842 research outputs found
Axiomatization and Models of Scientific Theories
In this paper we discuss two approaches to the axiomatization of scien- tific theories in the context of the so called semantic approach, according to which (roughly) a theory can be seen as a class of models. The two approaches are associated respectively to Suppesâ and to da Costa and Chuaquiâs works. We argue that theories can be developed both in a way more akin to the usual mathematical practice (Suppes), in an informal set theoretical environment, writing the set theoretical predicate in the language of set theory itself or, more rigorously (da Costa and Chuaqui), by employing formal languages that help us in writing the postulates to define a class of structures. Both approaches are called internal, for we work within a mathematical framework, here taken to be first-order ZFC. We contrast these approaches with an external one, here discussed briefly. We argue that each one has its strong and weak points, whose discussion is relevant for the philosophical foundations of science
Suszko's Problem: Mixed Consequence and Compositionality
Suszko's problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values
needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko
proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only
two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of
Tarski's structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced
a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated
value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. In this
paper we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko's problem and on mixed
consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating
structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic
interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance,
and establishing that (intersective) mixed consequence is fundamentally the
semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those
to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French
and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos and Wansing, for logics with various
structural properties (reflexivity, transitivity, none, or both). We strengthen
these results into exact rank results for non-permeable logics (roughly, those
which distinguish the role of premises and conclusions). We discuss the
underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently
by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve
compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer
truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction,
allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular
connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of
truth-functionality and additional semantic properties.Comment: Keywords: Suszko's thesis; truth value; logical consequence; mixed
consequence; compositionality; truth-functionality; many-valued logic;
algebraic logic; substructural logics; regular connective
Permutations and foster problems: two puzzles or one?
How are permutation arguments for the inscrutability of reference to be formulated in the context of a Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics? Davidson (1979) takes these arguments to establish that there are no grounds for favouring a reference scheme that assigns London to âLondresâ, rather than one that assigns Sydney to that name. We shall see, however, that it is far from clear whether permutation arguments work when set out in the context of the kind of truth-theoretic semantics which Davidson favours. The principle required to make the argument work allows us to resurrect Foster problems against the Davidsonian position. The Foster problems and the permutation inscrutability problems stand or fall together: they are one puzzle, not two
From Many-Valued Consequence to Many-Valued Connectives
Given a consequence relation in many-valued logic, what connectives can be
defined? For instance, does there always exist a conditional operator
internalizing the consequence relation, and which form should it take? In this
paper, we pose this question in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting for
the class of so-called intersective mixed consequence relations, which extends
the class of Tarskian relations. Using computer-aided methods, we answer
extensively for 3-valued and 4-valued logics, focusing not only on conditional
operators, but on what we call Gentzen-regular connectives (including negation,
conjunction, and disjunction). For arbitrary N-valued logics, we state
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such connectives in a
multi-premise multi-conclusion setting. The results show that mixed consequence
relations admit all classical connectives, and among them pure consequence
relations are those that admit no other Gentzen-regular connectives.
Conditionals can also be found for a broader class of intersective mixed
consequence relations, but with the exclusion of order-theoretic consequence
relations.Comment: Updated version [corrections of an incorrect claim in first version;
two bib entries added
Truth and Theories of Truth
The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic issues and the most influential and well-established philosophical theories and key concepts
A Tarskian Informal Semantics for Answer Set Programming
In their seminal papers on stable model semantics, Gelfond and Lifschitz introduced ASP by casting programs as epistemic theories, in which rules represent statements about the knowledge of a rational
agent. To the best of our knowledge, theirs is still the only published systematic account of the intuitive meaning of rules and programs under the stable semantics. In current ASP practice, however, we find numerous applications in which rational agents no longer seem to play any role. Therefore, we propose here an alternative explanation of the intuitive meaning of ASP programs, in which they are not viewed as statements about an agent\u27s beliefs, but as objective statements about the world. We argue that this view is more natural for a large part of current ASP practice, in particular the so-called Generate-Define-Test programs
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