Investigating decision rules with a new experimental design: the EXACT paradigm.

In the decision-making field, it is important to distinguish between the perceptual process (how information is collected) and the decision rule (the strategy governing decision-making). We propose a new paradigm, called EXogenous ACcumulation Task (EXACT) to disentangle these two components. The paradigm consists of showing a horizontal gauge that represents the probability of receiving a reward at time t and increases with time. The participant is asked to press a button when they want to request a reward. Thus, the perceptual mechanism is hard-coded and does not need to be inferred from the data. Based on this paradigm, we compared four decision rules (Bayes Risk, Reward Rate, Reward/Accuracy, and Modified Reward Rate) and found that participants appeared to behave according to the Modified Reward Rate. We propose a new way of analysing the data by using the accuracy of responses, which can only be inferred in classic RT tasks. Our analysis suggests that several experimental findings such as RT distribution and its relationship with experimental conditions, usually deemed to be the result of a rise-to-threshold process, may be simply explained by the effect of the decision rule employed

Cognitive Bias in Ambiguity Judgements:Using Computational Models to Dissect the Effects of Mild Mood Manipulation in Humans

Positive and negative moods can be treated as prior expectations over future delivery of rewards and punishments. This provides an inferential foundation for the cognitive (judgement) bias task, now widely-used for assessing affective states in non-human animals. In the task, information about affect is extracted from the optimistic or pessimistic manner in which participants resolve ambiguities in sensory input. Here, we report a novel variant of the task aimed at dissecting the effects of affect manipulations on perceptual and value computations for decision-making under ambiguity in humans. Participants were instructed to judge which way a Gabor patch (250ms presentation) was leaning. If the stimulus leant one way (e.g. left), pressing the REWard key yielded a monetary WIN whilst pressing the SAFE key failed to acquire the WIN. If it leant the other way (e.g. right), pressing the SAFE key avoided a LOSS whilst pressing the REWard key incurred the LOSS. The size (0-100 UK pence) of the offered WIN and threatened LOSS, and the ambiguity of the stimulus (vertical being completely ambiguous) were varied on a trial-by-trial basis, allowing us to investigate how decisions were affected by differing combinations of these factors. Half the subjects performed the task in a 'Pleasantly' decorated room and were given a gift (bag of sweets) prior to starting, whilst the other half were in a bare 'Unpleasant' room and were not given anything. Although these treatments had little effect on self-reported mood, they did lead to differences in decision-making. All subjects were risk averse under ambiguity, consistent with the notion of loss aversion. Analysis using a Bayesian decision model indicated that Unpleasant Room subjects were ('pessimistically') biased towards choosing the SAFE key under ambiguity, but also weighed WINS more heavily than LOSSes compared to Pleasant Room subjects. These apparently contradictory findings may be explained by the influence of affect on different processes underlying decision-making, and the task presented here offers opportunities for further dissecting such processes

Temporal characteristics of the influence of punishment on perceptual decision making in the human brain

Perceptual decision making is the process by which information from sensory systems is combined and used to influence our behavior. In addition to the sensory input, this process can be affected by other factors, such as reward and punishment for correct and incorrect responses. To investigate the temporal dynamics of how monetary punishment influences perceptual decision making in humans, we collected electroencephalography (EEG) data during a perceptual categorization task whereby the punishment level for incorrect responses was parametrically manipulated across blocks of trials. Behaviorally, we observed improved accuracy for high relative to low punishment levels. Using multivariate linear discriminant analysis of the EEG, we identified multiple punishment-induced discriminating components with spatially distinct scalp topographies. Compared with components related to sensory evidence, components discriminating punishment levels appeared later in the trial, suggesting that punishment affects primarily late postsensory, decision-related processing. Crucially, the amplitude of these punishment components across participants was predictive of the size of the behavioral improvements induced by punishment. Finally, trial-by-trial changes in prestimulus oscillatory activity in the alpha and gamma bands were good predictors of the amplitude of these components. We discuss these findings in the context of increased motivation/attention, resulting from increases in punishment, which in turn yields improved decision-related processing

Midbrain Dopamine Neurons Signal Belief in Choice Accuracy during a Perceptual Decision

Central to the organization of behavior is the ability to predict the values of outcomes to guide choices. The accuracy of such predictions is honed by a teaching signal that indicates how incorrect a prediction was (“reward prediction error,” RPE). In several reinforcement learning contexts, such as Pavlovian conditioning and decisions guided by reward history, this RPE signal is provided by midbrain dopamine neurons. In many situations, however, the stimuli predictive of outcomes are perceptually ambiguous. Perceptual uncertainty is known to influence choices, but it has been unclear whether or how dopamine neurons factor it into their teaching signal. To cope with uncertainty, we extended a reinforcement learning model with a belief state about the perceptually ambiguous stimulus; this model generates an estimate of the probability of choice correctness, termed decision confidence. We show that dopamine responses in monkeys performing a perceptually ambiguous decision task comply with the model’s predictions. Consequently, dopamine responses did not simply reflect a stimulus’ average expected reward value but were predictive of the trial-to-trial fluctuations in perceptual accuracy. These confidence-dependent dopamine responses emerged prior to monkeys’ choice initiation, raising the possibility that dopamine impacts impending decisions, in addition to encoding a post-decision teaching signal. Finally, by manipulating reward size, we found that dopamine neurons reflect both the upcoming reward size and the confidence in achieving it. Together, our results show that dopamine responses convey teaching signals that are also appropriate for perceptual decisions

Foraging as an evidence accumulation process

A canonical foraging task is the patch-leaving problem, in which a forager must decide to leave a current resource in search for another. Theoretical work has derived optimal strategies for when to leave a patch, and experiments have tested for conditions where animals do or do not follow an optimal strategy. Nevertheless, models of patch-leaving decisions do not consider the imperfect and noisy sampling process through which an animal gathers information, and how this process is constrained by neurobiological mechanisms. In this theoretical study, we formulate an evidence accumulation model of patch-leaving decisions where the animal averages over noisy measurements to estimate the state of the current patch and the overall environment. Evidence accumulation models belong to the class of drift diffusion processes and have been used to model decision making in different contexts. We solve the model for conditions where foraging decisions are optimal and equivalent to the marginal value theorem, and perform simulations to analyze deviations from optimal when these conditions are not met. By adjusting the drift rate and decision threshold, the model can represent different strategies, for example an increment-decrement or counting strategy. These strategies yield identical decisions in the limiting case but differ in how patch residence times adapt when the foraging environment is uncertain. To account for sub-optimal decisions, we introduce an energy-dependent utility function that predicts longer than optimal patch residence times when food is plentiful. Our model provides a quantitative connection between ecological models of foraging behavior and evidence accumulation models of decision making. Moreover, it provides a theoretical framework for potential experiments which seek to identify neural circuits underlying patch leaving decisions