The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games

Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe.Bribery, Coalition Formation, Computational Complexity

Efficient Emission Fees in the U.S. Electricity Sector

This paper provides new estimates of efficient emission fees for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions in the U.S. electricity sector. The estimates are obtained by coupling a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity markets with an integrated assessment model that links changes in emissions with atmospheric transport, environmental endpoints, and valuation of impacts. Efficient fees are found by comparing incremental benefits with emission levels. National quantity caps that are equivalent to these fees also are computed, and found to approximate caps under consideration in the current multi-pollutant debate in the U.S. Congress and the recent proposals from the Bush administration for the electricity industry. We also explore whether regional differentiation of caps on different pollutants is likely to enhance efficiency.emissions trading, emission fees, air pollution, cost-benefit analysis, electricity, particulates, nitrogen oxides, NOx, sulfur dioxide, SO2, health benefits

Moving Beyond Cleanup: Identifying the Crucibles of Environmental Gentrification

This paper reviews the distributional impacts associated with "environmental gentrification" following the cleanup and reuse of LULUs. By making a neighborhood more attractive, cleanup and reuse of LULUs may drive up local real estate prices. Renters in the neighborhood would have to pay higher rents. Moreover, existing residents may not value the removal of the disamenity as much as other households, creating a mismatch between their priorities and the new character of the neighborhood. Thus, even if they do not move, existing residents, especially renters, may be harmed by the gentrification effects of cleanup. We find that even a simple economic model does not yield clear predictions on neighborhood effects following cleanup, except for the initial effect of rising housing values. In the empirical literature, we actually find conflicting evidence of rising real estate prices following cleanup of LULUs. We find somewhat stronger evidence for increased housing density and increasing incomes, but no evidence for racial impacts. Our review also uncovers a variety of factors that are likely to minimize the likelihood of gentrification or temper its adverse consequences. Working Paper 07-2

Power distribution in the Basque Parliament using games with externalities

In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament since the restoration of the Spanish democracy. The classic simple games do not fit with the particular voting rule that it is used to invest the president of the regional government. In order to model this voting mechanism we incorporate coalitional externalities to the game. We use the extensions of the most popular power indices to games with externalities that have been proposed in the most recent literature. Moreover, we propose a method to estimate the probability of a given coalition based on the ideological positions of its members in a two-dimensional political spectrum

Designing Economic Instruments for the Environment in a Decentralized Fiscal System

When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to take the region, and the government, as a given; that is, this work has neglected important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the various levels of government. It typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?market failure, environmental federalism, externalities, fiscal decentralization, subsidiarity principle, economic instruments

On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities

The identification of the most potentially hazardous agents in a terrorist organisation helps to prevent further attacks by effectively allocating surveillance resources and destabilising the covert network to which they belong. In this paper, several mechanisms for the overall ranking of covert networks members in a general framework are addressed based on their contribution to the overall relative effectiveness in the event of a merger. In addition, the possible organisation of agents outside of each possible merger naturally influences their relative effectiveness score, which motivates the innovative use of games in partition function form and specific ranking indices for individuals. Finally, we apply these methods to analyse the effectiveness of the hijackers of the covert network supporting the 9/11 attacksThis work is part of the R+D+I project grants MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P and PID2021-124030NB-C32, funded byMCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research was also funded by Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2021/24 from the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Universidades, Xunta de Galicia.S

Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Games with Externalities

We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main novelty of our generalization is a monotonicity property that we define for games in partition function form. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on these kind of coalitions. We provide methods based on the multilinear extension of the game to compute the indices. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the current Parliament of Andalusia

Power indices and minimal winning coalitions for simple games in partition function form

We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity property that we define in this context. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on such coalitions. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the Parliament of Andalusia that emerged after the elections of March 22, 2015

Welfare Effects of Anti-Sprawl Policies in the Presence of Urban Decline

This paper extends first-best analysis of anti-sprawl policies, such as development taxes, and examines the welfare effects of development taxes in the presence of urban decline at the city core. We find that anti-sprawl policies generate several important feedbacks within the urban system, generating additional welfare gains and affecting the level of urban decline and suburban sprawl. Further, the optimal development tax exceeds the (first-best) Pigouvian level, irrespective of whether or not revenues are returned lump-sum to all landowners or earmarked for urban decline mitigation.urban sprawl, development taxes, second-best policies, spatial modeling, Land Economics/Use,

Designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system

When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government. For example, externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions. Also, local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction, but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions. Finally, the existence of locally-generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government. The standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate (or national) perspective, it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services, as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?Environmental Economics&Policies,Debt Markets,Taxation&Subsidies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Emerging Markets