Are Low-Price Compromises Collusion Guarantees? An Experimental Test of Price Matching Policies

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) to rise prices above the competitive levels. PMG is introduced both as a market institution (the effective selling price is always the lowest posted price) and as a strategic choice so subjects have to decide whether or not to offer it. Our results show that PMG leads to a clear collusive outcome as markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction if PM is imposed as a market institution. If subjects are allowed to decide whether to adopt PMG or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt PMG and prices get very close to the collusive ones.price-matching guarantees, experimental economics

Re-matching, Information and Sequencing Effects in Posted Offer Markets

This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matching or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing. Experimental results indicate that such variations can have first order effects on outcomes. For this reason, we recommend that results in oligopoly experiments be carefully interpreted in light of the procedures selected.Market Experiments, Oligopoly, Re-Matching, Information, Market Concentration

Competition and Stability in Banking

I review the state of the art of the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the potential trade-off between competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by exacerbating the coordination problem of depositors/investors on the liability side and fostering runs/panics, and by increasing incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability trade-off is characterized and the implications of the analysis for regulation and competition policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on the intensity of competition.antitrust, regulation, crisis, risk-taking, mergers, state aid, bail-outs

Pure Numbers Effects, Market Power, and Tacit Collusion in Posted Offer Markets

This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in this design. Unilateral market power raises prices, as predicted. However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration. Excess capacity appears to explain observed tacit collusion levels.experiments, market concentration, market power

Posted - Offer Markets In Near Continuous Time: an Experimental Investigation

This paper reports an experiment conducted to evaluate a ‘near continuous’ variant of the posted-offer trading institution, where the number of periods in a market session is increased by reducing sharply each period’s maximum length. Experimental results suggest that although decisions in time-truncated periods are not equivalent to periods of longer duration, extensive repetition improves considerably the drawing power of equilibrium predictions in some challenging environments. Nevertheless, significant deviations remain in the near continuous framework. We also observe that the extra data collected in the near continuous framework allows new insights into price convergence and price signaling.experiment, monopoly, pricing, price signaling