Achieving an optimal trade-off between revenue and energy peak within a smart grid environment

We consider an energy provider whose goal is to simultaneously set revenue-maximizing prices and meet a peak load constraint. In our bilevel setting, the provider acts as a leader (upper level) that takes into account a smart grid (lower level) that minimizes the sum of users' disutilities. The latter bases its decisions on the hourly prices set by the leader, as well as the schedule preferences set by the users for each task. Considering both the monopolistic and competitive situations, we illustrate numerically the validity of the approach, which achieves an 'optimal' trade-off between three objectives: revenue, user cost, and peak demand

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions

Tolling, Capacity Selection and Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints

An Equilibrium problem with an equilibrium constraint is a mathematical construct that can be applied to private competition in highway networks. In this paper we consider the problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium regarding competition in toll pricing on a network utilising 2 alternative algorithms. In the first algorithm, we utilise a Gauss Siedel fixed point approach based on the cutting constraint algorithm for toll pricing. In the second algorithm, we extend an existing sequential linear complementarity approach for finding Nash equilibrium subject to Wardrop Equilibrium constraints. Finally we consider how the equilibrium may change between the Nash competitive equilibrium and a collusive equilibrium where the two players co-operate to form the equivalent of a monopoly operation

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions.Market power, Electricity, Networks, Numeric models, Model comparison

Multi-Echelon Inventory Optimization and Demand-Side Management: Models and Algorithms

Inventory management is a fudamental problem in supply chain management. It is widely used in practice, but it is also intrinsically hard to optimize, even for relatively simple inventory system structures. This challenge has also been heightened under the threat of supply disruptions. Whenever a supply source is disrupted, the inventory system is paralyzed, and tremenduous costs can occur as a consequence. Designing a reliable and robust inventory system that can withstand supply disruptions is vital for an inventory system\u27s performance.First we consider a basic type of inventory network, an assembly system, which produces a single end product from one or several components. A property called long-run balance allows an assembly system to be reduced to a serial system when disruptions are not present. We show that a modified version is still true under disruption risk. Based on this property, we propose a method for reducing the system into a serial system with extra inventory at certain stages that face supply disruptions. We also propose a heuristic for solving the reduced system. A numerical study shows that this heuristic performs very well, yielding significant cost savings when compared with the best-known algorithm.Next we study another basic inventory network structure, a distribution system. We study continuous-review, multi-echelon distribution systems subject to supply disruptions, with Poisson customer demands under a first-come, first-served allocation policy. We develop a recursive optimization heuristic, which applies a bottom-up approach that sequentially approximates the base-stock levels of all the locations. Our numerical study shows that it performs very well.Finally we consider a problem related to smart grids, an area where supply and demand are still decisive factors. Instead of matching supply with demand, as in the first two parts of the dissertation, now we concentrate on the interaction between supply and demand. We consider an electricity service provider that wishes to set prices for a large customer (user or aggregator) with flexible loads so that the resulting load profile matches a predetermined profile as closely as possible. We model the deterministic demand case as a bilevel problem in which the service provider sets price coefficients and the customer responds by shifting loads forward in time. We derive optimality conditions for the lower-level problem to obtain a single-level problem that can be solved efficiently. For the stochastic-demand case, we approximate the consumer\u27s best response function and use this approximation to calculate the service provider\u27s optimal strategy. Our numerical study shows the tractability of the new models for both the deterministic and stochastic cases, and that our pricing scheme is very effective for the service provider to shape consumer demand

A review on demand-side tools in electricity market

With the advent of restructuring in the electricity markets, the Supply-side quickly adapted to the new environment, whereas, the story in the demand side has been different. Demand side dealt with the electric energy as a commodity available to the necessary extent. This caused the Supply-side to realize that the demand side would admit to purchase electric energy at any price, and this resulted in the advent of bidding strategies in the Supply-Side, known as “hockey-stick bidding”. The most important result was transfer of the demand side assets to the Supply-side. After a while, the demand side noticed the self-sloppy condition, therefore looked for tools to deal with these threats. This subject is examined in this paper