Public Opinion and Terrorist Acts

The paper explores the dimensions of public opinion relevant for supporting terrorism and their relationship with terrorist attacks. We link the 2007 PEW survey data on justification of suicide terrorism and opinions in 16 countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia on nine regional powers to the NCTC data on international terrorist incidents between 2004 and 2008. We find that justification of suicide terrorism and unfavorable opinion on regional powers are correlated with the occurrence of terrorism and the effect of each of these dimensions of public opinion varies with the level of the other. In addition, we find a robust positive relationship between the share of people in a country who at the same time justify suicide bombings and have an unfavorable opinion of a regional power and the occurrence of terrorism originating from that country.support for terrorism, public opinion, international terrorism

Daily and monthly costs of terrorism on Pakistani exports

This is first of its kind empirical study on the costs of terrorism on Pakistan’s exports. The analysis finds that intensity of terrorist activity can be divided into three distinct periods. The LAL Masjid incident in mid 2007 marks the first sign of intensification of terrorism in Pakistan. The second one is the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The third one comes in 2008 when the US announced to shift gear from Iraq to Afghanistan and incumbent government in Pakistan created a political support for armed action within Pakistani borders against the terrorists. The analysis finds that terrorism has more significant affect on Pakistani exports post Benazir assassination. The report calculates the monthly and daily costs of terrorism. On average there are 2 terrorist attacks every day whereas 5 citizens on average die in these attacks. A single terrorist attack costs 12 million dollars to the exports. Post Benazir assassination the costs rise to 18 million dollars due to increased intensity where not only the death toll on average has risen but the number of terrorist attacks have gone up. Average per month loss in exports due to terrorism is calculated to be around 500 million dollars. Pakistan in 2006-09 has lost nearly 30 billion dollars in exports as its market shares have fallen. Part of this loss is explained by terrorism, where we find that 18 billion dollars accounts for it. Please note that extending the data for later years may make our results more pronounced but suffice to say our calculated β’s are robust capable of predicting terrorism for coming years. For example, it is found out that costs of number of deaths and number of injured are different while exports are more sensitive to the former capturing severity of casualties that is the hall mark of extreme terrorist actions like suicide attacks.Conflict, Trade

Geoengineering: A war on climate change?

Geoengineering; specifically Solar Radiation Management ; has been proposed to effect rapid influence over the Earth’s climate system in order to counteract Anthropogenic Global Warming. This poses near-term to long-term governance challenges; some of which are within the planning horizon of current political administrations. Previous discussions of governance of SRM have focused primarily on two scenarios: an isolated “Greenfinger” individual; or state; acting independently ; versus more consensual; internationalist approaches. I argue that these models represent a very limited sub-set of plausible deployment scenarios. To generate a range of alternative models; I offer a short; relatively unstructured discussion of a range of different types of warfare – each with an analogous SRM deployment regime

Security analysis for agroterrorism: applying the threat, vulnerability, consequence framework to developing countries

"We examine access to, use of, and participation in decisions on improved water supply in the Volta basin of Ghana, one of the first countries to introduce a community-based approach to rural water supply on a large scale. While 71 percent of the households interviewed have access to improved water, 43 percent of these continue to use unsafe sources as their main domestic water source. Our results indicate that quality perceptions and opportunity costs play an important role in households' choice of water source. The effect of prices and income levels on this choice differs according to the pricing system used. Given that supply characteristics such as the location and pricing system affect household decisions to use the improved source, households may try to influence these characteristics in their favor during the community decision-making process for the improved source. However, less than 40 percent of the households interviewed participated in decisions on location or technology. We argue that the decision whether to participate depends on three main factors: (i) the household's bargaining power, (ii) the potential benefits from influencing outcomes, and (iii) the cost of participation, (mainly opportunity cost of time). Our results indicate that bargaining power matters In some developing countries the potential exists for agroterrorism to cause widespread disruption through loss of sustenance, income and production. Defense of agriculture may also be problematic because of the lack stability and basic biosecurity infrastructure for the detection and prevention of diseases or invasive species. Currently new methodological approaches for terrorism risk assessments are being actively explored for resource prioritization. One such methodology for risk based allocation of resources is Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence (TVC) Analysis. A qualitative application of the TVC framework is used to analyze the risk of agroterrorism in developing countries relative to industrialized countries. The analysis suggests that evidence exists to demonstrate general terrorist threats, vulnerability of agriculture and, depending on the country, potentially serious consequences arising from argoterrorism. Where specific threats emerge, action may be needed by the international community to strengthen biosecurity systems in developing countries through: increasing global cooperation, capacity building in monitoring, remediation and risk analysis technologies, and the dissemination of novel technologies for control of pests and diseases." Authors' AbstractCapacity strengthening, Water-supply Management, Agroterrorism, Biosecurity, Risk analysis, resource allocation, Terrorism, Governance,

Fragile States and Conflict Recurrence..

About 1bn people live in failing states. Their lives are plagued by insecurity and poverty. Failing states are marginalized and if current trends continue they will be lagging even further behind in the future; trapped in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and violent conflict. Thus, the definition of state failure focuses on two main aspects: failure to provide security and the failure to provide economic opportunities. State failure is costly in human and economic terms. It imposes costs not only to the citizens of their own state but even higher costs to other states in the region. Turning around failed states is an enormous challenge. Ultimately, the change has to come from within the country but the chapter also discusses what the international community can do to assist.

Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India

A discussion of the foundation of Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), the development of its modus operandi, and engages in an investigation of LeT’s activities in India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir region are discussed. Further, LeT’s fundraising methods are touched upon, and LeT’s relationships with regional state and nonstate actors such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company are analyzed. Also, the impact that these developments have on domestic Islamist terrorism in India are addressed. The author argues that although LeT has been a vital component of Islamabad’s regional strategy in the past, the organization has grown beyond the control of its former patron, is largely self-sufficient and operates independently of the political process, and has expanded its agenda well beyond Kashmir. These developments challenge the long-held notion that irregulars can be sustainably used to achieve limited objectives in an asymmetric conflict and should serve as a clear warning to other state sponsors of terrorism. However, contrary to many analyses, LeT is not likely to sacrifice its independence and come under Al-Qaeda’s umbrella. Rather, LeT will continue to evolve into a distinctive, South Asia-centric terrorist actor in its own right while still receiving aid from fringe elements in Pakistan’s security and intelligence apparatus and elsewhere. This will not only allow LeT to continue to plan future Mumbai-style terrorist attacks in India from safe havens in Pakistan, but will also allow LeT to guide and assist the predominantly indigenous Indian Mujahideen (IM).https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1347/thumbnail.jp