Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht

Logic and the Challenge of Computer Science

https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154161/1/39015099114889.pd

Specifying role interaction in concept languages

The KL-ONE concept language provides role-value maps (RVMs) as a concept forming operator that compares sets of role fillers. This is a useful means to specify structural properties of concepts. Recently, it has been shown that concept languages providing RVMs together with some other common concept-forming operators induce an undecidable subsumption problem. Thus, RVMs have been restricted to chainings of functional roles as, for example, in CLASSIC. Although this restricted RVM is still a useful operator, one would like to have additional means to specify interaction of general roles. The present paper investigates two concept languages for that purpose. The first one provides concept forming operators that generalize the restricted RVM in a different direction. Unfortunately, it turns out that this language also has an undecidable subsumption problem. The second formalism allows to specify structural properties w.r.t. roles without using general equality and is equipped with (complete) decision procedures for its associated reasoning problems

On the existence of a modal antinomy

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43821/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00636296.pd