Online Auctions

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

Factors affecting the adoption of online auctions by internet users in Hong Kong

This is an exploratory empirical study with the aim to identify the factors that affect the adoption of online auctions by Internet users in Hong Kong. The frameworks used were the TAM (Technology Acceptance Model), TCE (Transaction Cost Economics) and SERVQUAL (Service Quality). It was found that the dimensions that affected the customer’s perceived value of the online auction are benefits, costs, risks and service quality. Data was collected from four pilot focus groups, one online survey and a final focus group. The subjects in the focus groups were 21 undergraduates, whereas the subjects in the online survey were 152 internet users. The results of the pilot focus groups guided the design of the online survey. The results of the survey was analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis test. The final focus group was used to seek explanations to some issues arose from the online survey. It was found that the factors in the benefit dimension were liquidity, enjoyment, and price transparency. The factors in the cost dimension were time, effort, service charge and reputation of the user. The factor in the risk dimension was financial risk. The factors in the service quality dimension were efficiency and system availability. The final focus group revealed that the auctioneer’s role in policing the auction web site was important. For differences among the subjects, it was also found that the adult users consider their reputation in auction website, young adults are worried about financial risks, and female users are more concerned about financial risks than male users. The implications of these differences are discussed. The main academic contribution was the development of a questionnaire and a model which can be used in further research about other forms of auction

Trust and Reciprocity in the Market-Based Provision of Public Goods. Experimental Evidence and Applications to Conservation Tenders

Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen (Payments for Ecosystem Services – PES) und auktionsbasierte Vergabeverfahren sind ein wichtiges und innovatives Instrument im Kampf gegen den fortwährenden Verlust von biologischer Vielfalt. Basierend auf einem Vertrag zwischen einem Leistungserbringer und einem öffentlichen oder privaten Leistungsempfänger, der die Naturschutzleistung entlohnt, können bestimmte Vorgaben der Landschaftspflege oder der agrarwirtschaftlichen Bearbeitung verbindlich festgelegt werden. Die Vorteile von PES liegen in dem direkten monetären Anreiz zur Bereitstellung von Naturschutzleistungen und zudem in der Möglichkeit, ein Niveau an Umweltschutz und –qualität jenseits des von der Umweltgesetzgebung sichergestellten Mindestniveaus zu implementieren. Der Nachteil liegt in der hohen Informationsasymmetrie in der Vertragsbeziehung, welche einerseits dem Umweltgut als Vertragsgegenstand und andererseits der Natur ökonomischen Handelns geschuldet ist. Thema dieser Dissertation ist die Analyse der interdependenten Beziehung von Kompetitivität und Vertragserfüllung und das Aufzeigen der Relevanz von Vertrauen und Reziprozität in Verträgen über Umweltgüter. Auf diese Weise leistet sie einen Beitrag zu der umfangreichen und multidisziplinären Literatur über Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen und Naturschutzauktionen. Während der vergangenen 25 Jahre habe Praktiker und Wissenschaftler unser Verständnis der Funktionsweise von Ausschreibungen zur Allokation von Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen konstant verbessert und erweitert. Ein Großteil der Forschungsaktivität war jedoch auf die Auktionsmetrik und das Bieterverhalten gerichtet, wohingegen die resultierende Vertragsbeziehung zwischen Programmverwaltern (den Käufern) und Landbesitzern (den Ausführenden) weitgehend unbeachtet blieb. Wie in dieser Dissertation bewiesen wird, ist jedoch genau diese Beziehung der Schlüssel für ein erfolgreiches marktbasiertes Naturschutzprogramm. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird in drei Artikeln argumentiert, dass Vertrauen und Reziprozität für die Überwindung von asymmetrischer Information in kompetitiv alloziierten PES-Verträgen von herausragender Bedeutung sind. Anhand eines für diese Arbeit entwickelten, zweistufigen experimentellen Testszenarios wird der Entscheidungsprozess in der inversen Auktion und in der anschließenden Vertragserfüllung in der kontrollierten Laborumgebung simuliert. In einem ersten Experiment kann auf Basis dieses Untersuchungsdesigns gezeigt werden, dass die Informations- und Anreizkonstellation in Naturschutzauktionen ein erhöhtes Risiko für vorvertragliche adverse Selektion, opportunistisches Verhalten bei Vertragserfüllung und somit suboptimale Ergebnisse birgt. Das Marktversagen kann jedoch durch eine vertrauensstiftende Institution, wie zum Beispiel Kommunikation zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern, verhindert werden. Persönliche Interaktion veranlasst Marktteilnehmer ihr individuell-rationales Verhalten zugunsten einer sozial-verträglicheren Verhaltensweise zu ändern. Dabei entsteht ein erhebliches Potential für die Bilateralisierung der Vertragsbeziehungen. Ein zweites Experiment verdeutlicht jedoch, wie wichtig vertrauensbasierte Vertragsbeziehungen insbesondere in Bereitstellungsumgebungen sind, die stark von externen, stochastischen Einflüssen verzerrt werden können. Ohne das nötige Vertrauen bricht die Kooperation in einem derartigen Szenario fast vollständig zusammen. Schließlich lässt der systematische Vergleich der Ergebnisse aus beiden Experimenten in einem dritten Aufsatz keinen Zweifel daran, dass stabile Langzeitvertragsbeziehungen in auktionsbasierten Vertragsnaturschutzprogrammen gefördert und nicht verhindert werden sollten. Langzeitverträge sind randomisierten Kurzzeitverträgen aus der Perspektive des Naturschutzes aber auch hinsichtlich der Kosteneffektivität überlegen. Daher liegt eine wesentliche Herausforderung für Programmentwickler darin, einerseits die Bildung von ausreichend Sozialkapital zu ermöglichen und andererseits faire Markt- und Vergabestrukturen zu erhalten

Online Auctions and Social Media

With new forms of technology continually coming out, people have been creating more modern and convenient ways to find and complete tasks, and this leads to new jobs coming to life. In the wake of these changes, online auctions and social media have become more prevalent and have helped small businesses thrive and survive against bigger companies. This thesis examines how online auctions and social media collect information and how it is possible that both systems could be combined to improve both sites and business across both systems, which will affect the overall United States economy. The results show how actually forming this merging would be difficult, but there are possibilities that could lead to both systems becoming one in the future

Tractors on eBay: Differences between Internet and In-Person Auctions

Internet auction platforms are changing the face of transactions in many business sectors, including agriculture. We provide one of the first systematic examinations of the differences between internet and in-person auctions in agricultural input markets. A hedonic model estimated with used tractor transactions from Midwestern sellers pooled between eBay and in-person auctions reveals statistically distinct price surfaces for the two auction venues and predicts significantly lower prices for comparable equipment sold on eBay, though this difference is attenuated for tractors fully covered by eBay's buyer protection program and is fully absent for the most frequently traded tractor. An endogenous venue-selection model reveals that larger, more-valuable tractors are less likely to be offered on eBay, a choice that should enhance seller revenues. Furthermore, sellers in states with more valuable stocks of machinery, more frequent tractor sales, and a lower propensity to use the internet for agricultural marketing are more likely to offer tractors for sale via in-person auctions than on eBay.auctions, electronic commerce, eBay, farm equipment, hedonic models, Marketing, D44, Q13,

The Impact of Reputation and Promotion on Internet Auction Outcomes: Evidence from Huuto.net

Internet auctions have become increasingly popular in the 21st century. However, asymmetric information induced issues, such as the inability to trust the seller and product quality uncertainty, might discourage the buyers' willingness to bid according to their true valuations. In order to alleviate trust issues, sellers are able to build an online reputation through successful online transactions. The purpose of this Master's thesis is to explore the impact of seller's reputation and chosen promotion methods on auction outcomes in Finnish Huuto.net online auction website. The fundamental concepts of auction theory, such as valuation models, the basic four auction types, the revenue equivalence theorem and optimal auctions are introduced. Signaling theory is discussed in addition to the bidding mechanisms and reputation systems of internet auctions. The recent literature considering the impact of a seller's reputation and promotion methods on auction outcomes is reviewed. The hypotheses set to be tested are derived from the recent empirical studies and auction theory. The statistical method used in the tests of hypotheses is multiple linear regression analysis. The dataset analyzed in this study consists of 227 auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB mobile phones posted up for auction by 138 individual sellers. The main finding of this study is that the sellers who have acquired a costless identification from Huuto.net achieve a hefty increase in the final sales price. It also turns out that sellers who have not established an online reputation experience a steep decline in the realized closing price of the auction. The impact of negative feedback is significant as well; the increase of negative feedback points decreases the final sales price. Purchasing display-enhancing promotional options does not increase the price or probability of sale. In short, establishing reputation, avoiding negative feedback and acquiring identification pays off. The promotional options are not worth the cost.fi=Opinnäytetyö kokotekstinä PDF-muodossa.|en=Thesis fulltext in PDF format.|sv=Lärdomsprov tillgängligt som fulltext i PDF-format

Web Auctions in Europe

This paper argues that a better understanding of the business model of web auctions can be reached if we adopt a broader view and provide empirical research from different sites. In this paper the business model of web auctions is refined into four dimensions. These are auction model, motives, exchange processes, and stakeholders. One of the objects of this research is to redefine the blurry concept of the business model by analyzing one business model, the web auction model. We show in this research the complexity and diversity of factors contributing to the success of the web auction model. By generalizing the results to the level of business model we also show how complex and diverse business models can be. Motivated by the lack of empirically grounded justification for the mixed business results of web auctions, this paper adopts a qualitative approach that includes telephone interviews with web auctions developed in different European countries.exchange processes;stakeholders;Web auctions

A Short Introduction to Auctions

Η παρούσα εργασία αποτελεί εισαγωγή στη θεωρία των δημοπρασιών. Παρουσιάζει με σύντομο αλλά περιεκτικό τρόπο την ιστορική εξέλιξη των δημοπρασιών, τις βασικές έννοιες της θεωρίας δημοπρασιών και τα βασικά είδη δημοπρασιών.The present study is an introduction to auction theory. The scope of this dissertation is to give a short and comprehensive, yet complete and accurate, guide on the topic of auctions. From a methodological point of view, an attempt has been made to present both that auctions are relevant in today’s world and economy, and that they can be explained in a simple manner. First, this paper explores the ways auctions have been used and how they have evolved across the ages, and, secondly, it studies the main aspects of auction theory and the most common types of auctions. This paper is directed to students of any level or area of study and to the general public, aiming to inform and raise awareness on the matter of auction theory

Late Bidding, Single Bidding and the Role of Experience in Online Auctions: Evidence from Huuto.net

Online auctions are widely used in sales of collectible items and casual items. This mar-ket is constantly growing due to the growing number of people with access to the inter-net. Even in the newly emerged internet auctions, the traditional auction theory is still providing useful insights into the bidding strategies in auctions with given properties. The question regarding optimal bidding strategy is of interest due to the fact that it pro-vides bidders an edge in competitive markets. Previous studies, which have mostly focused on the eBay-auction model, show that the optimal bidding strategy is to wait until the ending of an auction. These studies also show that there is a tendency to shift towards this strategy while gaining experience as a bidder. However, a closer examination reveals that the strategic advantages of late bid-ding are obsolete in auctions with a soft-close ending rule, such as Huuto.net and Ama-zon. While this has not been previously tested in Huuto.net, empirical results from Am-azon have been as hypothesized. Testing these hypotheses is conducted in this study using similar statistical tests as the previous studies as the methodological approach. The tests are conducted on a data gathered from two product categories in Huuto.net: IPhones and Moomin mugs. This thesis provides a comparative insight into bidding strategies in online auctions with a soft-close ending rule. This study shows that late bidding does not occur in Huuto.net, but in fact quite the opposite. This study shows also that pure single-bidding occurs when a clearer common value component is present, and that the experienced bidders place fewer bids in both product categories.fi=Opinnäytetyö kokotekstinä PDF-muodossa.|en=Thesis fulltext in PDF format.|sv=Lärdomsprov tillgängligt som fulltext i PDF-format

Stand-alone renewable energy auctions: The case of Peru

Electrification policies are crucial to improve the welfare of rural populationsworldwide. In this context, auctions for the deployment of stand-alone solar home systems (SASHS) are an appropriate alternative to facilitate access to electricity in rural areas. The aim of this paper is to analyze the design elements and functioning of the SASHS auction in Peru in order to derive lessons for the effective and efficient design of those auctions. Based on an analytical framework developed elsewhere, this article draws on official documents and data, secondary material and interviews with stakeholders. Our results show that some design elements are particularly suitable in this regard. In contrast to renewable electricity auctions in general, for which the volume auctioned is usually set as capacity (MW) or generation (MWh), the volume of SASHS auctions should be set in terms of the number of SASHS providing an electricity service.Geographical diversity,with different auctions per region, would ensure the adoption of a minimum amount of SASHS in a given geographical area. Financial solvency, but not technical reputation, should be required. Otherwise, only the incumbents would be able to participate in the auction. The choice of technology-specific, price-only, sealed-bid, single-item auctions brings benefits in terms of economies of scale, lower support or transaction costs and a greater transparency or simplicity. A correction factor on the remuneration which accounts for the quality of the service, as applied in the Peru auction, is suitable for this type of auctions. Finally, provision of technical information, which facilitates the participation in the auction, and the implementation of a non-disclosed ceiling price are deemed appropriate. In contrast, given the lowpresence of local companies in the Peruvian PV market, the adoption of local content requirements would lead to higher support costs without significantly increasing the local development potential.The authors would like to acknowledge Mr. Julio Eisman Valdés forhis guidance and support and Mr. Mats Marquardt (Factor) for editingsupport. Dr. Cabeza would like to thank the Catalan Government forthe quality accreditation given to her research group GREiA (2017 SGR1537). GREiA is certified agent TECNIO in the category of technology de-velopers from the Government of Catalonia. This work is partially sup-ported by ICREA under the ICREA Academia progra