106,251 research outputs found

    Spatial groundings for meaningful symbols

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    The increasing availability of ontologies raises the need to establish relationships and make inferences across heterogeneous knowledge models. The approach proposed and supported by knowledge representation standards consists in establishing formal symbolic descriptions of a conceptualisation, which, it has been argued, lack grounding and are not expressive enough to allow to identify relations across separate ontologies. Ontology mapping approaches address this issue by exploiting structural or linguistic similarities between symbolic entities, which is costly, error-prone, and in most cases lack cognitive soundness. We argue that knowledge representation paradigms should have a better support for similarity and propose two distinct approaches to achieve it. We first present a representational approach which allows to ground symbolic ontologies by using Conceptual Spaces (CS), allowing for automated computation of similarities between instances across ontologies. An alternative approach is presented, which considers symbolic entities as contextual interpretations of processes in spacetime or Differences. By becoming a process of interpretation, symbols acquire the same status as other processes in the world and can be described (tagged) as well, which allows the bottom-up production of meaning

    Autonomic computing architecture for SCADA cyber security

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    Cognitive computing relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These technologies can be used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment and can autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation. IBM first used the term ‘Autonomic Computing’ in 2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has been inspired by the human biological autonomic system. An autonomic system is self-healing, self-regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator

    LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PARTITIONING OF MIND: DEPICTING THE SAME MAP?

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    The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that empirically delimited structures of mind are also differentiable by means of systematic logical analysis. In the sake of this aim, the paper first summarizes Demetriou's theory of cognitive organization and growth. This theory assumes that the mind is a multistructural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialized structural systems (SSSs) that guide processing within different reality and knowledge domains, and a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. In the second part the paper focuses on the SSSs, which are the target of our logical analysis, and it summarizes a series of empirical studies demonstrating their autonomous operation. The third part develops the logical proof showing that each SSS involves a kernel element that cannot be reduced to standard logic or to any other SSS. The implications of this analysis for the general theory of knowledge and cognitive development are discussed in the concluding part of the paper

    Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children's intuitive reasoning

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    This is an author-created version of this article. The original source of publication is Psychon Bull Rev. 2006 Dec;13(6):935-53 The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com Published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF0321390

    The intersection between Descriptivism and Meliorism in reasoning research: further proposals in support of 'soft normativism'

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    The rationality paradox centres on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative standards. Elqayam and Evans (e.g., 2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favour of a ‘value-free’ descriptive approach to studying high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans’ position, we defend an alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism’, which allows for normative evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. We propose that normative theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilising normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought’ inference in this context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution’ to this contested inference that is based on the concept of ‘informal reflective equilibrium’. Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and Evans’ recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programmes that are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist research programmes have a valuable reciprocal relationship with descriptivist accounts of reasoning. In sum, we believe that descriptions of reasoning processes are fundamentally enriched by evaluations of reasoning quality, and argue that if such standards are discarded altogether then our explanations and descriptions of reasoning processes are severely undermined

    Literal Perceptual Inference

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    In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

    The Potency Of Metacognitive Learning To Foster Mathematical Logical Thinking

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    The ability of thinking logically needs to be developed due to the fact that it is an essential basic skill. Logical thinking affects that giving reason must be true, and that a sequence of assumptions is based on the high truth value. Mathematics is a subject that functions to train students to think logically. The understanding of logic will help students to arrange the proof that support through process to finally arrive at a conclusion. Currently, metacognition is viewed as an essential element of learning. It refers to someone knowledge of processes and the result itself or of that connected to the process. Metacognition is needed when student solves the task that needs argumentation and logical understanding. In order to help student to skillful think logically, mathematics learning must be designed as such so that the condition will raise the skill of metacognitive acts. Key words: metacognitive learning, mathematical logical thinkin
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