23,276 research outputs found

    Unanimously acceptable agreements for negotiation teams in unpredictable domains

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    A negotiation team is a set of agents with common and possibly also conflicting preferences that forms one of the parties of a negotiation. A negotiation team is involved in two decision making processes simultaneously, a negotiation with the opponents, and an intra-team process to decide on the moves to make in the negotiation. This article focuses on negotiation team decision making for circumstances that require unanimity of team decisions. Existing agent-based approaches only guarantee unanimity in teams negotiating in domains exclusively composed of predictable and compatible issues. This article presents a model for negotiation teams that guarantees unanimous team decisions in domains consisting of predictable and compatible, and alsounpredictable issues. Moreover, the article explores the influence of using opponent, and team member models in the proposing strategies that team members use. Experimental results show that the team benefits if team members employ Bayesian learning to model their teammates’ preferences. 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.This research is partially supported by TIN2012-36586-C03-01 of the Spanish government and PROMETEOII/2013/019 of Generalitat Valenciana. Other part of this research is supported by the Dutch Technology Foundation STW, applied science division of NWO and the Technology Program of the Ministry of Economic Affairs; the Pocket Negotiator Project with Grant No. VICI-Project 08075.Sánchez Anguix, V.; Aydogan, R.; Julian Inglada, VJ.; Jonker, C. (2014). Unanimously acceptable agreements for negotiation teams in unpredictable domains. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications. 13(4):243-265. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2014.05.002S24326513

    Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

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    Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

    An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

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    Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

    Bargaining and Influence in Conflict Situations

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    [Excerpt] This chapter examines bargaining as an influence process through which actors attempt to resolve a social conflict. Conflict occurs when two or more interdependent actors have incompatible preferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from each other (Blalock 1989; Kriesberg 1982). Bargaining is a basic form of goal-directed action that involves both intentions to influence and efforts by each actor to carry out these intentions. Tactics are verbal and/or nonverbal actions designed to maneuver oneself into a favorable position vis-a-vis another or to reach some accommodation. Our treatment of bargaining subsumes the concept of negotiation (see Morley and Stephenson 1977). This chapter is organized around a conceptual framework that distinguishes basic types of bargaining contexts. We begin by introducing the framework and then present an overview of and analyze theoretical and empirical work on each type of bargaining context

    Uses of the argumentation in the negotiation

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    In the recent literature on conflict resolution tends to underline negotiation model based on the argument or dialogue. Exchange between different styles of argument some trends have emerged in the rhetoric applied to the law, especially in procedural law. During the last decade researchers have recognized the value of the argument to understand various problems of jurisprudence in cases of conflict and strife. This paper proposes a complementary design to the analysis of the negotiation process based on debate and dialogue. It advocates a theory of argumentation in negotiation processes for instances where rational agents use strategies unpredictable with incomplete information.Persuasion, argumentation, negotiation, conflicts and science social.

    The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings.

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    We investigate the influence of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on exchange theory, we expect that buyers with detailed cost information and less power than their opponent may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed cost information and that this result can be explained by the buyer's negotiation behavior.Behavior; Control; Cost; Exchange; Information; Negotiations;

    Climate change in game theory context

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    The aim of this paper is to survey the game theory modelling of the behaviour of global players in mitigation and adaptation related to climate change. Three main fields are applied for the specific aspects of temperature rise: behaviour games, CPR problem and negotiation games. The game theory instruments are useful in analyzing strategies in uncertain circumstances, such as the occurrence and impacts of climate change. To analyze the international players’ relations, actions, attitude toward carbon emission, negotiation power and motives, several games are applied for the climate change in this paper. The solution is surveyed, too, for externality problem
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