Optimizing Your Online-Advertisement Asynchronously

We consider the problem of designing optimal online-ad investment strategies for a single advertiser, who invests at multiple sponsored search sites simultaneously, with the objective of maximizing his average revenue subject to the advertising budget constraint. A greedy online investment scheme is developed to achieve an average revenue that can be pushed to within $O(\epsilon)$ of the optimal, for any $\epsilon>0$, with a tradeoff that the temporal budget violation is $O(1/\epsilon)$. Different from many existing algorithms, our scheme allows the advertiser to \emph{asynchronously} update his investments on each search engine site, hence applies to systems where the timescales of action update intervals are heterogeneous for different sites. We also quantify the impact of inaccurate estimation of the system dynamics and show that the algorithm is robust against imperfect system knowledge

Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding Infinite-Duration Games

In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid for the right to move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known to have a clean and elegant mathematical structure that relies on the ability of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many applications, however, require a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the monetary value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games form a large determined subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the strong property that there always exists exactly one player who can guarantee winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete bidding games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role in discrete-bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and show that, while some do not admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply determinacy for every pair of initial budgets

Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

Rational bidding using reinforcement learning: an application in automated resource allocation

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational resources is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic resource provisioning and usage of computational resources, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a framework for supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation and the generation of bids. Secondly, we introduce a consumer-side reinforcement learning bidding strategy which enables rational behavior by the generation and selection of bids. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare this bidding strategy against a truth-telling bidding strategy for two kinds of market mechanisms – one centralized and one decentralized

A Reliable and Cost-Efficient Auto-Scaling System for Web Applications Using Heterogeneous Spot Instances

Cloud providers sell their idle capacity on markets through an auction-like mechanism to increase their return on investment. The instances sold in this way are called spot instances. In spite that spot instances are usually 90% cheaper than on-demand instances, they can be terminated by provider when their bidding prices are lower than market prices. Thus, they are largely used to provision fault-tolerant applications only. In this paper, we explore how to utilize spot instances to provision web applications, which are usually considered availability-critical. The idea is to take advantage of differences in price among various types of spot instances to reach both high availability and significant cost saving. We first propose a fault-tolerant model for web applications provisioned by spot instances. Based on that, we devise novel auto-scaling polices for hourly billed cloud markets. We implemented the proposed model and policies both on a simulation testbed for repeatable validation and Amazon EC2. The experiments on the simulation testbed and the real platform against the benchmarks show that the proposed approach can greatly reduce resource cost and still achieve satisfactory Quality of Service (QoS) in terms of response time and availability

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst-case efficiency of (1-(1/e)) relative to the optimal node embedding, or VNET embedding if virtual links are mapped to exactly one physical link. This bound is optimal, that is, no better polynomial-time approximation algorithm exists, unless P=NP. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared to existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how by appropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.CNS-0963974 - National Science Foundationhttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/ToN-CAD.pdfAccepted manuscrip