Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the irreversibility of early actions plays an important role in the choice among them. We characterize the strategic effects of the reversibility option on the coordination outcome. Such an option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and we determine the direction of the effect based only on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on a generalization of the Laplacian property known from static global games: players at the beginning of a dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed about aggregate play of fellow players in each stage of the coordination process.: Delay, Exit, Global Games, Laplacian Belief, Learning, Option, Reversibility.

Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination

A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium selection in simple coordination games. In this paper we analyze and discuss the solution concept for common coordination problems as incorporated in the theory of Team Reasoning (TR). Special consideration is given to TR’s concept of opportunistic choice and to the resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which teams were given a chance to coordinate on a particular pattern of behavior in a sequence of HiLo games. A modification of the stage game offered opportunities to improve on the team goal through changing this accustomed pattern of behavior. Our observations throw considerable doubt on the idea of opportunistic team reasoning as a guide to coordination. Contrary to what TR would predict, individuals tend to stick to accustomed behavioral patterns. Moreover, we find that individual decisions are at least partly determined by private information not accessible to all members of a team. Alternative theories of choice, in particular cognitive hierarchy theory may be more suitable to explain the observed pattern of behavior

Government Policy and the Probability of Coordination Failures

This paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria. Such models are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible policy choice. We employ a selection mechanism that assigns, ex ante, a probability to each equilibrium indicating how likely it is to obtain. We show how such a mechanism can be derived as the natural result of an adaptive learning process. This approach leads to a well-defined optimal policy problem, and has important implications for the conduct of government policy. We illustrate these implications using a simple model of technology adoption under network externalities.

Density, structure and dynamics of water: the effect of Van der Waals interactions

It is known that ab initio molecular dynamics (AIMD) simulations of liquid water, based on the generalized gradient approximation (GGA) to density functional theory (DFT), yield structural and diffusive properties in reasonable agreement with experiment only if artificially high temperatures are used in the simulations. The equilibrium density, at normal conditions, of DFT water has been recently shown by Schmidt et al. [J. Phys. chem. B, 113, 11959 (2009)] to be underestimated by different GGA functionals for exchange and correlation, and corrected by the addition of interatomic pair potentials to describe van derWaals (vdW) interactions. In this contribution we present a DFTAIMD study of liquid water using several GGA functionals as well as the van der Waals density functional (vdW-DF) of Dion et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 246401(2004)]. As expected, we find that the density of water is grossly underestimated by GGA functionals. When a vdW-DF is used, the density improves drastically and the experimental diffusivity is reproduced without the need of thermal corrections. We analyze the origin of the density differences between all the functionals. We show that the vdW-DF increases the population of non-H-bonded interstitial sites, at distances between the first and second coordination shells. However, it excessively weakens the H-bond network, collapsing the second coordination shell. This structural problem is partially associated to the choice of GGA exchange in the vdW-DF. We show that a different choice for the exchange functional is enough to achieve an overall improvement both in structure and diffusivity.Comment: 11 pages, 9 figures, submitted. Revised versio

Controllability problems in MSC-based testing

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Computer Journal following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Dan, H and Hierons, RM (2012), "Controllability Problems in MSC-Based Testing", The Computer Journal, 55(11), 1270-1287] is available online at: http://comjnl.oxfordjournals.org/content/55/11/1270. Copyright @ The Authors 2011.In testing systems with distributed interfaces/ports, we may place a separate tester at each port. It is known that this approach can introduce controllability problems which have received much attention in testing from finite state machines. Message sequence charts (MSCs) form an alternative, commonly used, language for modelling distributed systems. However, controllability problems in testing from MSCs have not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, controllability problems in MSC test cases are analysed with three notions of observability: local, tester and global. We identify two types of controllability problem in MSC-based testing. It transpires that each type of controllability problem is related to a type of MSC pathology. Controllability problems of timing are caused by races but not every race causes controllability problems; controllability problems of choice are caused by non-local choices and not every non-local choice causes controllability problems. We show that some controllability problems of timing are avoidable and some controllability problems of choice can be overcome when testers have better observational power. Algorithms are provided to tackle both types of controllability problems. Finally, we show how one can overcome controllability problems using a coordination service with status messages based on algorithms developed in this paper.EPSR

An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout With Conformist Citizens

We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population's size or the groups' composition are also done.Turnout, Turnout, coordination games, Poisson games, conformism, selection dynamics.