Joseph Schumpeter. However, the author suggests that the current stagnation confronting most developed, capitalist economies "cannot be understood without synthesizing Schumpeter's insights with those of Kalecki and Keynes." Hence, Schumpeter's work alone is inadequate in explaining the links between government deficits in ensuring aggregate demand and corporate profits.

It\u27s Time for a Good Hard Look in the Mirror: The Corporate Law Example

This Article asserts that the move from the industrial age to the information age represents a fundamental change to our society on such a widespread basis that the legal order must reexamine the premises about how our society functions, assessing whether foundational elements of U.S. Common Law remain valid. This Article first confronts briefly the continuing acceptance of certain foundational premises in contract and intellectual property law, illustrating that such premises are no longer supported by the realities of modern society. With fundamental change challenging multiple areas of law in the information age, this problem is worthy of widespread inquiry by legal scholars in various fields. This Article then turns to a detailed analysis of the premises supporting shareholder primacy in corporate law, demonstrating that the historic justifications for allocations of ownership, control and duties no longer support these premises. Based on the relative needs of today’s businesses vis-à-vis the contributions of various other constituencies, this Article asserts that employees should also have certain duties owed to them. This Article concludes with a novel model for creating such a stake in the form of a springing right to profit sharing