Comparative Statics with Consumption Externalities

We consider the comparative statics of consumer demand when there are consumption externalities in one commodity between two individuals. We show that the externality can switch goods which would naturally be normal into inferior goods and as a result th e externality can also lead to Giffen goods. In addition the externality can transform complementarity relations between goods. Thus substitutes can become complements or vice versa once the feedback effects of the externality are taken into account. Next we consider the effect of externalities on Slutsky symmetry and negativity restrictions With consumption externalities there are generalised forms of such restrictions. We derive these both for the two individual case and for cases in which either there are two individuals but all goods may cause externalities or there is a single externality good but H individuals. We relate the generalised symmetry restrictions to the rank conditions of Browning and Chiappori. Finally we consider the effects of consumption externalities on consumer surplus analysis.

Estimating Global Environmental Implications of Agricultural Trade Liberalization: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis

Preliminary results indicate a reduction in agricultural trade barriers offers some benefits to poorer nations at the expense of some richer nations. A positive externality if trade liberalization is a decrease in coal combustion and a slight decrease in global CO2 emissions.Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade,

On the Viability of Gift Exchange in a Market Environment

Is gift-exchange inevitably to be crowded out by impersonal market exchange? The presence of a thick-market externality indicates that this is indeed likely to be the case. But reciprocity or gift-exchange induces social relations. The utility function is extended in order to take account of social relations in the form of symbolic utility or moral sentiments. As long as moral sentiments are valued high enough it is shown that both market and gift-exchange can coexist. The spontaneous order need not necessarily select the most efficient market size however.exchange;reciprocity;gifts;moral and extended preferences

Against the Virtual: Kleinherenbrink’s Externality Thesis and Deleuze’s Machine Ontology

Drawing from Arjen Kleinherenbrink's recent book, Against Continuity: Gilles Deleuze's Speculative Realism (2019), this paper undertakes a detailed review of Kleinherenbrink's fourfold "externality thesis" vis-à-vis Deleuze's machine ontology. Reading Deleuze as a philosopher of the actual, this paper renders Deleuzean syntheses as passive contemplations, pulling other (passive) entities into an (active) experience and designating relations as expressed through contraction. In addition to reviewing Kleinherenbrink's book (which argues that the machine ontology is a guiding current that emerges in Deleuze's work after Difference and Repetition) alongside much of Deleuze's oeuvre, we relate and juxtapose Deleuze's machine ontology to positions concerning externality held by a host of speculative realists. Arguing that the machine ontology has its own account of interaction, change, and novelty, we ultimately set to prove that positing an ontological "cut" on behalf of the virtual realm is unwarranted because, unlike the realm of actualities, it is extraneous to the structure of becoming-that is, because it cannot be homogenous, any theory of change vis-à-vis the virtual makes it impossible to explain how and why qualitatively different actualities are produced

Climate change in game theory context

The aim of this paper is to survey the game theory modelling of the behaviour of global players in mitigation and adaptation related to climate change. Three main fields are applied for the specific aspects of temperature rise: behaviour games, CPR problem and negotiation games. The game theory instruments are useful in analyzing strategies in uncertain circumstances, such as the occurrence and impacts of climate change. To analyze the international players’ relations, actions, attitude toward carbon emission, negotiation power and motives, several games are applied for the climate change in this paper. The solution is surveyed, too, for externality problem

"The Social Capital of Regional Dynamics: A Policy Perspective"

This paper deals with social capital as an extra-market externality, and its role for innovations and growth. It analyses the changes of innovation activity over time, from early industrialism to the global knowledge economy, how the relations between the actors of today's innovation systems have developed and the role of social networks for innovations. The different kinds of networks built by the three constructers of social networks: the individual, the organizations and the (public and civic) society are discussed. The role of public policy in building social capital for innovations and growth is analyzed.

Generalized externality games: economic applications.

This paper analyzes two specific economic problems: The division of profits between associated firms and the distribution of cost of a public good. We tackle these problems using game theoretic techniques. To do so, a new c1ass of games in characteristic function form, called Generalizad Externality Games is defined in this paper. Sorne attractive features of this c1ass of games are that the core is non-empty and that these new games there seems to be a connection with relational goods.Cooperative Games; Balanced Games; Core; Coob-Douglas Production; Public Goods; Relations Goods;

Aquaculture-Fisheries Interactions

In this paper, I investigate aquaculture externalities on fisheries, affecting either habitat, wild fish stock genetics, or fishing efficiency under open-access and rent-maximising fisheries. This is done with a Verhulst-Schaefer model of fish population-dynamics and production, coupled with a simple aquaculture production model. Externalities are modelled by letting carrying capacity, the stock’s intrinsic growth rate, or catchability coefficient in the fishery depend on aquaculture production. The different externalities can give totally opposite results on steady-state fishing effort, yield, and stock, even for only negative externalities. With a catchability externality, increased unit cost of fishing effort implies reduced aquaculture production to maximise benefits to society under reasonable assumptions. Resource allocation between the industries is analysed under three different coastal management regimes: 1) aquaculture has a primary right of use; 2) joint management of aquaculture and fishery; 3) fishers have a primary right of use, including the right to sell marine farming rights.Aquaculture, fisheries, externality, interactions, carrying capacity, intrinsic growth rate, catchability coefficient, habitat, genetics., Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade, Public Economics, Q22, R52,

Personal networks and locus of control in large urban centers of Argentina

El presente estudio se propone analizar la relación entre la representación del locus de control y las estructuras de vínculos interpersonales en la Argentina. A partir de una muestra (n=1500) de hogares representativa de siete grandes centros urbanos (>200 mil habitantes) se examina la relación entre la externalidad del locus de control y diferentes aspectos de las redes personales de cada participante. Los resultados muestran que a mayor cantidad de relaciones disponibles se encuentran niveles inferiores de externalidad del locus de control, así como también menores niveles de externalidad al disponerse de lazos interpersonales fuera del barrio y con vínculos de nivel socioeducativo alto. En este sentido, se verifican asociaciones significativas entre representación de control del entorno y estructuras vinculares.This study analyzes the relationship between locus of control and interpersonal relations structures in Argentina. After a representative sample (n = 1500) of households in seven major urban centers (>200,000 inhabitants), it examines the relationship between the externality of locus of control and different aspects of personal networks of each respondent. The results show that people having more relations experiment lower levels of externality of locus of control. Likewise, lower levels of externality are informed when personal ties outside the neighborhood are available, as well as ties high educational level. In this regard, significant associations are verified between control and personal relations structures.Fil: De Grande, Pablo Ernesto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Tariff Escalation and Invasive Species Risk

We investigate the interface between trade and invasive species (IS) risk, focusing on the existing tariff escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets and its implication IS risk. Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products exacerbates the risk of IS by biasing trade flows towards increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that reductions of tariff escalation by reduction of the tariff on processed goods increase allocative efficiency and reduce the IS externality, a win-win situation. We also identify policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods leading to win-win situations.International Relations/Trade,