A Decentralised Digital Identity Architecture

Current architectures to validate, certify, and manage identity are based on centralised, top-down approaches that rely on trusted authorities and third-party operators. We approach the problem of digital identity starting from a human rights perspective, with a primary focus on identity systems in the developed world. We assert that individual persons must be allowed to manage their personal information in a multitude of different ways in different contexts and that to do so, each individual must be able to create multiple unrelated identities. Therefore, we first define a set of fundamental constraints that digital identity systems must satisfy to preserve and promote privacy as required for individual autonomy. With these constraints in mind, we then propose a decentralised, standards-based approach, using a combination of distributed ledger technology and thoughtful regulation, to facilitate many-to-many relationships among providers of key services. Our proposal for digital identity differs from others in its approach to trust in that we do not seek to bind credentials to each other or to a mutually trusted authority to achieve strong non-transferability. Because the system does not implicitly encourage its users to maintain a single aggregated identity that can potentially be constrained or reconstructed against their interests, individuals and organisations are free to embrace the system and share in its benefits.Comment: 30 pages, 10 figures, 3 table

Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act : Hearing Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., October 2, 2013 (Remarks by Professor Laura K. Donohue, Geo. U. L. Center)

Congress introduced the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to make use of new technologies and to enable the intelligence community to obtain information vital to U.S. national security, while preventing the National Security Agency (NSA) and other federal intelligence-gathering entities from engaging in broad domestic surveillance. The legislature sought to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of the 1960s and 1970s that accompanied the Cold War and the rapid expansion in communications technologies. Congress purposefully circumscribed the NSA’s authorities by limiting them to foreign intelligence gathering. It required that the target be a foreign power or an agent thereof, insisted that such claims be supported by probable cause, and heightened the protections afforded to the domestic collection of U.S. citizens’ information. Initially focused on electronic surveillance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act gradually expanded over time to incorporate physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace, and business records and tangible goods. The addition of these provisions took place within the same general framing that Congress had adopted in enacting the legislation in the first place. Documents related to the recently revealed telephony metadata program, conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Intelligence Act and its subsequent amendments, suggests that the National Security Agency is now interpreting the statutory provisions in a manner directly contrary to Congress’ intent. It reflects neither the particularization required by Congress prior to acquisition of information, nor the role anticipated by Congress for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Court of Review. The specific legal reasoning offered in defense of the program, moreover, violates the statutory language in three important ways: (a) it contradicts the requirement the records sought “are relevant to an authorized investigation”; (b) it violates the statutory provision that requires that information sought could be obtained via subpoena duces tecum; and (c) it bypasses the statutory framing for pen registers and trap and trace devices. In addition, the program raises serious constitutional concerns. The FISC order amounts to a general warrant, which the Fourth Amendment is designed to preclude. Efforts by the government to save the program on grounds of third party doctrine are similarly unpersuasive in light of the unique circumstances of Smith v. Maryland, new technologies, and changed circumstances. An end to the telephony metadata program and FISA reform are necessary to bring surveillance operations and emerging technologies within the bounds of the Constitution

Time Enough - Consequences of Human Microchip Implantation

Dr. Ramesh argues that microchip implantation is both possible and, for some purposes, desirable and suggests that now is the time to consider strategies for preventing potentially grievous intrusion into personal privacy

The Patriot Act: How it Hurts Democracy

After the devastating attacks on American soil on September 11th, 2001, the world\u27s perceptions of security changed forever. Immediately following the attacks, the United States government passed the USA PATRIOT Act, broadening definitions of terrorism and codifying unconstitutional acts, such as unwarranted searches of private property, indefinite holding of suspected terrorists, and ultimately torturing those suspects. This act has had several long term implications leading to a reduction in the quality of American democracy, which subsequently affected other liberal democracies around the world through violations of basic democratic principles, or civil liberties, such as: due process, physical attacks, and freedom of speech. Through the study of the definitions, history, precedents, and what democracies traditionally value, this capstone attempts to explain how anti-terrorism legislation can have potentially grave consequences for democracies and how those consequences set a negative precedent for future legislation

Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations

The National Security Agency’s bulk collection of telephony metadata runs contrary to Congress’s intent in enacting the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The program also violates the statute in three ways: the requirement that records sought be “relevant to an authorized investigation;” the requirement that information could be obtained via subpoena duces tecum; and the steps required for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. Additionally, the program gives rise to serious constitutional concerns. Efforts by the government to save the program on grounds of third party doctrine are unpersuasive in light of the unique circumstances of Smith v. Maryland, the privacy invasions resulting from the universal use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, and the advent of new technologies. Over the past decade, tension has emerged between the view that new technologies should be considered from the perspective of trespass doctrine and the view that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test should apply. Cases involving, for instance, GPS chips, thermal scanners, and highly-trained dogs divide along these lines. Regardless of which approach one adopts, however, similar results mark the application of these doctrines. Under trespass doctrine, the primary order for the telephony metadata program amounts to a general warrant—the elimination of which was the aim of the Fourth Amendment. Under Katz, in turn, citizens do not expect that their telephony metadata will be collected and analyzed. Most Americans do not even realize what can be learned from such data, making invalid any claim that they reasonably expect the government to have access to such information. FISA reform is necessary to enable the government to take advantage of new technologies, to empower the intelligence agencies to respond to national security threats, and to bring surveillance operations within the bounds of statutory and constitutional law. Inserting adversarial counsel into the FISA process, creating a repository of technological expertise for FISC and FISCR, restoring prior targeting, heightening protections for U.S. persons, further delimiting relevant data, narrowing the definition of “foreign intelligence” to exclude “foreign affairs,” and requiring the government to demonstrate past effectiveness prior to obtaining renewal orders offer some possibilities for the future of foreign intelligence gathering in the United States