65 research outputs found
Cryptographic Hash Functions in Groups and Provable Properties
We consider several "provably secure" hash functions that compute simple sums in a well chosen group (G,*). Security properties of such functions provably translate in a natural way to computational problems in G that are simple to define and possibly also hard to solve. Given k disjoint lists Li of group elements, the k-sum problem asks for gi ∊ Li such that g1 * g2 *...* gk = 1G. Hardness of the problem in the respective groups follows from some "standard" assumptions used in public-key cryptology such as hardness of integer factoring, discrete logarithms, lattice reduction and syndrome decoding. We point out evidence that the k-sum problem may even be harder than the above problems. Two hash functions based on the group k-sum problem, SWIFFTX and FSB, were submitted to NIST as candidates for the future SHA-3 standard. Both submissions were supported by some sort of a security proof. We show that the assessment of security levels provided in the proposals is not related to the proofs included. The main claims on security are supported exclusively by considerations about available attacks. By introducing "second-order" bounds on bounds on security, we expose the limits of such an approach to provable security. A problem with the way security is quantified does not necessarily mean a problem with security itself. Although FSB does have a history of failures, recent versions of the two above functions have resisted cryptanalytic efforts well. This evidence, as well as the several connections to more standard problems, suggests that the k-sum problem in some groups may be considered hard on its own, and possibly lead to provable bounds on security. Complexity of the non-trivial tree algorithm is becoming a standard tool for measuring the associated hardness. We propose modifications to the multiplicative Very Smooth Hash and derive security from multiplicative k-sums in contrast to the original reductions that related to factoring or discrete logarithms. Although the original reductions remain valid, we measure security in a new, more aggressive way. This allows us to relax the parameters and hash faster. We obtain a function that is only three times slower compared to SHA-256 and is estimated to offer at least equivalent collision resistance. The speed can be doubled by the use of a special modulus, such a modified function is supported exclusively by the hardness of multiplicative k-sums modulo a power of two. Our efforts culminate in a new multiplicative k-sum function in finite fields that further generalizes the design of Very Smooth Hash. In contrast to the previous variants, the memory requirements of the new function are negligible. The fastest instance of the function expected to offer 128-bit collision resistance runs at 24 cycles per byte on an Intel Core i7 processor and approaches the 17.4 figure of SHA-256. The new functions proposed in this thesis do not provably achieve a usual security property such as preimage or collision resistance from a well-established assumption. They do however enjoy unconditional provable separation of inputs that collide. Changes in input that are small with respect to a well defined measure never lead to identical output in the compression function
A framework for cryptographic problems from linear algebra
We introduce a general framework encompassing the main hard problems emerging in lattice-based cryptography, which naturally includes the recently proposed Mersenne prime cryptosystem, but also problems coming from code-based cryptography. The framework allows to easily instantiate new hard problems and to automatically construct plausibly post-quantum secure primitives from them. As a first basic application, we introduce two new hard problems and the corresponding encryption schemes. Concretely, we study generalisations of hard problems such as SIS, LWE and NTRU to free modules over quotients of Z[X] by ideals of the form (f,g), where f is a monic polynomial and gâZ[X] is a ciphertext modulus coprime to f. For trivial modules (i.e. of rank one), the case f=Xn+1 and g=qâZ>1 corresponds to ring-LWE, ring-SIS and NTRU, while the choices f=Xnâ1 and g=Xâ2 essentially cover the recently proposed Mersenne prime cryptosystems. At the other extreme, when considering modules of large rank and letting deg(f)=1, one recovers the framework of LWE and SIS
Asymptotically Efficient Lattice-Based Digital Signatures
We present a general framework that converts certain types of linear collision-resistant hash
functions into one-time signatures. Our generic construction can be instantiated based on both
general and ideal (e.g. cyclic) lattices, and the resulting signature schemes are provably secure
based on the worst-case hardness of approximating the shortest vector (and other standard
lattice problems) in the corresponding class of lattices to within a polynomial factor. When
instantiated with ideal lattices, the time complexity of the signing and verification algorithms,
as well as key and signature size is almost linear (up to poly-logarithmic factors) in the dimension
n of the underlying lattice. Since no sub-exponential (in n) time algorithm is known to solve
lattice problems in the worst case, even when restricted to ideal lattices, our construction gives
a digital signature scheme with an essentially optimal performance/security trade-off
A Subfield Lattice Attack on Overstretched NTRU Assumptions:Cryptanalysis of Some FHE and Graded Encoding Schemes
International audienc
Vector and Functional Commitments from Lattices
Vector commitment (VC) schemes allow one to commit concisely to an
ordered sequence of values, so that the values at desired positions
can later be proved concisely. In addition, a VC can be statelessly
updatable, meaning that commitments and proofs can be updated to
reflect changes to individual entries, using knowledge of just those
changes (and not the entire vector). VCs have found important
applications in verifiable outsourced databases, cryptographic
accumulators, and cryptocurrencies. However, to date there have been
relatively few post-quantum constructions, i.e., ones that are
plausibly secure against quantum attacks.
More generally, functional commitment (FC) schemes allow one to
concisely and verifiably reveal various functions of committed data,
such as linear functions (i.e., inner products, including evaluations
of a committed polynomial). Under falsifiable assumptions, all known
functional commitments schemes have been limited to ``linearizable\u27\u27
functions, and there are no known post-quantum FC schemes beyond
ordinary VCs.
In this work we give post-quantum constructions of vector and
functional commitments based on the standard Short Integer Solution
lattice problem (appropriately parameterized):
\begin{itemize}
\item First, we present new statelessly updatable VCs with
significantly shorter proofs than (and efficiency otherwise similar
to) the only prior post-quantum, statelessly updatable construction
(Papamanthou \etal, EUROCRYPT 13). Our constructions use private-key
setup, in which an authority generates public parameters and then
goes offline.
\item Second, we construct functional commitments for \emph{arbitrary
(bounded) Boolean circuits} and branching programs. Under
falsifiable assumptions, this is the first post-quantum FC scheme
beyond ordinary VCs, and the first FC scheme of any kind that goes
beyond linearizable functions. Our construction works in a new model
involving an authority that generates the public parameters and
remains online to provide public, reusable ``opening keys\u27\u27 for
desired functions of committed messages.
\end{itemize
Efficient Statistical Zero-Knowledge Authentication Protocols for Smart Cards Secure Against Active & Concurrent Attacks
We construct statistical zero-knowledge authentication protocols for smart cards based on general assumptions. The main protocol is only secure against active attacks, but we present a modification based on trapdoor commitments that can resist concurrent attacks as well. Both protocols are instantiated using lattice-based primitives, which are conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks. We illustrate the practicality of our main protocol on smart cards in terms of storage, computation, communication, and round complexities. Furthermore, we compare it to other lattice-based authentication protocols, which are either zero-knowledge or have a similar structure. The comparison shows that our protocol improves the best previous protocol
SPRING: Fast Pseudorandom Functions from Rounded Ring Products
International audienceRecently, Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen (EUROCRYPT 2012) proposed new theoretical pseudorandom function candidates based on "rounded products" in certain polynomial rings, which have rigorously provable security based on worst-case lattice problems. The functions also enjoy algebraic properties that make them highly parallelizable and attractive for modern applications, such as evaluation under homomorphic encryption schemes. However, the parameters required by BPR's security proofs are too large for practical use, and many other practical aspects of the design were left unexplored in that work. In this work we give two concrete and practically efficient instantiations of the BPR design, which we call SPRING, for "subset-product with rounding over a ring." One instantiation uses a generator matrix of a binary BCH error-correcting code to "determinstically extract" nearly random bits from a (biased) rounded subset-product. The second instan-tiation eliminates bias by working over suitable moduli and decomposing the computation into "Chinese remainder" components. We analyze the concrete security of these instantiations, and provide initial software implementations whose throughputs are within small factors (as small as 4.5) of those of AES
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