Forbidden ways of life

I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could not develop under an autonomy-promoting education. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why autonomy-minded liberals should bite the bullet and accept this

Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism

This article argues that our nation\u27s ideological commitment to decentralized local governance has helped to create the phenomenon of the favored quarter. Localism, or the ideological commitment to local governance, has helped to produce fragmented metropolitan regions stratified by race and income. This fragmentation produces a collective action problem or regional prisoner\u27s dilemma that is well-known in the local governance literature

Sisyphus & the Labor of Imagination: Autonomy, Cultural Production and the Antinomies of Worker Self-Management

Is there any radical potential left in the notion and practices of worker self-management? What I want do in this essay is to try and see if it is possible to distill something of a radical kernel from the many difficulties and complications that confront it, particularly within fields of cultural production. How can self-management contribute to what Jacques Ranciere describes as a movement not of slaves filled with ressentiment, but of people living and embodying a new time of sociability and cooperation, creating resources and skills that can spread out from this, rather than being caught and contained by the conditions of is own creation? Drawing from my own experiences working in Ever Reviled Records, a worker owned and run record label, I want to ferret out--conducting something akin to an organizational autoethnography--hints as to whether or not self-management could be useful for radical social struggles today

Treatment as an Individual and the Priority of Persons Over Groups in Antidiscrimination Law

The Supreme Court has said that the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination require that all persons be treated as individuals and that the laws operate primarily to protect “persons, not groups.” This article shows that the legal requirement of individual treatment has two distinct components: a rule invalidating inferences about persons based on their membership in protected groups and a rule prohibiting disparate treatment for the sake of group interests or intergroup equality. The first rule is rooted in moral principles of respect for individual autonomy. The second rule is a principle that gives lexical priority to individual rights over group welfare. Both are formal, anti-classification rules that abjure reliance on group concerns, and both are central to antidiscrimination law. Neither rule, however, mandates group-blindness or entails the categorical irrelevance of group classifications. Antidiscrimination law cannot be completely understood without reference to goals of substantive intergroup equality. The rules of individual treatment and the protection of “persons, not groups” represent formal constraints on the means by which substantive equality can be sought. They should not be mistaken as substitutes for it

Promise, Agreement, Contract

It is natural to wonder about contract law’s relationship to the morality of promises and agreements. This Chapter distinguishes two ways to conceive of that relationship. First, parties’ agreement-based moral obligations might figure into the explanation of contract law—into an account of its functions or justifications. Contract law might serve to enforce parties’ first-order performance obligations, to enforce second-order remedial obligations, to support the culture of making and keeping agreements more generally, or at least to do no harm to that culture or to people’s ability to act morally. Second, contract can be understood as the legal analog to promise. Both contract and promise enable people to undertake new obligations to one another when they wish. Each is a type of normative power, the one legal, the other moral. The Chapter concludes by arguing that these two ways of thinking about contract law are not mutually exclusive. Contract law both imposes on parties to exchange agreements a legal obligation to perform for reasons independent of the parties’ possible contractual intent, and confers on them the power to undertake that legal obligation when they so intend because they so intend

The reign of Prince Auto : psychology in an age of science

Copyright SpringerThe principle of autonomy (hereafter Prince Auto) is a doctrine which commits physicalistic philosophers to mechanical explanations of human behaviour. In this paper I argue that physicalism (in all its forms) presents a much too narrow account of scientific explanation. If we are to develop an adequate philosophy of psychology we must first free ourselves from the rule of a metaphysical picture which has dominated philosophy since at least the time of Descartes. We must free ourselves from the reign of Prince Auto.Peer reviewe