The Anglosphere Core as a Pluralistic Security Community

This thesis posits that in the post World War 2 era, a nexus of relationships has given rise to a transnational group of five states that form a Deutschian security community. This Anglospheric security community of the US, UK, Australia and NZ, is examined by utilising Adler and Barnett’s security community model. The model is adapted to give greater weight to the role of memes/culture. It finds that it is culture factors (meme-complexes) related to political values and social behaviour that inform the nature, and modus operandi of this Anglospheric security community. The Brexit debate on the UK’s future is found to have illuminated these issues by exposing aspects the contradictions between the competing meme-complexes of the wider Anglospheric community and the EU. The Anglospheric security community’s durability and progress is found to be directly related to notions of legitimacy. This conclusion is informed by revisiting Deutsch’s original writings on the difference between naturally developing communities and the dangers of policy-elites creating political constructs that run counter to cultural considerations. A values-based meme-complex found to provides not just a common identity but to inform the nature of the Anglospheric security community from which it accrues legitimacy. It is further posited that the Adler and Barnett model’s standard categorisations of pluralistic security community types do not adequately describe certain features of the Anglospheric security community. The research in this thesis has uncovered new institutions and fora and established that members do assist one another in conflict and confirms it to be a tightly-coupled version. However, the Anglospheric security community displays an actorship not implicit in Adler and Barnett’s categorisation. This thesis offers the terms ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ to describe functional and dysfunctional communities. The Anglospheric security community is held to be synergic since it exhibits actorship on defence and security matters externally. In contrast the European Union is held up to be hemiplegic due to endemic problems to function cohesively on external defence issues

A "special relationship": bridging the NATO intelligence gap

Despite NATOs long history of close military cooperation and coordination, the Alliance cannot fully support major multinational operations. Tested by conflicts in the 1990s through to the recent war in Libya, NATO capabilities have consistently fallen short. During each conflict, intelligence played a key role in securing victory, but NATOs operational successes were made possible only through substantial U.S. intelligence support. The lack of an independent NATO intelligence capability presents a problem for the United States, which needs a NATO capable of conducting operations in the event of a simultaneous conflict in another region. Given the rise of austerity measures in Europe, it is unlikely that European governments will provide additional funding to establish a comprehensive NATO intelligence capability. Therefore, the U.S. should establish an enhanced intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO to offset the paucity of NATO intelligence support and operational resources. Intelligence sharing can increase international cooperation and allow for greater burden sharing among allies. This is most aptly demonstrated by the United Kingdom-U.S.A. (UKUSA) series of signals intelligence agreements developed during World War II, which arguably provided the foundation for the special relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. today.http://archive.org/details/aspecialrelation1094534652Lieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Britain and the Greek-Turkish war and settlement of 1919-1923: the pursuit of security by "proxy" in Western Asia Minor

The present study sets out to examine British policy over the area of Western Asia Minor and the Straits, one of the three vital strategic spots that Britain sought to safeguard in the area of the Near and Middle East, alongside Persia and Iraq, after the end of the First World War. The focus is on Britain’s attitude towards the Greek Expedition in Asia Minor and the ensuing Greek-Turkish war from 1919 to1922 with the settlement of 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. The work centres on examining British policy-making process regarding Western Asia Minor and the Straits. Within the British policy-making elite there was a split between those favouring the establishment of Greece as the new protector of British interests in the area, after Turkey’s defeat, and those wanting to continue supporting Turkey for this role. The War, Colonial and India offices inclined towards the former while David Lloyd George and elements within the Foreign Office opted for the Greek solution. The inability of the Greek forces to establish firmly the Greek occupation of Western Asia Minor by defeating the Turkish Nationalist forces in 1921 made a drastic change in the minds of those British policy-makers who had initially supported the Greek option inevitable. This, along with developments such as the Nationalist movement in turkey and the attempts of Britain’s friends and foes alike to contain its supremacy in the region contributed to the change of policy. The study illuminates themes like the Anglo-French relations over the Near and Middle East and British attitudes towards the role of Soviet Russia in the region. With the Treaty of Lausanne British policy returned to the traditional policy of supporting Turkey as the British proxy in the region. British policy-makers by 1923 had achieved a relative stability in the area of the Near and Middle East which remained unchallenged up until the outbreak of the Second World War

The collectors : Naval, Army and Air Intelligence in the New Zealand Armed Forces during the Second World War

This thesis examines the performance of the intelligence collection organisations of the armed services of New Zealand during the Second World War. It considers the intelligence bodies of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force and looks at their growth, development and demise, and assesses their effectiveness as intelligence organisations. The question of how much New Zealand could be expected to achieve in the field of intelligence arises, not least because New Zealand was demographically small, had a long coastline and was geographically relatively remote. How much could New Zealand contribute to the Allied cause in intelligence terms is another issue, and what forms did any participation take? Were there lessons to be learned from the wartime experience (there were, but they went for the most part largely unheeded)? New Zealand, like other countries, had a fragmented approach to intelligence collection, making for a degree of complexity over a range of activity, despite the intelligence organisations being of modest size. The examination of the organisations in this thesis includes multi-service and multi-departmental dimensions along with the production of useful intelligence. Whether good use was made of intelligence collected is another matter. There was a substantial amount of liaison, contact and practice between departments of state as to various aspects of intelligence, the Organization for National Security and coastwatching being two notable areas. The overarching role and limitations of the Organization for National Security with regard to intelligence is explored, and the development of a combined intelligence centre examined. The participation of New Zealand signals intelligence organisations in the great Allied interception offensive is detailed, along with the mundane but fundamental task of coastal surveillance. The establishment and spectacular decline of the first local independent security service is traced. Both the intelligence and security aspects of the Army's operationally deployed units are covered, along with the growth of RNZAF air intelligence. The effectiveness of all of these organisations could hardly be expected to be uniform, and indeed it was not. Some bodies succeeded in their collection roles beyond expectations, others were reasonably effective, and two organisations failed dismally in different ways, for a number of reasons. If a pattern emerges at all, it is that small single service component-type intelligence sections collecting operational intelligence were the most effective New Zealand intelligence organisations. Operational focus and. operational requirements underlay the drive for successful collection. Most significant within the Allied context were the signals intelligence bodies. At the other end of the scale, larger co-operative interdepartmental New Zealand intelligence ventures failed to deliver projected results. New Zealand's armed forces had an interesting variety of intelligence contributions during the Second World War. Of these, the most effective organisations collected intelligence to meet directed operational requirements

The untold story: The role of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Canadian foreign intelligence.

Of the Canadian agencies involved in intelligence work, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has tended to be overlooked. In fact, DFAIT acts as a collector, analyzer and disseminator of foreign intelligence. It is actively involved in foreign intelligence collection, participates in international intelligence sharing, and contributes to the Canadian intelligence-community. This thesis explores and highlights for the first time DFAIT's involvement in foreign intelligence work, albeit selectively, over the past sixty years.The original print copy of this thesis may be available here: http://wizard.unbc.ca/record=b160009

Greece between East and West: a survey and an historical interpretation

Thesis (Ph.D.)—-Boston University.Greece's difficulties are not new nor entirely Greek and they became acute, from time to time, as a result of unusual circumstances. Deep problems underlie the fluctuating currents of Greek history, and the Great Powers have been party to many of Greece's difficulties, while Greece's neighbors have been instruments of Great Power machtpolitik in the Balkans. Greece's tragedy has been fourfold: first, its territory occupies the peninsula which commands an arena of intensepolitical rivalry. Second, since its creation it has been a small and poor nation occupying a strategic geographic position. Third, Greek liberation was made possible by the aid of many Powers that continued to retain their "interest" in Greece. Lastly, Greek nationalism which found fertile soil in the "Great Idea" with the belief that for survival the little kingdom had to strengthen itself economically and politically by absorbing adjacent lands. These lands, however, more often than not, were inhabited predominantly by Greeks who were faced with absorption or annihilation by a reawakening of Slavic Balkan peoples or renascent Ottoman nationalism. This situation led to a fervent and natural desire for enosis by exohellenes and the historical anagke and almost religious passion felt by the Greek Government to effect a union so long sought after and for so long desired. From the outset the Greeks were caught between East and West, for Greece's independence and later the extension of its boundaries could be realized only at the expense of Turkey and the policies of Austro-Hungary and England. For Austria, a continental Power, this meant maintenance of Metternich's "consecrated structure"; for England, an insular Power, it meant maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire since its dissolution would not only disrupt the equilibrium of Europe but its dismemberment would remove the last substantial political bulwark to Russian expansion. It is not surprising that Castlereagh could set aside his doctrine of noninterference in the Greek issue since, as in the Lowlands, its application would have threatened British interests. At the same time, Greece could expect little from Russia, for concessions from that quarter, notwithstanding the Tsarist ruse of protecting co-religionists would be at the expense of PanSlavism and Tsarist expansion. Furthermore, being non "Catholic," Greece could expect no sympathy from Catholic powers. Finally, her early boundaries, like most boundaries in the Near East, reflected neither a political nor an economic necessity but were drawn to guarantee weakness and rivalry and became an object of power politics. This inherent situation has brought Greece periodic chastisements and unsolicited transgressions by the Great Powers with serious effects on her domestic life as well as her inter-national position. Historically, Austria-Hungary, England, France, and Germany, individually or in collusion, had prevented Russian domination of the Balkans and the Near East; but recent history proved more favorable to the Soviet Union until Soviet designs against Greece and Turkey after World War II forced the United States to take a series of decisive actions best described as the "Truman Doctrine" which caused international Communism to suffer in Greece its first and only major defeat in the post-war period. As a result, Greece found a new protector in the United States, but at the same time fell more securely into the Western orbit. In 1841, Sir Edmund Lyons, the British Minister to Athens, made the prophetic statement, "A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. Greece is Russian or she is English; and since she must not be Russian, it is necessary that she be English." In 1947, the Truman Doctrine reaffirmed this dictum with the modification that since Greece cannot be English, it is necessary that she be "American.

Intelligence agencies in cyberspace: Adapting the intelligence cycle to cyber threats and opportunities

Intelligence has grown and changed dramatically over the past hundred years with the advent of cyberspace. This thesis will begin by examining how the intelligence cycle has adapted to accommodate cyber threats and opportunities, before conducting three national case studies examining the organisational changes in the signals intelligence agencies in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. It will utilise the analysis of how the intelligence cycle and States have grown to accommodate cyber phenomenon and will conduct two case studies on the recent events concerning Huawei and the hacking of the 2016 US Election. Through this, this thesis will ultimately show that one of the main responses to cyber by intelligence agencies has been increased social engagement, through interaction with the general public in a familiar cyber environment, such as Twitter, in an endeavour to combat the rise in cyber crime by promoting awareness of cyber security issues and ensuring people have the knowledge and means to keep themselves safe in cyber space. This has also involved the monitoring and combatting of extremist propaganda material disseminated online for the purposes of promoting extremist ideologies and indoctrinating vulnerable people

“Their Need Was Great”: Émigrés and Anglo-American Intelligence Operations in the Early Cold War

Covert action during the Cold War has been the subject of much historiography. This research, however, is based for the most part on primary sources, specifically on the records declassified in the United States in 2007 as a consequence of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. The majority of the historiography on this topic either predates or neglects these records. The study of covert operations inside the Iron Curtain during the early Cold War, sponsored by Western states using émigré agents, usually ends with the conclusion that these operations were a failure, both in operational terms and from the point of view of the intelligence gathered. I will challenge this conclusion, showing that not only the operations gathered a significant amount of intelligence, but also that the intelligence obtained was considered valuable by policymakers and had an impact in the planning and policymaking strategies of the early Cold War. The focus on primary sources also allowed a detailed description of the practical aspects of the operations, leading to a more coherent and solid analysis of their development and consequences. This study focuses on American operations, due to the abundance of records available. British operations have also been considered and assessed in the best way the author found possible. Two case studies have been selected, based on the nationality of the émigré agents used: White Russians and Ukrainians. The intelligence outcome from these operations has been carefully analysed, and their influence on policymaking assessed in the wider context of the Cold War. The conclusion is a complete re-evaluation of the importance and value of Western Human intelligence in the late 1940s and 1950s

Serbian Americans and Their Communities of Cleveland Volume 1

This first volume emphasizes the Serbian history, cultural traits, literature, immigration and the Serbian communities of Cleveland. The second volumedeals with Serbian art and is the only survey ever written on this subject in English.https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevmembks/1062/thumbnail.jp

Serbian Americans and Their Communities of Cleveland Volume 1

This first volume emphasizes the Serbian history, cultural traits, literature, immigration and the Serbian communities of Cleveland. The second volume deals with Serbian art and is the only survey ever written on this subject in English. Original publication date 1977.https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevmembks/1062/thumbnail.jp