The Development of COLESTVIAModel as An Effort of Internanalization of Character Values in Social Studies

ABSTRACT Purpose: This research is based on a condition of Social Studies instruction in Junior High schools in Surakarta that is still far from the expectation. It focuses on the cognitive aspect and lack of affective aspects. Therefore, it is important to develop an instruction throughCOLESTVIA Model by combining STAD type, Tournament and VIA as an effort in internalization of character values in Social Studies instruction. The development of character values is concerned with cognitive development and the result of social interaction. It is believed that by integrating the character values, it can strengthen the character and personality for the Junior High school students in Surakarta. Method:The Developmentof COLESTVIA Model is done through development research by three main steps, namely Preliminary Study, Development, and Model Pilot. The data was collected through Observational Technique, Interview, Questionaire and Doccumentation. The Data Analysis for the Preliminary Study uses qualitative, while the Model Pilot was by means of experiment using quantitative Approach as to answer the research questions, namely : (1) How is the performance of the Social Studies instruction of the grade VIII of Junior High School students in Surakarta, (2) How is the development of COLESTVIA Model that can integrate the character values, and (3) How is the effectiveness of The DevelopmentCOLESTVIA Model as an attempt of the internalization of the character values in Social Studies instruction in grade VIII Junior High school.T- test was used to know the difference between the model of COLESTVIA instruction and conventional model. Findings: The result of the research shows after performing the try out in SMP 19 through Classroom Action Research (CAR); the larger scaled-trial in SMP 2 and private Junior High School A, (experiment), SMP 3 and private Junior High School B (control), and the effectiveness of trial in SMP 19, SMP 24 and private Junior High School C (experiment) and SMP 10, SMP 25 and private Junior High School D (contol), proved that thatCOLESTVIA instruction is able to improve the competency and the SMP students’ character values in various groups of schools. The conclusion of the research is that the model of COLESTVIA instruction fulfill the principles and proves significantly the increase of the SMP students’ character values in Surakarta compared with the various conventional models of instruction

Fuzzy judgment in bargaining games : diverse patterns of price determination and transaction in buyer-seller exchange

game theory;bargaining

Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory

We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata

Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets.

In this paper we consider a model of group formation where group of individuals may have different feasible sets. We focus on two polar cases, increasing returns, when the set of feasible alternatives increases if a new member joins thegroup, and decreasing returns, when a new member has an opposite effect and reduces the number of alternatives available for the enlarged group. We consider two notions, stability and strong stability of group structures, that correspond to Nash and Strong Nash equilibrium of the associated non-cooperative game. We prove existence results for various classes of environments and also investigate the link between the dimensionality of the set of alternatives and the existence of stable structures.feasible sets; stable partitions; positive externality; increasing and decreasing returns

Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond

This essay surveys the literature on the axiomatic model of bargaining formulated by Nash ("The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 28, 1950, 155-162).Nash's bargaining model, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Egalitarian solution

Large Newsvendor Games

We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. A similar game (modeled in terms of costs) was considered by Muller et al. (2002), who proved that this game is balanced for every possible joint distribution of the random demands. In this paper we consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game, and we show that in a game with a continuum of players, under a nonatomic condition on the demand, the core is a singleton. For a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases.newsvendor games, nonatomic games, core, balanced games.