Tensed Ontology Based on Simple Partial Logic

Simple partial logic (=SPL) is, broadly speaking, an extensional logic which allows for the truth-value gap. First I give a system of propositional SPL by partializing classical logic, as well as extending it with several non-classical truth-functional operators. Second I show a way based on SPL to construct a system of tensed ontology, by representing tensed statements as two kinds of necessary statements in a linear model that consists of the present and future worlds. Finally I compare that way with other two ways based on Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic and branching temporal logic

Tensed Ontology Based on Simple Partial Logic

Simple partial logic (=SPL) is, broadly speaking, an extensional logic which allows for the truth-value gap. First I give a system of propositional SPL by partializing classical logic, as well as extending it with several non-classical truth-functional operators. Second I show a way based on SPL to construct a system of tensed ontology, by representing tensed statements as two kinds of necessary statements in a linear model that consists of the present and future worlds. Finally I compare that way with other two ways based on Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic and branching temporal logic

The actual future is open

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is 'open,' i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to (branching-time) open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Kit Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open futurists must (i) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (ii) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of "actual future," (iii) open futurism is naturally coupled with the view that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions

The Invisible Thin Red Line

The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine (2005)’s non-standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts. In this way, we show how to reconcile a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world

Physical processes, their life and their history

Here, I lay the foundations of a high-level ontology of particulars whose structuring principles differ radically from the 'continuant' vs. 'occurrent' distinction traditionally adopted in applied ontology. These principles are derived from a new analysis of the ontology of “occurring” or “happening” entities. Firstly, my analysis integrates recent work on the ontology of processes, which brings them closer to objects in their mode of existence and persistence by assimilating them to continuant particulars. Secondly, my analysis distinguishes clearly between processes and events, in order to make the latter abstract objects of thought (alongside propositions). Lastly, I open my ontological inventory to properties and facts, the existence of which is commonly admitted. By giving specific roles to these primitives, the framework allows one to account for static and dynamic aspects of the physical world and for the way that subjects conceive its history: facts account for the life of substances (physical objects and processes), whereas events enable cognitive subjects to account for the life story of substances

Eventuality-based interval semantics and Free Logic: what if there, like, is no future, man?

2019 Summer.Includes bibliographical references.Future contingent propositions have famously been a source of trouble for philosophers and logicians committed to any variety of indeterminism on which facts about the future are not yet fixed. One possible answer to the problem involves presupposition—namely, that propositions lack truth-value when other propositions that they presuppose are false. This paper explores the plausibility of such an answer, beginning with a brief discussion of the problem of future contingent propositions and presupposition. From there, an in-depth discussion of Free Logic lays the groundwork of logical tools for the project, exploring the motivation for Free Logic's development and examples of Free Logic semantics. Subsequently, this paper discusses the history and usefulness of events-based semantics in analyzing English sentences. Using the tools of events-based semantics and formal logic, this paper formally models this approach to sentences in English by defining a semantics which can capture both tense and aspect of such sentences and which allows for truth-valueless future contingent propositions while preserving logical truths like the law of excluded middle

The Actual Future is Open

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is \u2018open\u2019, i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, (branching-time) open futurists must (1) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (2) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of \u201cactual future\u201d, (3) it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions

The metaphysics of time investigations in tense-logic and a B-series semantics

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83).The view that time flows from the future to the present and then recedes into the past is both natural and deeply problematic. So called 'A-theories' about time claim that this is the fundamental nature of temporality. This is not the view which will be defended in this paper. Rather I shall argue for what is known as a 'B-theory' analysis of time and language, one in which the relations of 'earlier than' and 'later than' are necessary and sufficient for any analysis of time. The structure of this paper is tripartite. The first part will address the philosophical and metaphysical tenets of both the A and B-theories of time. In this section, McTaggart's 1908 argument for the unreality of time will be presented along with some objections to it. I will show that some seemingly convincing arguments against 'McTaggart's paradox' are unsuccessful and his paradox does indeed call the A-series into question. This section will lay the groundwork for further discussions relating to other disciplines which are concerned with this debate by describing the issues and points of tension

Tense and the Logic of Change

In this paper it is shown how the DRT (Discourse Representation Theory) treatment of temporal anaphora can be formalized within a version of Montague Semantics that is based on classical type logic

THE INDETERMINATE PRESENT: AN ESSAY ON QUANTUM MECHANICS AND THE OPEN FUTURE

The dissertation is a defense of the following conditional claim: if there are objective collapses of the wavefunction, then the future is genuinely open. Although this is no radically new idea, the strategy I shall use to defend it is a new one. It proceeds in two main steps. First, building upon the recent literature on metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, I argue for the view that systems in superposition have be interpreted as objectively indeterminate state of affairs. Second, I propose an alternative way to think of openness, according to which the future is open as of t, if and only if there is an indeterminate state of affair S at t, and S becomes determinate at t\u2019 (with t\u2019 later than t). To argue for the second step, I will give an analysis of the objective collapses of the wavefunction as the becoming determinate of previously indeterminate systems. Furthermore, in developing my arguments, I will also make some remarks concerning the ontology of objective collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, the issue of whether metaphysical indeterminacy can be at some derivate level of reality, and the possibility of the openness of the future being an emergent phenomenon