Impersonal efficiency and the dangers of a fully automated securities exchange

This report identifies impersonal efficiency as a driver of market automation during the past four decades, and speculates about the future problems it might pose. The ideology of impersonal efficiency is rooted in a mistrust of financial intermediaries such as floor brokers and specialists. Impersonal efficiency has guided the development of market automation towards transparency and impersonality, at the expense of human trading floors. The result has been an erosion of the informal norms and human judgment that characterize less anonymous markets. We call impersonal efficiency an ideology because we do not think that impersonal markets are always superior to markets built on social ties. This report traces the historical origins of this ideology, considers the problems it has already created in the recent Flash Crash of 2010, and asks what potential risks it might pose in the future

Determinants of power spreads in electricity futures markets: A multinational analysis. ESRI WP580, December 2017

The growth in variable renewable energy (vRES) and the need for flexibility in power systems go hand in hand. We study how vRES and other factors, namely the price of substitute fuels, power price volatility, structural breaks, and seasonality impact the hedgeable power spreads (profit margins) of the main dispatchable flexibility providers in the current power systems - gas and coal power plants. We particularly focus on power spreads that are hedgeable in futures markets in three European electricity markets (Germany, UK, Nordic) over the time period 2009-2016. We find that market participants who use power spreads need to pay attention to the fundamental supply and demand changes in the underlying markets (electricity, CO2, and coal/gas). Specifically, we show that the total vRES capacity installed during 2009-2016 is associated with a drop of 3-22% in hedgeable profit margins of coal and especially gas power generators. While this shows that the expansion of vRES has a significant negative effect on the hedgeable profitability of dispatchable, flexible power generators, it also suggests that the overall decline in power spreads is further driven by the price dynamics in the CO2 and fuel markets during the sample period. We also find significant persistence (and asymmetric effects) in the power spreads volatility using a univariate TGARCH model

The Invisible Power of MacHines Revisiting the Proposed Flash Order Ban in the Wake of the Flash Crash

Technological innovation continues to make trading and markets more efficient, generally benefitting market participants and the investing public. But flash trading, a practice that evolved from high-frequency trading, benefits only a select few sophisticated traders and institutions with the resources necessary to view and respond to flashed orders. This practice undermines the basic principles of fairness and transparency in securities regulation, exacerbates information asymmetries and harms investor confidence. This iBrief revisits the Securities and Exchange Commission\u27s proposed ban on the controversial practice of flash trading and urges the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to implement the ban across the securities and futures markets. Banning flash trading will not impact high-frequency trading or other advantageous innovative trading practices, and will benefit all market participants by making prices and liquidity more transparent. In the wake of the May 6, 2010 flash crash and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, now is an opportune time for the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission to implement the ban

The Invisible Power of MacHines Revisiting the Proposed Flash Order Ban in the Wake of the Flash Crash

Technological innovation continues to make trading and markets more efficient, generally benefitting market participants and the investing public. But flash trading, a practice that evolved from high-frequency trading, benefits only a select few sophisticated traders and institutions with the resources necessary to view and respond to flashed orders. This practice undermines the basic principles of fairness and transparency in securities regulation, exacerbates information asymmetries and harms investor confidence. This iBrief revisits the Securities and Exchange Commission\u27s proposed ban on the controversial practice of flash trading and urges the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to implement the ban across the securities and futures markets. Banning flash trading will not impact high-frequency trading or other advantageous innovative trading practices, and will benefit all market participants by making prices and liquidity more transparent. In the wake of the May 6, 2010 flash crash and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, now is an opportune time for the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission to implement the ban

The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company

From its inception, the federal securities law regime created and enforced a major divide between public and private capital raising. Firms that chose to “go public” took on substantial disclosure burdens, but in exchange were given the exclusive right to raise capital from the general public. Over time, however, the disclosure quid pro quo has been subverted: Public companies are still asked to disclose, yet capital is flooding into private companies with regulators’ blessing. This Article provides a critique of the new public-private divide centered on its information effects. While regulators may have hoped for both the private and public equity markets to thrive, they may instead be hastening the latter’s decline. Public companies benefit significantly less from mandatory disclosure than they did just three decades ago, because raising large amounts of capital no longer requires going and remaining public. Meanwhile, private companies are thriving in part by free-riding on the information contained in public company stock prices and disclosure. This pattern is unlikely to be sustainable. Public companies have little incentive to subsidize their private company competitors in the race for capital--and we are already witnessing a sharp decline in initial public offerings and stock exchange listings. With fewer and fewer public companies left to produce the information on which private companies depend, the outlook is uncertain for both sides of the securities-law divide

Financial development : structure and dynamics

This paper analyzes the bright and dark sides of the financial development process through the lenses of the four fundamental frictions to which agents are exposed -- information asymmetry, enforcement, collective action, and collective cognition. Financial development is shaped by the efforts of market participants to grind down or circumvent these frictions, a process further spurred by financial innovation and scale and network effects. The analysis leads to broad predictions regarding the sequencing and convexity of the dynamic paths for a battery of financial development indicators. The method used also yields a robust way to benchmark the financial development paths followed by individual countries or regions. The paper explores the reasons for path deviations and gaps relative to the benchmark. Demand-related effects (past output growth), financial crashes, and supply-related effects (the quality of the enabling environment) all play an important role. Informational frictions are easier to overcome than contractual frictions, not least because of the transferability of financial innovation across borders.Debt Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Emerging Markets,Access to Finance,Banks&Banking Reform