Coverage games in small cells networks

This paper considers the problem of cooperative power control in distributed small cell wireless networks. We introduce a novel framework, based on repeated games, which models the interactions of the different transmit base stations in the downlink. By exploiting the specific structure of the game, we show that we can improve the system performance by selecting the Pareto optimal solution as well as reduce the price of stability

Balance of Power

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact.We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players.This theory of conduct predicts that entry by new firms leads to a less aggressive outcome if it creates a balance of power. A balance of power is created if more players get technologies that are close to the most efficient technology.Using a related argument, we show that an increase in entry costs can lead to more aggressive outcomes.pricing games;Folk theorem;refinement of predicted outcomes;supergames;contestable market

Game theory

game theory

Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning

This paper examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Individuals differ across rates of time preference. A planner must choose a local interaction system or neighborhood design before observing the realization of these rates. Given the planner's choice of design and a realization of discount factors, each individual plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. We introduce the concept of a local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) to describe a stationary sequential equilibrium in which, for any realization of discount factors, each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one "acceptable" group of neighbors. The presence of impatient types implies that some free riding may be tolerated in equilibrium. When residents' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative "core" and an uncooperative "fringe." Uncooperative (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when residents' discount factors are independently distributed, the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul-de-sacs). In that case, each person's cooperation decision becomes a pure local public good. Finally, if types are correlated, then incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.repeated games, local interaction, social norms, neighborhood design, local trigger strategy

Evolutionary games on graphs

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure