38,738 research outputs found
The Conception of Life in Synthetic Biology
The phrase âsynthetic biology' is used to describe a set of different scientific and technological disciplines, which share the objective to design and produce new life forms. This essay addresses the following questions: What conception of life stands behind this ambitious objective? In what relation does this conception of life stand to that of traditional biology and biotechnology? And, could such a conception of life raise ethical concerns? Three different observations that provide useful indications for the conception of life in synthetic biology will be discussed in detail: 1. Synthetic biologists focus on different features of living organisms in order to design new life forms, 2. Synthetic biologists want to contribute to the understanding of life, and 3. Synthetic biologists want to modify life through a rational design, which implies the notions of utilising, minimising/optimising, varying and overcoming life. These observations indicate a tight connection between science and technology, a focus on selected aspects of life, a production-oriented approach to life, and a design-oriented understanding of life. It will be argued that through this conception of life synthetic biologists present life in a different light. This conception of life will be illustrated by the metaphor of a toolbox. According to the notion of life as a toolbox, the different features of living organisms are perceived as various rationally designed instruments that can be used for the production of the living organism itself or secondary products made by the organism. According to certain ethical positions this conception of life might raise ethical concerns related to the status of the organism, the motives of the scientists and the role of technology in our societ
A Functional Naturalism
I provide two arguments against value-free naturalism. Both are based on considerations concerning biological teleology. Value-free naturalism is the thesis that both (1) everything is, at least in principle, under the purview of the sciences and (2) all scientific facts are purely non-evaluative. First, I advance a counterexample to any analysis on which natural selection is necessary to biological teleology. This should concern the value-free naturalist, since most value-free analyses of biological teleology appeal to natural selection. My counterexample is unique in that it is likely to actually occur. It concerns the creation of synthetic life. Recent developments in synthetic biology suggest scientists will eventually be able to develop synthetic life. Such life, however, would not have any of its traits naturally selected for. Second, I develop a simple argument that biological teleology is a scientific but value-laden notion. Consequently, value-free naturalism is false. I end with some concluding remarks on the implications for naturalism, the thesis that (1). Naturalism may be salvaged only if we reject (2). (2) is a dogma that unnecessarily constrains our conception of the sciences. Only a naturalism that recognizes value-laden notions as scientifically respectable can be true. Such a naturalism is a functional naturalism
Motility at the origin of life: Its characterization and a model
Due to recent advances in synthetic biology and artificial life, the origin
of life is currently a hot topic of research. We review the literature and
argue that the two traditionally competing "replicator-first" and
"metabolism-first" approaches are merging into one integrated theory of
individuation and evolution. We contribute to the maturation of this more
inclusive approach by highlighting some problematic assumptions that still lead
to an impoverished conception of the phenomenon of life. In particular, we
argue that the new consensus has so far failed to consider the relevance of
intermediate timescales. We propose that an adequate theory of life must
account for the fact that all living beings are situated in at least four
distinct timescales, which are typically associated with metabolism, motility,
development, and evolution. On this view, self-movement, adaptive behavior and
morphological changes could have already been present at the origin of life. In
order to illustrate this possibility we analyze a minimal model of life-like
phenomena, namely of precarious, individuated, dissipative structures that can
be found in simple reaction-diffusion systems. Based on our analysis we suggest
that processes in intermediate timescales could have already been operative in
prebiotic systems. They may have facilitated and constrained changes occurring
in the faster- and slower-paced timescales of chemical self-individuation and
evolution by natural selection, respectively.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, Artificial Lif
Canguilhem and the logic of life
In this paper we examine aspects of Canguilhemâs philosophy of biology, concerning the
knowledge of life and its consequences on science and vitalism. His concept of life stems
from the idea of a living individual, endowed with creative subjectivity and norms, a Kantian
view which âdisconcerts logicâ. In contrast, two different approaches ground naturalistic
perspectives to explore the logic of life (Jacob) and the logic of the living individual
(Maturana and Varela) in the 1970s. Although Canguilhem is closer to the second, there are
divergences; for example, unlike them, he does not dismiss vitalism, often referring to it in
his work and even at times describing himself as a vitalist. The reason may lie in their different
views of science
Overcoming the Newtonian Paradigm: The Unfinished Project of Theoretical Biology from a Schellingian Perspective
Defending Robert Rosenâs claim that in every confrontation between physics and biology it is physics that
has always had to give ground, it is shown that many of the most important advances in mathematics
and physics over the last two centuries have followed from Schellingâs demand for a new physics that
could make the emergence of life intelligible. Consequently, while reductionism prevails in biology, many
biophysicists are resolutely anti-reductionist. This history is used to identify and defend a fragmented but
progressive tradition of anti-reductionist biomathematics. It is shown that the mathematicoephysico
echemical morphology research program, the biosemiotics movement, and the relational biology of
Rosen, although they have developed independently of each other, are built on and advance this antireductionist tradition of thought. It is suggested that understanding this history and its relationship to the broader history of post-Newtonian science could provide guidance for and justify both the integration of these strands and radically new work in post-reductionist biomathematics
Beyond persons: extending the personal / subpersonal distinction to non-rational animals and artificial agents
The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agentâs interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to do completely without the distinction, while using agent-centered concepts all the way. It is argued that the rejection of agent level explanations in favour of mechanistic ones is due to an unmotivated need to choose among representationalism and eliminativism. The dilemma is a false one if the possibility of a radical form of externalism is considered
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