Linear Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden verallgemeinerte Nash Spiele (LGNEPs) unter Linearitätsannahmen eingeführt und untersucht. Durch Ausnutzung der speziellen Struktur lassen sich theoretische und algorithmische Resultate erzielen, die weit über die Ergebnisse für allgemeine LGNEPs hinausgehen

Algorithms for generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables

We consider generalized potential games, that constitute a fundamental subclass of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We propose different methods to compute solutions of generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables, i.e., games in which some variables are continuous while the others are discrete. We investigate which types of equilibria of the game can be computed by minimizing a potential function over the common feasible set. In particular, for a wide class of generalized potential games, we characterize those equilibria that can be computed by minimizing potential functions as Pareto solutions of a particular multi-objective problem, and we show how different potential functions can be used to select equilibria. We propose a new Gauss–Southwell algorithm to compute approximate equilibria of any generalized potential game with mixed-integer variables. We show that this method converges in a finite number of steps and we also give an upper bound on this number of steps. Moreover, we make a thorough analysis on the behaviour of approximate equilibria with respect to exact ones. Finally, we make many numerical experiments to show the viability of the proposed approaches

Gap functions for quasi-equilibria

An approach for solving quasi-equilibrium problems (QEPs) is proposed relying on gap functions, which allow reformulating QEPs as global optimization problems. The (generalized) smoothness properties of a gap function are analysed and an upper estimates of its Clarke directional derivative is given. Monotonicity assumptions on both the equilibrium and constraining bifunctions are a key tool to guarantee that all the stationary points of a gap function actually solve QEP. A few classes of constraints satisfying such assumptions are identified covering a wide range of situations. Relying on these results, a descent method for solving QEP is devised and its convergence proved. Finally, error bounds are given in order to guarantee the boundedness of the sequence generated by the algorithm

On the analysis of stochastic optimization and variational inequality problems

Uncertainty has a tremendous impact on decision making. The more connected we get, it seems, the more sources of uncertainty we unfold. For example, uncertainty in the parameters of price and cost functions in power, transportation, communication and financial systems have stemmed from the way these networked systems operate and also how they interact with one another. Uncertainty influences the design, regulation and decisions of participants in several engineered systems like the financial markets, electricity markets, commodity markets, wired and wireless networks, all of which are ubiquitous. This poses many interesting questions in areas of understanding uncertainty (modeling) and dealing with uncertainty (decision making). This dissertation focuses on answering a set of fundamental questions that pertain to dealing with uncertainty arising in three major problem classes: [(1)] Convex Nash games; [(2)] Variational inequality problems and complementarity problems; [(3)] Hierarchical risk management problems in financial networks. Accordingly, this dissertation considers the analysis of a broad class of stochastic optimization and variational inequality problems complicated by uncertainty and nonsmoothness of objective functions. Nash games and variational inequalities have assumed practical relevance in industry and business settings because they are natural models for many real-world applications. Nash games arise naturally in modeling a range of equilibrium problems in power markets, communication networks, market-based allocation of resources etc. where as variational inequality problems allow for modeling frictional contact problems, traffic equilibrium problems etc. Incorporating uncertainty into convex Nash games leads us to stochastic Nash games. Despite the relevance of stochastic generalizations of Nash games and variational inequalities, answering fundamental questions regarding existence of equilibria in stochastic regimes has proved to be a challenge. Amongst other reasons, the main challenge arises from the nonlinearity arising from the presence of the expectation operator. Despite the rich literature in deterministic settings, direct application of deterministic results to stochastic regimes is not straightforward. The first part of this dissertation explores such fundamental questions in stochastic Nash games and variational inequality problems. Instead of directly using the deterministic results, by leveraging Lebesgue convergence theorems we are able to develop a tractable framework for analyzing problems in stochastic regimes over a continuous probability space. The benefit of this approach is that the framework does not rely on evaluation of the expectation operator to provide existence guarantees, thus making it amenable to tractable use. We extend the above framework to incorporate nonsmoothness of payoff functions as well as allow for stochastic constraints in models, all of which are important in practical settings. The second part of this dissertation extends the above framework to generalizations of variational inequality problems and complementarity problems. In particular, we develop a set of almost-sure sufficiency conditions for stochastic variational inequality problems with single-valued and multi-valued mappings. We extend these statements to quasi-variational regimes as well as to stochastic complementarity problems. The applicability of these results is demonstrated in analysis of risk-averse stochastic Nash games used in Nash-Cournot production distribution models in power markets by recasting the problem as a stochastic quasi-variational inequality problem and in Nash-Cournot games with piecewise smooth price functions by modeling this problem as a stochastic complementarity problem. The third part of this dissertation pertains to hierarchical problems in financial risk management. In the financial industry, risk has been traditionally managed by the imposition of value-at-risk or VaR constraints on portfolio risk exposure. Motivated by recent events in the financial industry, we examine the role that risk-seeking traders play in the accumulation of large and possibly infinite risk. We proceed to show that when traders employ a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) metric, much can be said by studying the interaction between value at risk (VaR) (a non-coherent risk measure) and conditional value at risk CVaR (a coherent risk measure based on VaR). Resolving this question requires characterizing the optimal value of the associated stochastic, and possibly nonconvex, optimization problem, often a challenging problem. Our study makes two sets of contributions. First, under general asset distributions on a compact support, traders accumulate finite risk with magnitude of the order of the upper bound of this support. Second, when the supports are unbounded, under relatively mild assumptions, such traders can take on an unbounded amount of risk despite abiding by this VaR threshold. In short, VaR thresholds may be inadequate in guarding against financial ruin

Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with partial differential operators: Theory, algorithms, and risk aversion

PDE-constrained (generalized) Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) are considered in a deterministic setting as well as under uncertainty. This includes a study of deterministic GNEPs with nonlinear and/or multivalued operator equations as forward problems and PDE-constrained GNEPs with uncertain data. The deterministic nonlinear problems are analyzed using the theory of generalized convexity for set-valued operators, and a variational approximation approach is proposed. The stochastic setting includes a detailed overview of the recently developed theory and algorithms for risk-averse PDE-constrained optimization problems. These new results open the way to a rigorous study of stochastic PDE-constrained GNEPs

International Conference on Continuous Optimization (ICCOPT) 2019 Conference Book

The Sixth International Conference on Continuous Optimization took place on the campus of the Technical University of Berlin, August 3-8, 2019. The ICCOPT is a flagship conference of the Mathematical Optimization Society (MOS), organized every three years. ICCOPT 2019 was hosted by the Weierstrass Institute for Applied Analysis and Stochastics (WIAS) Berlin. It included a Summer School and a Conference with a series of plenary and semi-plenary talks, organized and contributed sessions, and poster sessions. This book comprises the full conference program. It contains, in particular, the scientific program in survey style as well as with all details, and information on the social program, the venue, special meetings, and more

Existence, iteration procedures and directional differentiability for parabolic QVIs

We study parabolic quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) of obstacle type. Under appropriate assumptions on the obstacle mapping, we prove the existence of solutions of such QVIs by two methods: one by time discretisation through elliptic QVIs and the second by iteration through parabolic variational inequalities (VIs). Using these results, we show the directional differentiability (in a certain sense) of the solution map which takes the source term of a parabolic QVI into the set of solutions, and we relate this result to the contingent derivative of the aforementioned map. We finish with an example where the obstacle mapping is given by the inverse of a parabolic differential operator.Comment: 41 page

Gap functions for quasi-equilibria

An approach for solving quasi-equilibrium problems (QEPs) is proposed relying on gap functions, which allow reformulating QEPs as global optimization problems. The (generalized) smoothness properties of a gap function are analysed and an upper estimate of its Clarke directional derivative is given. Monotonicity assumptions on both the equilibrium and constraining bifunctions are a key tool to guarantee that all the stationary points of a gap function actually solve QEP. A few classes of constraints satisfying such assumptions are identified covering a wide range of situations. Relying on these results, a descent method for solving QEP is devised and its convergence proved. Finally, error bounds are given in order to guarantee the boundedness of the sequence generated by the algorithm

Towards a Theoretical Foundation of Policy Optimization for Learning Control Policies

Gradient-based methods have been widely used for system design and optimization in diverse application domains. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in studying theoretical properties of these methods in the context of control and reinforcement learning. This article surveys some of the recent developments on policy optimization, a gradient-based iterative approach for feedback control synthesis, popularized by successes of reinforcement learning. We take an interdisciplinary perspective in our exposition that connects control theory, reinforcement learning, and large-scale optimization. We review a number of recently-developed theoretical results on the optimization landscape, global convergence, and sample complexity of gradient-based methods for various continuous control problems such as the linear quadratic regulator (LQR), $\mathcal{H}_\infty$ control, risk-sensitive control, linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control, and output feedback synthesis. In conjunction with these optimization results, we also discuss how direct policy optimization handles stability and robustness concerns in learning-based control, two main desiderata in control engineering. We conclude the survey by pointing out several challenges and opportunities at the intersection of learning and control.Comment: To Appear in Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous System

Sample-path solutions for simulation optimization problems and stochastic variational inequalities

inequality;simulation;optimization