Allocation of Authority when a Person is not a Robot

We formalize a conception of authority, which is commonly defined as the right of controlling a person’s actions embedded in human assets in sociology. Due to the inalienable property of human assets, the contractible formal authority is hard to verify and enforce, while real authority usually diverges from formal authority. Inefficiency tends to arise when a task is not routine or can not be done by a robot. Using a framework of incomplete contract, we show that allocation of formal authority, as an instrument to mitigate the inefficiency, is determined by features of tasks and specificity of assets, and the relationship between the resources. Monitoring is then introduced to fine tune value of delegation

A Mediated Definite Delegation Model allowing for Certified Grid Job Submission

Grid computing infrastructures need to provide traceability and accounting of their users" activity and protection against misuse and privilege escalation. A central aspect of multi-user Grid job environments is the necessary delegation of privileges in the course of a job submission. With respect to these generic requirements this document describes an improved handling of multi-user Grid jobs in the ALICE ("A Large Ion Collider Experiment") Grid Services. A security analysis of the ALICE Grid job model is presented with derived security objectives, followed by a discussion of existing approaches of unrestricted delegation based on X.509 proxy certificates and the Grid middleware gLExec. Unrestricted delegation has severe security consequences and limitations, most importantly allowing for identity theft and forgery of delegated assignments. These limitations are discussed and formulated, both in general and with respect to an adoption in line with multi-user Grid jobs. Based on the architecture of the ALICE Grid Services, a new general model of mediated definite delegation is developed and formulated, allowing a broker to assign context-sensitive user privileges to agents. The model provides strong accountability and long- term traceability. A prototype implementation allowing for certified Grid jobs is presented including a potential interaction with gLExec. The achieved improvements regarding system security, malicious job exploitation, identity protection, and accountability are emphasized, followed by a discussion of non- repudiation in the face of malicious Grid jobs

Distributed Virtual System (DIVIRS) Project

As outlined in our continuation proposal 92-ISI-50R (revised) on contract NCC 2-539, we are (1) developing software, including a system manager and a job manager, that will manage available resources and that will enable programmers to program parallel applications in terms of a virtual configuration of processors, hiding the mapping to physical nodes; (2) developing communications routines that support the abstractions implemented in item one; (3) continuing the development of file and information systems based on the virtual system model; and (4) incorporating appropriate security measures to allow the mechanisms developed in items 1 through 3 to be used on an open network. The goal throughout our work is to provide a uniform model that can be applied to both parallel and distributed systems. We believe that multiprocessor systems should exist in the context of distributed systems, allowing them to be more easily shared by those that need them. Our work provides the mechanisms through which nodes on multiprocessors are allocated to jobs running within the distributed system and the mechanisms through which files needed by those jobs can be located and accessed

Performance Pay, Delegation, and Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness An Empirical Investigation

The existing empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive with respect to a number of the key predictions of the agency model. Although the reach of agency theory is considerably wider, the dominant portion of work has been taken up with examining the nature of the trade-off between risk and incentives, and the implications thereof for contractual design. More specifically, some researchers have recently noted that the predicted trade-off between risk and incentives turns out to be rather weak, and perhaps non-existent, when confronted with the available empirical evidence. In this paper, we examine the risk-incentives trade-off and related predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We find that the relation between the use of performance pay in these firms and the environmental uncertainty they confront which is one way to test the risk/incentives tradeoff is indeed weak and in many cases even perverse. We then suggest, in line with other recent contributions to the literature, that this may be caused by the widespread use of delegation. One effect of delegation is that it breaks the simple relation between risks and incentives. We examine the suggestion that that those firms that are more prone to use delegation of decision rights in their internal organization are facing an uncertain environment to a larger extent than the rest of the population. We argue that this constitutes an indirect confirmation of the hypothesis. We also examine the multi-tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted. We fail to find support for this hypothesis. It is suggested that the reason for this finding is also related to delegation.Uncertainty, pay-for-performance, delegation, innovation, competition

Nurse prescribing of medicines in 13 European countries

Background: Nurse prescribing of medicines is increasing worldwide, but there is limited research in Europe. The objective of this study was to analyse which countries in Europe have adopted laws on nurse prescribing. Methods: Cross-country comparative analysis of reforms on nurse prescribing, based on an expert survey (TaskShift2Nurses Survey) and an OECD study. Country experts provided country-specific information, which was complemented with the peer-reviewed and grey literature. The analysis was based on policy and thematic analyses. Results: In Europe, as of 2019, a total of 13 countries have adopted laws on nurse prescribing, of which 12 apply nationwide (Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK)) and one regionally, to the Canton Vaud (Switzerland). Eight countries adopted laws since 2010. The extent of prescribing rights ranged from nearly all medicines within nurses’ specialisations (Ireland for nurse prescribers, Netherlands for nurse specialists, UK for independent nurse prescribers) to a limited set of medicines (Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden). All countries have regulatory and minimum educational requirements in place to ensure patient safety; the majority require some form of physician oversight. Conclusions: The role of nurses has expanded in Europe over the last decade, as demonstrated by the adoption of new laws on prescribing rights.TU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel - 201