RAMPART: RowHammer Mitigation and Repair for Server Memory Systems

RowHammer attacks are a growing security and reliability concern for DRAMs and computer systems as they can induce many bit errors that overwhelm error detection and correction capabilities. System-level solutions are needed as process technology and circuit improvements alone are unlikely to provide complete protection against RowHammer attacks in the future. This paper introduces RAMPART, a novel approach to mitigating RowHammer attacks and improving server memory system reliability by remapping addresses in each DRAM in a way that confines RowHammer bit flips to a single device for any victim row address. When RAMPART is paired with Single Device Data Correction (SDDC) and patrol scrub, error detection and correction methods in use today, the system can detect and correct bit flips from a successful attack, allowing the memory system to heal itself. RAMPART is compatible with DDR5 RowHammer mitigation features, as well as a wide variety of algorithmic and probabilistic tracking methods. We also introduce BRC-VL, a variation of DDR5 Bounded Refresh Configuration (BRC) that improves system performance by reducing mitigation overhead and show that it works well with probabilistic sampling methods to combat traditional and victim-focused mitigation attacks like Half-Double. The combination of RAMPART, SDDC, and scrubbing enables stronger RowHammer resistance by correcting bit flips from one successful attack. Uncorrectable errors are much less likely, requiring two successful attacks before the memory system is scrubbed.Comment: 16 pages, 13 figures. A version of this paper will appear in the Proceedings of MEMSYS2

A Review paper on the Memory Built-In Self-Repair with Redundancy Logic

The Present review paper expresses the word oriented memory test methodology for Built-In Self-Repair (BISR). To replace the defect words few logics are introduced. These logics are memory BIST logic and Wrapper logic. Whenever a test is carries on, the defected words are pointed out by its address only and these addresses are called failing address. The failing addresses are stored in the fuse box. Using fuse box it avoids the classic redundancy concept, where the RAMS has spare rows and columns. After the detection of faulty address, they are stored in redundancy logic. During test and redundancy configuration, the fuse box is connected to a scan registernbsp by this processnbsp inputnbsp and output data can be evaluated

March CRF: an Efficient Test for Complex Read Faults in SRAM Memories

In this paper we study Complex Read Faults in SRAMs, a combination of various malfunctions that affect the read operation in nanoscale memories. All the memory elements involved in the read operation are studied, underlining the causes of the realistic faults concerning this operation. The requirements to cover these fault models are given. We show that the different causes of read failure are independent and may coexist in nanoscale SRAMs, summing their effects and provoking Complex Read Faults, CRFs. We show that the test methodology to cover this new read faults consists in test patterns that match the requirements to cover all the different simple read fault models. We propose a low complexity (?2N) test, March CRF, that covers effectively all the realistic Complex Read Fault

On the use of error detecting and correcting codes to boost security in caches against side channel attacks

Microprocessor memory is sensitive to cold boot attacks. In this kind of attacks, memory remanence is exploited to download its content after the microprocessor has been struck by a hard boot. If just in this moment, a crypto-algorithm was in execution, the memory data can be downloaded into a backup memory and specialized tools can be used to extract the secret keys. In the main memory data can be protected using efficient encryption techniques but in caches this is not possible unless the performance becomes seriously degraded. Recently, an interleaved scrambling technique (IST) was presented to improve the security of caches against cold boot attacks. While IST is effective for this particular kind of attacks, a weakness exists against side channel attacks, in particular using power analysis. Reliability of data in caches is warranted by means of error detecting and correcting codes. In this work it is shown how these kinds of codes can be used not only to improve reliability but also the security of data. In particular, a self-healing technique is selected to make the IST technique robust against side channel attacks using power analysis.Postprint (author’s final draft

Design techniques for dense embedded memory in advanced CMOS technologies

University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. February 2012. Major: Electrical Engineering. Advisor: Chris H. Kim. 1 computer file (PDF); viii, 116 pages.On-die cache memory is a key component in advanced processors since it can boost micro-architectural level performance at a moderate power penalty. Demand for denser memories only going to increase as the number of cores in a microprocessor goes up with technology scaling. A commensurate increase in the amount of cache memory is needed to fully utilize the larger and more powerful processing units. 6T SRAMs have been the embedded memory of choice for modern microprocessors due to their logic compatibility, high speed, and refresh-free operation. However, the relatively large cell size and conflicting requirements for read and write make aggressive scaling of 6T SRAMs challenging in sub-22 nm. In this dissertation, circuit techniques and simulation methodologies are presented to demonstrate the potential of alternative options such as gain cell eDRAMs and spin-torque-transfer magnetic RAMs (STT-MRAMs) for high density embedded memories.Three unique test chip designs are presented to enhance the retention time and access speed of gain cell eDRAMs. Proposed bit-cells utilize preferential boostings, beneficial couplings, and aggregated cell leakages for expanding signal window between data `1' and `0'. The design space of power-delay product can be further enhanced with various assist schemes that harness the innate properties of gain cell eDRAMs. Experimental results from the test chips demonstrate that the proposed gain cell eDRAMs achieve overall faster system performances and lower static power dissipations than SRAMs in a generic 65 nm low-power (LP) CMOS process. A magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) scaling scenario and an efficient HSPICE simulation methodology are proposed for exploring the scalability of STT-MRAMs under variation effects from 65 nm to 8 nm. A constant JC0*RA/VDD scaling method is adopted to achieve optimal read and write performances of STT-MRAMs and thermal stabilities for a 10 year retention are achieved by adjusting free layer thicknesses as well as projecting crystalline anisotropy improvements. Studies based on the proposed methodology show that in-plane STT-MRAM will outperform SRAM from 15 nm node, while its perpendicular counterpart requires further innovations in MTJ material properties in order to overcome the poor write performance from 22 nm node