141,394 research outputs found

    US assessments of Japanese ground warfare tactics and the Army’s campaigns in the Pacific theaters, 1943-45: lessons learned and methods applied

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    The article examines the evolution of US intelligence assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army's tactical methods during the Pacific War, and explains how the resulting perceptions influenced the development of American doctrine for fighting the Japanese. It argues that US evaluations of the Japanese were characterized primarily by the need to gain a realistic understanding of enemy fighting capabilities, coupled with a realization of the need to improve the army's techniques for fighting a successful campaign

    Dismantling the ‘Lesser Men’ and ‘Supermen’ myths: US intelligence on the imperial Japanese army after the fall of the Philippines, winter 1942 to spring 1943

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    During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April the last vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of tactical skill, and assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army tended to exaggerate the latter’s capabilities

    “To bury the dead and to feed the living” Allied Military Government in Sicily, 1943

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    “The Eyes of All Fixed on Sicily” Canada’s Unexpected Victory, 1943

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    No Shortage of Tanks!: The Canadian Army’s System for the Recovery, Repair and Replacement of A and B Vehicles and Major Weapons Systems

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    This article is an overview of the First Canadian Army in North West Europe’s ability to recover, repair and damaged, destroyed and broken down vehicles and weapons systems. This capability was a crucial factor in maintaining the overall combat power of the Canadian Army Overseas during operations in the last year of war. To support this argument the author examines Canadian wartime primary documents as well as multiple secondary sources

    The Experience of the 756th Tank Battalion in World War Two: A Microcosm

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    December 7, 1941, a day which will live in infamy, was the moment that the United States was plunged into the largest conflict that the world had ever seen. The sovereignty of the United States was being threatened at two ends of the globe by tyrannical leaders on the continent of Europe and the islands of the Pacific. In the years to come, the U.S. would have to fight to stop the spread of Emperor Hirohito\u27s army in the Pacific and Hitler\u27s Nazi Wermacht in Europe. It would take all the resources our mighty country could muster and the fighting spirit of the nation\u27s youth to conquer the enemy that was before us. The U.S.\u27s fighting spirit was displayed in battlefields the world over, but no more so than in the European Theatre of Operations by the 756th Tank Battalion. The wide and varied experience of the 756th Tank Battalion in its conquest through the European Theatre can be used as a microcosm that mirrors the experience of the soldiers who fought in the different sectors of that theatre. To trace the 756th from its roots in the Pacific Northwest to its final battle in Salzburg, Germany, helps one to better understand the experience of the American G.I. in the Second World War. To understand how the experience of the 756th Tank Battalion differed over time, location, and unit attachment in each facet of the European Theatre of Operations is to better understand how the characteristic American soldier\u27s experience differed over the same locations

    The Balance Sheet: The Costs and the Gains of the Bombing Campaign

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    Critics of the bomber offensive frequently argue that the material and human cost of the campaign far overshadowed the gains, and that the resources dedicated to it could have been more effectively utilized elsewhere. They have argued that the combat manpower could have been better used in the other fighting services, especially the army, and industry could have been used to produce more weapons for these fighting services. However, proponents of this line of thought assume that the weight of effort expended on the bombing campaign was inordinately high. Richard Overy maintains that it was actually rather modest. “Measured against the totals for the entire war effort (production and fighting), bombing absorbed 7 percent, rising to 12 percent in 1944–45. Since at least a proportion of bomber production went to other theatres of war, the aggregate figures for the direct bombing of Germany were certainly smaller than this. Seven percent of Britain’s war effort can hardly be regarded as an unreasonable allocation of resources.” Further, although some significant infantry shortages were experienced in 1944, they never reached an extremely critical overall level and were eventually rectified. With respect to materiel, none of the services was conspicuously wanting for anything by 1943, and the British effort was thereafter bolstered by substantial North American war production

    The Fighter-Bomber in the Normandy Campaign: The Role of 83 Group

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    The dichotomy between popular and academic history is, for most historians, and readers, an uncomfortable one. A book that appeals to a mass audience risks the scorn of academia, whereas a scholarly work may never reach beyond the confines of the university. While there are exceptions to this rule, John Keegan’s The Face of Battle being perhaps the most famous, by and large academic study runs parallel with popular accounts and rarely the twain meet. No where is this more prevalent in the study of military history than the question of the role played by tactical air power in the Normandy campaign. With over a half century of intense study and voluminous publication this subject continues to defy a comprehensive reconciliation. It has therefore remained an area of constant debate

    Fighting the Mujahideen: Lessons from the Soviet Counter-Insurgency Experience if Afghanistan

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    The Canadian Forces currently in Afghanistan as part of a NATO coalition are playing a major role in a counter-insurgency campaign directed against a resurgent Taliban threat. Dealing with this menace will not be easy as the Taliban, realizing they cannot defeat NATO’s superior military strength, have resorted to asymmetric actions that strike at the coalition’s will through the cumulative effects of terror and small-scale “hit and run” military operations. Although NATO must contend with these tactics, concentrating solely on the military aspects of the problem will not address the real danger. The true nature of the Taliban’s threat rests in its political strength and not in its military capability. In order to destroy the Taliban’s influence in the region a combination of political, social, economic, and military means are necessary. The complexities of dealing with these issues in a coherent manner are significant, but in the case of Afghanistan there is no precedent. Interestingly, the Soviets faced many of these same challenges while fighting a counter-insurgency campaign against the Mujahideen through much of the 1980s.1 The Soviet experience should be of interest to coalition members as it provides a contemporary example of the challenges of conducting counter-insurgency operations within that country. Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets followed a logical and multifaceted, if somewhat brutal, counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. A critical examination of the Soviet performance reveals that many of their failings can be directly attributed to a lack of resources and in this respect, there are a surprising number of similarities between the operational environment the Soviets faced and the situation that now confronts NATO. This paper will explore aspects of Soviet counterinsurgency operations during their occupation of Afghanistan, and assess strengths and weaknesses relevant to current operations in that country.
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