Hoffmeister in his Proving Ground: Sicily, July–August 1943

Lieutenant-Colonel Bert Hoffmeister established his reputation as an able battlefield commander in Sicily. In the Campaign to wrest the Italian island from the Axis Powers, he fought with skill and courage. Both were important; commanders not only have to be technically competent at managing the men and resources under their command, they also have to able to do it when shells are falling and soldiers are dying. In the combat crucible of Sicily, Hoffmeister demonstrated his ability to do both

General Simonds Speaks: Canadian Battle Doctrine in Normandy

On the afternoon of 11 July 1944, a Canadian Corps HQ once again became operational on the soil of France. Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds assumed responsibility for 8,000 yards of front in the Caen sector. There was little time or inclination to mark this event or link it with the memory of the vaunted Canadian Corps of World War 1 fame—there was too much to be done. Elements of the newly-arrived 2nd Canadian Infantry Division would take over part of the line and acquire some badly needed experience. Plans for the Corps’ role in Operation “Goodwood” had to be elaborated while Simonds met with his Divisional and Brigade commanders. The following documents are reproduced from the War Diaries of the 2nd Field Historical Section, July 1944 (National Archives of Canada RG24 Volume 17506). Major A.T, Sesia, who commanded the unit, tried to record Simonds’ words in the first extract, but settled on a summary of the General’s views in subsequent reports

Clay-kickers of Flanders Fields: Canadian Tunnellers at Messines Ridge 1916-1917

This article explores the Canadian tunnelling companies’ military mining organisation and accomplishments in underground galleries during the Great War. This comprehensive study explains the crucial role played by the Canadian engineers, in conjunction with British and Australian engineers, in the successful detonation of nineteen deep mines at Messines Ridge, Belgium on 7 June 1917. The tunnellers’ perseverance and skill were evident that morning when they slammed home plungers and threw switches igniting the largest planned explosion up to that time. However, daily hardships and dangers of underground warfare from the claustrophobic environment to the stress from the eavesdropping enemy led to disciplinary action including Field Punishment No. 1

Clay-kickers of Flanders Fields: Canadian Tunnellers at Messines Ridge 1916-1917

This article explores the Canadian tunnelling companies’ military mining organisation and accomplishments in underground galleries during the Great War. This comprehensive study explains the crucial role played by the Canadian engineers, in conjunction with British and Australian engineers, in the successful detonation of nineteen deep mines at Messines Ridge, Belgium on 7 June 1917. The tunnellers’ perseverance and skill were evident that morning when they slammed home plungers and threw switches igniting the largest planned explosion up to that time. However, daily hardships and dangers of underground warfare from the claustrophobic environment to the stress from the eavesdropping enemy led to disciplinary action including Field Punishment No. 1

The Myth of the Learning Curve: Tactics and Training in the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1916-1918

Canadian military historians generally accept that during the First World War the Canadian military improved over time. This idea of a “learning curve” suggests that Canadians began the war as inexperienced colonial volunteers and, as the Corps gained experience on the battlefield, commanders and ordinary soldiers alike learned from their mistakes and successes and improved combat tactics from battle to battle and from year to year.1 Several different approaches to this argument are evident in the literature. Tim Cook and Bill Rawling both published works in the mid-1990s that argue technology was the impetus behind this process of learning. On the other hand, Shane Schreiber, James McWilliams and R. James Steel have focused on what they see as the ultimate success of the learning curve: the August 1918 Battle of Amiens.2 However, while technology played an important role in the conduct of the war, and the Battle of Amiens was indeed a significant Allied victory, one question remains: where is the hard evidence that this learning curve exists? One of the best ways to find evidence of “learning,” a largely abstract process, is through an examination of training. Because training is meant to impart specific knowledge, during the Great War written training instructions and orders were spelled out in minute and explicit detail and the lessons that were to be learned from various exercises were highlighted. While many excellent works have been produced on the Canadian Expeditionary Force, there is still room for further scholarship. Until recently, training has been a sorely neglected subject in the historiography. In recent years historians such as such as Andrew Iarocci and David Campbell have begun to re-examine training as a means of measuring and evaluating the learning curve.3 This paper builds on the work of previous scholars and extends some of their arguments while challenging others. It examines the training of the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade for the battles of the Somme and Amiens, as well as the official training manuals, to look at tactical change over time. It argues that while combat became more complex and “all arms” oriented, the basic tactical concepts of 1916 essentially remained the same in 1918. Except for terminology and the addition of new weapons, little changed in how the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade was taught to fight between the Somme and Amiens. Indeed, while new weapons were utilized and emphasized in training, they were merely integrated into existing tactical doctrine and had little appreciable impact on what was envisioned as the key to battlefield success

'Destructive and formidable': British infantry firepower, 1642-1765

This work is an examination of the effectiveness of British infantry firepower from 1642 to 1765, it establishes the manner in which that firepower was organised and managed and how it developed. In order to achieve this it has been necessary to develop and propose a new approach to the study of military history; practical military history, which uses a thorough understanding of the practices and procedures of the army to interpret and analyse contemporary writings on the subject. In doing so it has been possible to identify and analyse the effectiveness of the tactical doctrine and combat techniques of British infantry during the English Civil Wars and then to trace a continuous line of development of doctrine and technique from then until 1765, in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War, when this study concludes. It has also been possible to analyse the battlefield effectiveness of those techniques and to identify previously unrecognised aspects of them. It has also been possible to correct some long held misconceptions and to pinpoint times when key changes were brought about, such as the introduction of the organisation of platoons into firings. As well as identifying, for the first time, a single underlying tactical doctrine it has also been possible to clarify the manner in which the methods used to execute that doctrine changed

Incursion at Howz-e Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette

On 20 June 2007, Canadian and Afghan National Army forces supported by Dutch and American air forces conducted one of a series of incursions into the Zharey District west of Kandahar City. This incursion, called Operation SEASONS, was representative of operations undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in this area and is an evolution from how Canadian ground forces have been employed since they were re–introduced to the region in 2005. This account is based on the personal experiences of the author who observed these combat operations while they were in progress