181 research outputs found
Science as systems learning. Some reflections on the cognitive and communicational aspects of science
This paper undertakes a theoretical investigation of the 'learning' aspect of science as opposed to the 'knowledge' aspect. The practical background of the paper is in agricultural systems research â an area of science that can be characterised as 'systemic' because it is involved in the development of its own subject area, agriculture. And the practical purpose of the theoretical investigation is to contribute to a more adequate understanding of science in such areas, which can form a basis for developing and evaluating systemic research methods, and for determining appropriate criteria of scientific quality. Two main perspectives on science as a learning process are explored: research as the learning process of a cognitive system, and science as a social, communicational system. A simple model of a cognitive system is suggested, which integrates both semiotic and cybernetic aspects, as well as a model of selfreflective learning in research, which entails moving from an inside 'actor' stance to an outside 'observer' stance, and back. This leads to a view of scientific knowledge as inherently contextual and to the suggestion of reflexive objectivity and relevance as two related key criteria of good science
Psychosocial: qu'est-ce que c'est?
My title - which of course is inspired by the Talking Heads and by Asbo Derek â reflects the preoccupation with the nature and limits of psychosocial studies expressed, quite appropriately, at the inaugural APS (Association for Psychosocial Studies) meeting. My unscripted comments at that meeting were intended to encourage an open definition of psychosocial studies as a critical and non-foundational transdiscipline, and, in line with this, to discourage the premature consolidation of a version of psychosocial studies foundationed upon psychoanalysis. Such a foundation risks an unfortunate âhardeningâ of the categories âinner worldâ and âouter worldâ â a hardening which lodges a false sense of disciplinary expertise just where an open channel of constructive interchange is most required
The Incipient Mind Argument: The Persistence of Absolutist Thinking in Biological Philosophy of Mind
The incipient mind argument is the central argument of Evan Thompsonâs solution to the so-called mind-body problem. This paper challenges Evan Thompsonâs (and Francisco Varelaâs) assumption of a pristine form of subjectivity, as well as of interiority in unicellular life forms. I claim that this assumption makes sense only as a useful strategy for an absolutist account of mind. In this paper, I argue that Thompsonâs thesis is erroneous at the object-level, as well as at the meta-level of his argumentation. By paying greater attention to the meta-level of his exposition, I show that Thompsonâs assumption of an âincipient mindâ obeys an absolutist, two-sided pattern of thinking and, therefore, that his argumentation fails to give an accurate account of the systemic generation and development of mind. After demonstrating this, I suggest an innovative action-based approach to mind in order to accurately give an account of its real-constructive development
- âŚ