ADB–OECD Study on Enhancing Financial Accessibility for SMEs: Lessons from Recent Crises

During the era of global financial uncertainty, stable access to appropriate funding sources has been much harder for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The global financial crisis impacted SMEs and entrepreneurs disproportionately, exacerbating their traditional financing constraints. The financial conditions of many SMEs were weakened by the drop in demand for goods and services and the credit tightening. The sovereign debt crisis that hit several European countries contributed to further deterioration in bank lending activities, which negatively affected private sector development. The global regulatory response to financial crises, such as the Basel Capital Accord, while designed to reduce systemic risks may also constrain bank lending to SMEs. In particular, Basel III requires banks to have tighter risk management as well as greater capital and liquidity. Resulting asset preference and deleveraging of banks, particularly European banks with significant presence in Asia, could limit the availability of funding for SMEs in Asia and the Pacific. Lessons from the recent financial crises have motivated many countries to consider SME access to finance beyond conventional bank credit and to diversify their national financial system. Improving SME access to finance is a policy priority at the country and global level. Poor access to finance is a critical inhibiting factor to the survival and growth potential of SMEs. Financial inclusion is thus key to the development of the SME sector, which is a driver of job creation and social cohesion and takes a pivotal role in scaling up national economies. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have recognized that it is crucial to develop a comprehensive range of policy options on SME finance, including innovative financing models. With this in mind, sharing Asian and OECD experiences on SME financing would result in insightful discussions on improving SME access to finance at a time of global financial uncertainty. Based on intensive discussions in two workshops organized by ADB in Manila on 6–7 March 2013 and by OECD in Paris on 21 October 2013, the two organizations together compiled this study report on enhancing financial accessibility for SMEs, especially focusing on lessons from the past and recent crises in Asia and OECD countries. The report takes a comparative look at ADB and OECD experiences, and aims to identify promising policy solutions for creating an SME base that is resilient to crisis, from a viewpoint of access to finance, and which can help drive growth and development

The future of securitization

Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, and the objective is to restore a “comprehensive incentive alignment”. The toe-hold for strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital requirements

Informational Paradox of external financing

In this paperI develop a model for small and medium enterprises’ external financing. I concentrate on a situation where a firm offering trade credit to his customer applies for a credit at a bank. The effect of a defaulting customer on the borrowing capacity of the supplier has not yet been covered by the litterature. In a contract theroretical more generaly, in a game theoretical framework, there is an informational asymmetry between the lender and the borrower on the credit worthyness of the entrepreneur. In this model, the informational asymmetry leads to moral hazard which results in credit rationing.An optimal contract considering also a possibly defaulting customer generates additional credit rationing. The paper develops two subcases: in the first one the borrower has informational advantage on his customer compared to the creditor, in the second there is not any informatioanl advantage related to the customer. The results show an informational paradox, the informational advantage of the borrower reduces the volume of credit he can receive, while the informational symmetry leads to a higher borrowing capacity.The model decribes a typical situation on the Hungarian market. Banks provide a low volume of credit to SME because the firms’s financial statements and their relationship with their customers is not opac. So the informational disadvantage induces the bank to offer a low level of credit even if the net present value of the financed projects is highly positive.

Trade credit defaults and liquidity provision by firms

Using a unique data set on trade credit defaults among French firms, we investigate whether and how trade credit is used to relax financial constraints. We show that firms that face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are more likely to default on trade credit, especially when the shocks are unexpected, firms have little liquidity, are likely to be credit constrained or are close to their debt capacity. We estimate that credit constrained firms pass more than one fourth of the liquidity shocks they face on to their suppliers down the trade credit chain. The evidence is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate the consequences of credit constraints. In addition, we show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches firms that are large, liquid, and have access to financial markets. This suggests that liquidity is allocated from large firms with access to outside finance to small, credit constrained firms through trade credit chains

Settlement risk under gross and net settlement

Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, we show that net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.Payment systems ; Risk

Competition of the mechanisms : how Chinese home appliance firms coped with default risk of trade credit?

During the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy in 1990s of China, there was a considerable accrual of deferred payment, and default due to inferior enforcement institutions. This is a very common phenomenon in the transition economies at that time. Interviews with home electronics appliance firms revealed that firms coped with this problem by adjusting their sales mechanisms (found four types), and the benefit of institutions was limited. A theoretical analysis claim that spot and integration are inferior to contracts, a contract with a rebate on volume and prepayment against an exclusive agent can realize the lowest cost and price. The empirical part showed that mechanisms converged into a mechanism with the rebate on volume an against exclusive agent and its price level is the lowest. The competition is the driving force of the convergence of mechanisms and improvement risk management capacity.China, Electronic industries, Corporate accounting, Industrial management, Trade credit, Distribution channel strategy, Contract, Convergence of mechanisms

Managing Agricultural Price Risk in Developing Countries

We survey the experience of risk management in developing country agricultural supply chains. We focus on exposure, instruments, impediments to access and developing country futures markets. We draw on lessons from experience over the past two decades.Commodities, Risk Management, Developing Countries

Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries

This review examines portions of the vast literature on rural financial markets and household behavior in the face of risk and uncertainty. We place particular emphasis on studying the important role of financial intermediaries, competition and regulation in shaping the changing structure and organization of rural markets, rather than on household strategies and bilateral contracting. Our goal is to provide a framework within which the evolution of financial intermediation in rural economies can be understood.Rural Finance, Financial Intermediation, Agricultural Credit

Default risk in an interconnected banking system with endogeneous asset markets : [Version: August 2011]

This paper analyzes the emergence of systemic risk in a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets. Given a shock to asset values of one or several banks, systemic risk in the form of multiple bank defaults depends on the strength of balance sheets and asset market liquidity. The price of bank assets on the secondary market is endogenous in the model, thereby relating funding liquidity to expected solvency - an important stylized fact of banking crises. Based on the concept of a system value at risk, Shapley values are used to define the systemic risk charge levied upon individual banks. Using a parallelized simulated annealing algorithm the properties of an optimal charge are derived. Among other things we find that there is not necessarily a correspondence between a bank's contribution to systemic risk - which determines its risk charge - and the capital that is optimally injected into it to make the financial system more resilient to systemic risk. The analysis has policy implications for the design of optimal bank levies. JEL Classification: G01, G18, G33 Keywords: Systemic Risk, Systemic Risk Charge, Systemic Risk Fund, Macroprudential Supervision, Shapley Value, Financial Networ