Introduction: An Overview of Trust and Some Key Epistemological Applications

I give an overview of the trust literature and then of six central issues concerning epistemic trust. The survey of trust zeroes in on the kinds of expectations that trust involves, trust’s characteristic psychology, and what makes trust rational. The discussion of epistemic trust focuses on its role in testimony, the epistemic goods that we trust for, the significance of epistemic trust in contrast to reliance, what makes epistemic trust rational, and epistemic self-trust

Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?

trust, testimonial knowledge, authority, epistemic dependenceAlthough there is widespread agreement that our epistemic dependence on other people's knowledge is a key ingredient of our cognitive life, the role of trust in this dependence is much more open to debate. Is trust in epistemic authority—or “epistemic trust” for short—an epistemological notion in any sense, or is it simply a bridge-concept that connects our epistemological concerns to moral issues? Should we depict it in terms of the more familiar sociological notion of trust as a basis for cooperation

Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief

This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an extensive discussion of standard accounts of both kinds of trust and criticises especially the standard accounts of non-evidential trust. A new account of non-evidential trust is offered that avoids a number of difficulties that plague the standard accounts by rejecting what we call ‘attitude-liability assumptions’

Contradictory information flow in networks with trust and distrust

We offer a proof system and a NetLogo simulation for trust and distrust in networks where contradictory information is shared by ranked lazy and sceptic agents. Trust and its negative are defined as properties of edges: the former is required when a message is passed bottom-up in the hierarchy or received by a sceptic agent; the latter is attributed to channels that require contradiction resolution, or whose terminal is a lazy agent. These procedures are associated with epistemic costs, respectively for confirmation and refutation. We describe the logic, illustrate the algorithms implemented in the model and then focus on experimental results concerning the analysis of epistemic costs, the role of the agents’ epistemic attitude on distrust distribution and the influence of (dis)trust in reaching consensus

Contradictory information flow in networks with trust and distrust

We offer a proof system and a NetLogo simulation for trust and distrust in networks where contradictory information is shared by ranked lazy and sceptic agents. Trust and its negative are defined as properties of edges: the former is required when a message is passed bottom-up in the hierarchy or received by a sceptic agent; the latter is attributed to channels that require contradiction resolution, or whose terminal is a lazy agent. These procedures are associated with epistemic costs, respectively for confirmation and refutation. We describe the logic, illustrate the algorithms implemented in the model and then focus on experimental results concerning the analysis of epistemic costs, the role of the agents’ epistemic attitude on distrust distribution and the influence of (dis)trust in reaching consensus

Abstracta and Possibilia: Modal Foundations of Mathematical Platonism

This paper aims to provide modal foundations for mathematical platonism. I examine Hale and Wright's (2009) objections to the merits and need, in the defense of mathematical platonism and its epistemology, of the thesis of Necessitism. In response to Hale and Wright's objections to the role of epistemic and metaphysical modalities in providing justification for both the truth of abstraction principles and the success of mathematical predicate reference, I examine the Necessitist commitments of the abundant conception of properties endorsed by Hale and Wright and examined in Hale (2013); and demonstrate how a two-dimensional approach to the epistemology of mathematics is consistent with Hale and Wright's notion of there being non-evidential epistemic entitlement rationally to trust that abstraction principles are true. A choice point that I flag is that between availing of intensional or hyperintensional semantics. The hyperintensional semantic approach that I advance is a topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics. Epistemic and metaphysical states and possibilities may thus be shown to play a constitutive role in vindicating the reality of mathematical objects and truth, and in providing a conceivability-based route to the truth of abstraction principles as well as other axioms and propositions in mathematics

From Self-trust to Other-trust: the Role of Reasons and the Theoretical Insignificance of Behavioral Inconsistency

There is intuitive pull to the idea that if a subject knows or believes that others are just like her, and if she trusts herself as an epistemic agent, then she should also trust others as epistemic agents. It seems that she would be inconsistent to trust herself, and then when faced with an identical being in a situation or environment identical to her own, not extend trust to that other being as well. In this paper I argue that charges of inconsistency of the sort above can only apply if one\u27s self-trust is on the basis of reasons. I consider why the intuitive consistency claim sounds right, address some possible concerns about my conception of inconsistency, and then go on to suggest that behavioral inconsistency is theoretically insignificant - it needn\u27t play any significant role in a theory of trust intended to show that other‑trust requirements are not being met. Theories wishing to show that there are other‑trust requirements should give reasons for trust. I conclude by considering an objection involving self‑trust policies

Development and validation of a self-report measure of epistemic trust

Epistemic trust (ET) refers to trust in communicated knowledge. This paper describes the development and validation of a new self-report questionnaire, the Epistemic Trust, Mistrust and Credulity Questionnaire (ETMCQ). We report on two studies (Study 1, n = 500; Study 2, n = 705) examining the psychometric properties of the ETMCQ and the relationship between EMTCQ scores (i.e., an individual’s epistemic stance) and exposure to adverse childhood experiences, mental health symptoms, attachment, mentalizing and general self-efficacy. The factor structure of the ETMCQ was examined using Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses, and its reliability and test-retest reliability were tested. Both studies yielded three correlated yet distinct factors – Trust, Mistrust and Credulity – and confirmed the reliability and validity of the ETMCQ. Preregistered hypotheses were confirmed and replicated across both studies. Main findings suggest intriguing links between the ETMCQ and developmental psychopathology constructs and are consistent with thinking on the role of epistemic stance in undermining adaptation and increasing the developmental risk of mental health problems. Mistrust and Credulity scores were associated with childhood adversity and higher scores on the global psychopathology severity index and both factors partially mediated the link between early adversity and mental health symptoms. Mistrust and Credulity were positively associated with difficulties in understanding mental states and insecure attachment styles. Post-hoc analysis identified that different attachment styles were associated with differences in epistemic stance. In addition, Trust was not associated with reduced levels of mental health symptoms and did not moderate the impact of childhood adversity – findings are congruent with the suggestion that the reduction of mistrust and credulity may be crucial common factors in promoting resilience and the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic interventions. This investigation and the ETMCQ provide an empirical measure of what until now has been largely a theoretical concept and open new avenues for future research

Susann Wagenknecht’s "'Facing the Incompleteness of epistemic trust' - A Critical Reply"

In this response paper I aim to do three things. First, I wish to clarify the claim that epistemic trust is incomplete and I suggest that there is one dimension to the incompleteness not mentioned by Wagenknecht. Second, I argue that moral trust can play an important role in managing epistemic dependency under conditions of incomplete epistemic trust. By moral trust I mean trust in the moral character of the testifier. Finally, I raise some questions for future research.Non peer reviewe

The Epistemological Importance of Trust in Science

I argue that trust is epistemically important because it is the foundation of social practices that confer significant epistemic benefits on scientific communities. I begin by showing the limitations of the dominant rational choice account of trust, which maintains that trust is rational when the truster has good reason to believe that it is in the trusted's self-interest to act trustworthily. These limitations motivate my alternative account of trust, which recognizes non-self-interested motivations for acting trustworthily, such as having a sense of duty. The first part of the account captures the cognitive aspect of trust. When we trust, we take a particular cognitive attitude towards the claim that the trusted will do what we expect her to do; I argue that this cognitive attitude can be either belief or acceptance, in the sense outlined by Michael Bratman. The second part of my account captures the emotional and moral aspects of trust by providing a framework to understand the connection between trust and betrayal—the feeling that usually results from being let down by a person one trusts. I provide an account of betrayal as a reactive emotion that connects it to beliefs about relational obligations. Thus when we trust, we depend on the trusted because we believe that our relationship with the trusted morally obliges her to act as expected. Using this account of trust, I argue that scientific communities can garner significant epistemic benefits when scientists are trustworthy and when they trust each other. Applying a framework adapted from Alvin Goldman's work on social epistemology, I argue that trust fosters epistemically beneficial sharing between scientists. These arguments are supported by a case study of the role that trust played in the achievements made by the community of early 20th Century Drosophilists. Finally, using recent examples of scientific fraud in cloning research and public policy responses to much-publicized 'crises in trust', I argue that the epistemic success of science results, in part, from science's ability to balance competition and cooperation, trust and distrust, self-interest and other-interest