50 research outputs found

    The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

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    We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n >= 2 oce seeking candidates and runo voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.Downs, Free Entry, Runoff System, Equilibrium

    Aggregate uncertainty, framing effects, and candidate entry

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    This dissertation studies how different voter characteristics and electoral rules affect the incentives and decisions to seek political office. The focus is on generalizing standard approaches to observed differences in the runoff rule and incorporating more accurate descriptions of voter behavior which may not be fully rational. In each chapter, I consider a model of strategic entry by candidates for office in democratic elections. In the first chapter, I incorporate the observed differences in thresholds for first-round victory in a model of runoff elections. The set of equilibria varies substantially with the threshold, indicating that the 50 percent threshold used in most models is not innocuous. The set of equilibria immediately contains equilibria that were thought to exist only under plurality rule, whereas for thresholds above 50 percent, there is no change in the set of equilibria. Additionally, for any threshold under one half, there exist equilibria in which a candidate who loses with certainty still chooses to run. The set of two candidate equilibria is invariant to all thresholds under one third, and the set of multicandidate equilibria is invariant to all thresholds above one half. In the second chapter, I introduce aggregate uncertainty by making candidates unsure of the distribution of voter preferences in the electorate. The set of three candidate equilibria expands and equilibrium platforms become more diverse. This provides a theoretical basis for Duverger’s Hypothesis. Equilibria also feature two common empirical phenomena. For instance, some candidates choose to enter despite losing with certainty in equilibrium. Also, in some equilibria, a Condorcet winning candidate (a candidate who would win every pairwise election) fails to win the election. In the third chapter, I generalize the citizen-candidate model to a multidimensional setting and characterize the set of equilibria. I later incorporate two well-documented violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference in a model of plurality elections: the compromise and attraction effects. Entry by an extreme candidate may shift the frame of reference for some voters in ways which favor particular moderate candidates. Incorporating these preferences generate equilibria in which extremist candidates enter plurality elections in order to attractively frame their preferred moderate, even if the extremist has probability zero of obtaining office themselves

    Expressions of Biases in the Ghanaian Political System

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    This project sought to identify the presence of biases in the Ghanaian political system, in order to define and explain the possible polarization existing within the country, and its consequences on the country’s political progress. This project involved research in Ghana, conducted in a 3 week period between December 2010 and January 2011, to test the hypothesis that biases were present within the local population and the cause of dangerous (rebellion-prompting) polarization within the population. The biases anticipated were motivated bias, explicitly ‘myside’ biases in the form of selective exposure, belief overkill, and biased assimilation/polarization. The research method was the use of an orally administered questionnaire to suit the needs of the population. It was found that there exists polarization within the country, though not an extreme polarization of the sort that would forewarn of revolution. These results are significant in that they help us understand the current Ghanaian political climate and the actions of its people

    Why does voting get so complicated? : a review of theories for analyzing democratic participation.

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    The purpose of this article is to present a sample from the panoply of formal theories on voting and elections to Statistical Science readers who have had limited exposure to such work. These abstract ideas provide a framework for understanding the context of the empirical articles that follow in this volume. The primary focus of this theoretical literature is on the use of mathematical formalism to describe electoral systems and outcomes by modeling both voting rules and human behavior. As with empirical models, these constructs are never perfect descriptors of reality, but instead form the basis for understanding fundamental characteristics of the studied system. Our focus is on providing a general, but not overly simplified, review of these theories with practical examples. We end the article with a thought experiment that applies different vote aggregation schemes to the 2000 presidential election count in Florida, and we find that alternative methods provide different results

    Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff

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    We know that electoral systems have an effect on the number of competing candidates. However, a mystery remains concerning the impact of majority runoff. According to theory, the number of competing candidates should be equal (or only marginally larger) under majority runoff than under plurality. However, in real-life elections, this number is much higher under majority runoff. To provide new insights on this puzzle, we report the results of a laboratory experiment where subjects play the role of candidates in plurality and majority runoff elections. We use a candidate-only and sincere-voting model to isolate the effect of the electoral system on the decision of candidates to enter the election. We find very little difference between the two electoral systems. We thus re-affirm the mystery of the number of competing candidates under majority runoff

    Essays in Theoretical Political Economy

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    Comparing Electoral Systems: A Geometric Analysis

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    This paper constructs a game-theoretic model of elections in alternative electoral systems with three or four candidates. Each electoral system specifies how the platforms of the candidates and their scores give rise to an outcome. When geometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can compete against each other for victory, a pivot probability is associated to that pair. Each voter is rational and picks the candidate that maximizes her expected utility, which results from the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about the pivot-probabilities. Candidate positioning is endogenous and the result of a Nash game. The possible equilibria are computed for plurality and runoff majority systems

    Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

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    We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f(d) as a function of distance d is constant or strictly decreasing. We show that this game admits a best-response potential. This result holds in particular for f(d) = wd with 0 < w ≤ 1. For this case special attention will be given to the structure of the equilibrium set and a conjecture about the increasingness of best-response correspondences will be made

    The Electoral Success of Communist-Successor Parties in the Czech Republic and Romania

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    Communist-successor parties are impacted by six social and political factors: party reimaging, coalition building, corruption and scandal, party leadership, EU accession, and social indicators. This project explores how the descendants of the totalitarian communist parties in the Czech Republic and Romania are influenced by each factor by analyzing election result data against these indicators. Party reimaging and coalition building are the most influential in determining voter turnout, while the other four work in conjunction to influence election results. This project contributes to the literature on electoral volatility, post-communist countries, voter behavior, and seeks to offer a model that can predict party success under various conditions

    The Moderating Effect of Instant Runoff Voting

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    Instant runoff voting (IRV) has recently gained popularity as an alternative to plurality voting for political elections, with advocates claiming a range of advantages, including that it produces more moderate winners than plurality and could thus help address polarization. However, there is little theoretical backing for this claim, with existing evidence focused on case studies and simulations. In this work, we prove that IRV has a moderating effect relative to plurality voting in a precise sense, developed in a 1-dimensional Euclidean model of voter preferences. Our results show that as long as voters are symmetrically distributed and not too concentrated at the extremes, IRV cannot elect an extreme candidate over a moderate. In contrast, we show plurality can. Our methods develop new frameworks for the theoretical analysis of voting systems, deriving exact winner distributions geometrically and establishing a connection between plurality voting and stick-breaking processes.Comment: 42 pages; updated intro and title, added GitHub lin
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