Whither the Regulatory “War on Coal”? Scapegoats, Saviors, and Stock Market Reactions

Complaints about excessive economic burdens associated with regulation abound in contemporary political and legal rhetoric. In recent years, perhaps nowhere have these complaints been heard as loudly as in the context of U.S. regulations targeting the use of coal to supply power to the nation’s electricity system, as production levels in the coal industry dropped by nearly half between 2008 and 2016. The coal industry and its political supporters, including the president of the United States, have argued that a suite of air pollution regulations imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during the Obama administration seriously undermined coal companies’ bottom lines, presenting an existential threat to the industry. Under the Trump administration, industry players have lobbied hard for (and sometimes received) financial subsidies and regulatory changes, with the president seemingly all too happy to play the role of the industry’s savior. Stepping back, we consider the extent to which regulations have really led to the decline in demand for coal and how much the coal industry can actually expect to gain from the deregulatory policies of the current administration. To illuminate these questions, we statistically analyze stock market reactions to important events in what critics called the regulatory “war on coal” during the Obama administration. Using an event-study framework that measures abnormal market activity in the immediate wake of these events, we are able to isolate any potential impact of regulatory developments above and beyond market factors, such as secular trends in natural gas prices and market performance as a whole. Surprisingly, we find no systemic evidence consistent with a “war on coal” based on investor assessments of the industry’s financial prospects in the wake of new regulatory developments, even though our methods do find evidence of stock market reactions to other events, such as bankruptcies of other companies. Coal firms’ investors—the very actors with financial stakes in understanding the impact of regulation on the industry—appear to have behaved as if they never actually bought into the regulatory “war on coal” narrative. Our findings are consistent both with broader evidence about the effects of regulation and with an underlying political economy of regulatory scapegoating, according to which actors in a declining industry prefer to blame regulation rather than competitive factors for their businesses’ decline. By calling attention to the pervasive incentives for scapegoating and cheap talk by politicians seeking to be saviors, we offer an account that can explain the mismatch between our findings and the rhetoric of the “war on coal.” Along the way, our account reinforces how important it is for courts, elected officials, and the public to demand that government agencies base their regulatory decisions on evidence instead of relying on political rhetoric

Whither the Regulatory War on Coal ? Scapegoats, Saviors, and Stock Market Reactions

Complaints about excessive economic burdens associated with regulation abound in contemporary political and legal rhetoric. In recent years, perhaps nowhere have these complaints been heard as loudly as in the context of U.S. regulations targeting the use of coal to supply power to the nation’s electricity system, as production levels in the coal industry dropped by nearly half between 2008 and 2016. The coal industry and its political supporters, including the president of the United States, have argued that a suite of air pollution regulations imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during the Obama administration seriously undermined coal companies’ bottom lines, presenting an existential threat to the industry. Under the Trump administration, industry players have lobbied hard for (and sometimes received) financial subsidies and regulatory changes, with the president seemingly all too happy to play the role of the industry’s savior.Stepping back, we consider the extent to which regulations have really led to the decline in demand for coal and how much the coal industry can actually expect to gain from the deregulatory policies of the current administration. To illuminate these questions, we statistically analyze stock market reactions to important events in what critics called the regulatory “war on coal” during the Obama administration. Using an event-study framework that measures abnormal market activity in the immediate wake of these events, we are able to isolate any potential impact of regulatory developments above and beyond market factors, such as secular trends in natural gas prices and market performance as a whole. Surprisingly, we find no systemic evidence consistent with a “war on coal” based on investor assessments of the industry’s financial prospects in the wake of new regulatory developments, even though our methods do find evidence of stock market reactions to other events, such as bankruptcies of other companies. Coal firms’ investors—the very actors with financial stakes in understanding the impact of regulation on the industry—appear to have behaved as if they never actually bought into the regulatory “war on coal” narrative.Our findings are consistent both with broader evidence about the effects of regulation and with an underlying political economy of regulatory scapegoating, according to which actors in a declining industry prefer to blame regulation rather than competitive factors for their businesses’ decline. By calling attention to the pervasive incentives for scapegoating and cheap talk by politicians seeking to be saviors, we offer an account that can explain the mismatch between our findings and the rhetoric of the “war on coal.” Along the way, our account reinforces how important it is for courts, elected officials, and the public to demand that government agencies base their regulatory decisions on evidence instead of relying on political rhetoric

Scape Goats, Silver Bullets, and Other Pitfalls in the Path to Sustainability

This paper draws from The Lathe of Heaven by Ursula Le Guin to highlight some of the most likely pitfalls on the political road to a sustainable planet. Through the literary device of dreams that can change the world, Le Guin explores how the individual’s egoistic desire to save humanity can be twisted by the limitations of our psyche and our society, turning an already uncomfortable future Earth into a devastated planet. It is a stinging critique of answers handed down from above, and a call to action for those of us who just get by here below. Her story warns of the ancient “road to hell”, paved and trodden by would be saviors with the best intentions but also points to the license that public apathy provides to the powerful when the costs of environmental harm are borne by the powerless. These disconnects, combined with cycles of rationalization, silver bullet mentalities, and the tendency to scapegoat others for negative side effects, can all derail sustainability transitions. Lathe provides an allegorical assessment of this process, but much more study is needed to fully understand and regulate the resulting governance treadmill

Annual Report, 2016-2017

Beginning in 2004/2005- issued in online format onl

JAVNI ODGOVOR NA 9/11 U POLITICI: PATRIOTIZAM, STRAH I JEZIČNI PROBLEMI

The paper with the title “Public Response to 9/11 in Politics: Patriotism, Fear and Language Issues” examines the immediate responses that emerged in American political administration after the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001 in New York City and Washington, D.C. Moreover, the paper analyzes the speech “We Have Seen the State of Our Union” given before the Congress on September 20, 2001, by the former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, showing the prevalent manner of the rhetoric of the then current government administration. Seeking to explain the rhetoric of the politicians after 9/11, the analysis explores several parameters. This kind of rhetoric addressed the issues connected to 9/11, and employed a great deal of patriotism-related words as well as a language that could help instigate fear and paranoia in Americans and their culture.Rad s naslovom "Javni odgovor na 9/11 u politici: patriotizam, strah i jezični problemi" istražuje neposredne reakcije koje su se pojavile u američkoj političkoj administraciji nakon terorističkih napada 11. rujna 2001. u New Yorku i Washingtonu. U članku se analizira govor "Vidjeli smo stanje naše zajednice" koji je pred Kongresom 20. rujna 2001. godine dao bivši američki predsjednik George H.W. Bush, koji pokazuje prevladavajući način retorike tadašnje vladine administracije. U potrazi za objašnjavanjem retorike političara nakon 11. rujna, analiza istražuje nekoliko parametara. Ova vrsta retorike govorila je o pitanjima vezanim za 11. rujna, a koristila je mnogo riječi povezanih sa patriotizmom, kao i jezik koji bi mogao potaknuti strah i paranoju kod Amerikanaca i u njihovoj kulturi

Qualitative Study of Current and Prospective Student Perceptions of a University Website

Building a sustainable system that goes beyond myopic interests and short-term policies is an arduous task for any school leader. In the U.S., our education system has been criticized for being too shallow in curriculum and unsustainable in the long run. In fact, a 2007 report by UNICEF concerning children’s well-being in 22 countries ranked the U.K. and the U.S. at the bottom of the industrialized nations in the survey. Hargreaves (2007) laments that these two countries, in their single-minded pursuit of economic competitiveness and development at all costs, are destroying the planet, while “eating their young.

MNE responses to carbon pricing regulations: Theory and evidence

AbstractThis paper develops theory suggesting that, relative to purely domestic firms, multinational enterprises (MNE) have greater incentives and strategic and operational means to respond to expanding carbon emissions constraints. We test our resulting hypotheses with data on changes in carbon emissions by over 6,000 industrial plants during Phase 2 (2008–2012) of the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme. We find that MNE maintain: (1) consistent carbon reductions across institutional contexts, and (2) an overall carbon performance edge over domestic firms. The carbon performance gap between MNEs and domestic firms narrowed, however, in host countries transitioning towards more stringent market regulatory systems. By demonstrating that the effects of national and international carbon regulations on firm behavior interact in important ways with each other and with firm characteristics, this paper deepens understanding of how institutions are likely to shape the ongoing energy transition towards a low-carbon economy

Crisis Communication and crisis management during COVID-19

This paper presents results from a comparative and qualitative discourse-historical analysis of governmental crisis communication in Austria, Germany, France, Hungary and Sweden, during the global COVID-19 pandemic lockdown from March 2020 to May 2020 (a ‘discourse strand’). By analysing a sample of important speeches and press conferences by government leaders (all performing as the ‘face of crisis management’), it is possible to deconstruct a range of discursive strategies announcing/legitimising restrictive measures in order to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic where everybody is in danger of falling ill, regardless of their status, position, education and so forth. I focus on four frames that have been employed to mitigate the ‘dread of death’ (Bauman, 2006) and counter the ‘denial of death’ (Becker, 1973/2020): a ‘religious frame’, a ‘dialogic frame’, a frame emphasising ‘trust’, and a frame of ‘leading a war’. These interpretation frameworks are all embedded in ‘renationalising’ tendencies, specifically visible in the EU member states where even the Schengen Area was suddenly abolished (in order to ‘keep the virus out’) and borders were closed. Thus, everybody continues to be confronted with national biopolitics and body politics (Wodak, 2021)

May 6, 1976

Minutes from the May 6, 1976, meeting of the University Senate. 70 page