Methodological Artefacts in Consciousness Science

Consciousness is scientifically challenging to study because of its subjective aspect. This leads researchers to rely on report-based experimental paradigms in order to discover neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). I argue that the reliance on reports has biased the search for NCCs, thus creating what I call 'methodological artefacts'. This paper has three main goals: first, describe the measurement problem in consciousness science and argue that this problem led to the emergence of methodological artefacts. Second, provide a critical assessment of the NCCs put forward by the global neuronal workspace theory. Third, provide the means of dissociating genuine NCCs from methodological artefacts

Is the emotional modulation of the attentional blink driven by response bias?

Several studies have shown that the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is diminished for highly arousing T2 stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005). Whereas this effect is most often interpreted as evidence for a more efficient processing of arousing information, it could be due also to a bias to report more arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli. We introduce a paradigm that allows one to control for such a response bias. Using this paradigm, we obtained evidence that the diminished AB for taboo words cannot be explained by a response bias. This supports the idea that the emotional modulation of the AB is caused by attentional processes

Reduced attentional blink for alcohol-related stimuli in heavy social drinkers

Researchers have used various paradigms to show that attentional biases for substance-related stimuli are an important feature of addictive behaviours. However, it is not clear whether these attentional biases occur at the level of encoding or at later post-attentive processing stages. We examined attentional bias at the level of encoding with the attentional blink paradigm in a sample of non-clinical heavy and light-drinking students. Our results show a diminished attentional blink effect for alcohol-related words compared with soft drink-related words among heavy drinkers. The attentional blink was equally strong for alcohol-related and soft drink-related words among light drinkers. This suggests that alcohol-related information is processed relatively more efficiently in the former group. Even though these results are promising, our study shows that the internal consistency of the attentional blink can be improved

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink.

The attentional blink (AB) represents a cognitive deficit in reporting the second of two targets (T2), when that second target appears 200-600 msec after the first (T1). However, it is unclear how this paradigm impacts the subjective visibility (that is, the conscious perception) of T2, and whether the temporal profile of T2 report accuracy matches the temporal profile of subjective visibility. In order to compare report accuracy and subjective visibility, we asked participants to identify T1 and T2, and to rate the subjective visibility of T2 across two experiments. Event-related potentials were also measured. The results revealed different profiles for the report of T2 versus the subjective visibility of T2, particularly when T1 and T2 appeared within 200 msec of one another. Specifically, T2 report accuracy was high but T2 visibility was low when the two targets appeared in close temporal succession, suggesting what we call the Experiential Blink is different from the classic AB. Electrophysiologically, at lag-1, the P3 component was modulated more by subjective visibility than by report accuracy. Collectively, the data indicate that the deficit in accurately reporting T2 is not the same as the deficit in subjectively experiencing T2. This suggests that traditional understandings of the AB may require adjustment and that, consistent with other findings, working memory (WM) encoding and conscious perception may not be synonymous

Oscillations, metastability and phase transitions in brain and models of cognition

Neuroscience is being practiced in many different forms and at many different organizational levels of the Nervous System. Which of these levels and associated conceptual frameworks is most informative for elucidating the association of neural processes with processes of Cognition is an empirical question and subject to pragmatic validation. In this essay, I select the framework of Dynamic System Theory. Several investigators have applied in recent years tools and concepts of this theory to interpretation of observational data, and for designing neuronal models of cognitive functions. I will first trace the essentials of conceptual development and hypotheses separately for discerning observational tests and criteria for functional realism and conceptual plausibility of the alternatives they offer. I will then show that the statistical mechanics of phase transitions in brain activity, and some of its models, provides a new and possibly revealing perspective on brain events in cognition

Distrust before first sight: Knowledge- and appearance-based effects of trustworthiness on the visual consciousness of faces

Not all visual stimuli processed by the brain reach the level of conscious perception. Previous research has shown that the emotional value of a stimulus is one of the factors that can affect whether it is consciously perceived. Here, we investigated whether social-affective knowledge influences a face’s chance to reach visual consciousness. Furthermore, we took into account the impact of facial appearance. Faces differing in facial trustworthiness (i.e., being perceived as more or less trustworthy based on appearance) were associated with neutral or negative socially relevant information. Subsequently, an attentional blink task was administered to examine whether the manipulated factors affect the faces’ chance to reach visual consciousness under conditions of reduced attentional resources. Participants showed enhanced detection of faces associated with negative as compared to neutral social information. In event-related potentials (ERPs), this was accompanied by effects in the time range of the early posterior negativity (EPN) component. These findings indicate that social-affective person knowledge is processed already before or during attentional selection and can affect which faces are prioritized for access to visual consciousness. In contrast, no clear evidence for an impact of facial trustworthiness during the attentional blink was found

Seeing the invisible: The scope and limits of unconscious processing in binocular rivalry

When an image is presented to one eye and a very different image is presented to the corresponding location of the other eye, they compete for conscious representation, such that only one image is visible at a time while the other is suppressed. Called binocular rivalry, this phenomenon and its deviants have been extensively exploited to study the mechanism and neural correlates of consciousness. In this paper, we propose a framework, the unconscious binding hypothesis, to distinguish unconscious processing from conscious processing. According to this framework, the unconscious mind not only encodes individual features but also temporally binds distributed features to give rise to cortical representation, but unlike conscious binding, such unconscious binding is fragile. Under this framework, we review evidence from psychophysical and neuroimaging studies, which suggests that: (1) for invisible low level features, prolonged exposure to visual pattern and simple translational motion can alter the appearance of subsequent visible features (i.e. adaptation); for invisible high level features, although complex spiral motion cannot produce adaptation, nor can objects/words enhance subsequent processing of related stimuli (i.e. priming), images of tools can nevertheless activate the dorsal pathway; and (2) although invisible central cues cannot orient attention, invisible erotic pictures in the periphery can nevertheless guide attention, likely through emotional arousal; reciprocally, the processing of invisible information can be modulated by attention at perceptual and neural levels

The attentional blink impairs detection and delays encoding of visual information: Evidence from human electrophysiology

This article explores the time course of the functional interplay between detection and encoding stages of information processing in the brain and the role they play in conscious visual perception. We employed a multitarget rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) approach and examined the electrophysiological P3 component elicited by a target terminating an RSVP sequence. Target-locked P3 activity was detected both at frontal and parietal recording sites and an independent component analysis confirmed the presence of two distinct P3 components. The posterior P3b varied with intertarget lag, with diminished amplitude and postponed latency at short relative to long lags—an electroencephalographic signature of the attentional blink (AB). Under analogous conditions, the anterior P3a was also reduced in amplitude but did not vary in latency. Collectively, the results provide an electrophysiological record of the interaction between frontal and posterior components linked to detection (P3a) and encoding (P3b) of visual information. Our findings suggest that, although the AB delays target encoding into working memory, it does not slow down detection of a target but instead reduces the efficacy of this process. A functional characterization of P3a in attentive tasks is discussed with reference to current models of the AB phenomenon