Disrupting Illicit Supply Networks: New Applications of Operations Research and Data Analytics to End Modern Slavery

Report from a 2017 National Science Foundation workshop on promising research directions for applications of operations research and data analytics toward the disruption of illicit supply networks like human trafficking. The workshop was funded by the NSF’s Operations Engineering (ENG) and the Law & Social Sciences Program (SBE) under grant # CMMI-1726895. The report addresses the opportunity to apply advances from the fields of operations research, management science, analytics, machine learning, and data science toward the development of disruptive interventions against illicit networks. Such an extension of the current research agenda for trafficking would move understanding of such dynamic systems from descriptive characterization and predictive estimation toward improved dynamic operational control.Bureau of Business Researc

The changing nature of U.S. card payment fraud: industry and public policy options

As credit and debit card payments have become the primary payment instrument in retail transactions, awareness of identity theft and concerns over the safety of payments has increased. Traditional forms of card payment fraud are still an important threat, but fraud resulting from unauthorized access to payment data appears to be rising, and we are only beginning to get a sense of the dimensions of the problem. ; Thus far, the role of public policy has been to encourage the card payment industry to limit fraud by developing its own standards and procedures. Whether this policy stance is sufficient depends on the effectiveness of industry efforts to limit fraud in light of the dramatic shift toward card payments. ; Sullivan provides an overview of card payment fraud in the United States. He develops a preliminary estimate of the rate of U.S. card payment fraud and suggests that such fraud is higher than in several other countries for which data are available. The U.S. payment industry is taking steps to combat payment fraud, but progress has been slowed by conflicts of interest, inadequate incentives, and lack of coordination. Thus, policymakers should monitor the card payment industry to see if it better coordinates security efforts, and if not, consider actions to help overcome barriers to effective development of security.

Avoiding the internet of insecure industrial things

Security incidents such as targeted distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on power grids and hacking of factory industrial control systems (ICS) are on the increase. This paper unpacks where emerging security risks lie for the industrial internet of things, drawing on both technical and regulatory perspectives. Legal changes are being ushered by the European Union (EU) Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2016 and the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) (both to be enforced from May 2018). We use the case study of the emergent smart energy supply chain to frame, scope out and consolidate the breadth of security concerns at play, and the regulatory responses. We argue the industrial IoT brings four security concerns to the fore, namely: appreciating the shift from offline to online infrastructure; managing temporal dimensions of security; addressing the implementation gap for best practice; and engaging with infrastructural complexity. Our goal is to surface risks and foster dialogue to avoid the emergence of an Internet of Insecure Industrial Things

Adversarial behaviours knowledge area

The technological advancements witnessed by our society in recent decades have brought improvements in our quality of life, but they have also created a number of opportunities for attackers to cause harm. Before the Internet revolution, most crime and malicious activity generally required a victim and a perpetrator to come into physical contact, and this limited the reach that malicious parties had. Technology has removed the need for physical contact to perform many types of crime, and now attackers can reach victims anywhere in the world, as long as they are connected to the Internet. This has revolutionised the characteristics of crime and warfare, allowing operations that would not have been possible before. In this document, we provide an overview of the malicious operations that are happening on the Internet today. We first provide a taxonomy of malicious activities based on the attacker’s motivations and capabilities, and then move on to the technological and human elements that adversaries require to run a successful operation. We then discuss a number of frameworks that have been proposed to model malicious operations. Since adversarial behaviours are not a purely technical topic, we draw from research in a number of fields (computer science, criminology, war studies). While doing this, we discuss how these frameworks can be used by researchers and practitioners to develop effective mitigations against malicious online operations.Published versio

Avaddon ransomware: an in-depth analysis and decryption of infected systems

The commoditization of Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) allows criminals to obtain financial benefits at a low risk and with little technical background. One such popular product in the underground economy is ransomware. In ransomware attacks, data from infected systems is held hostage (encrypted) until a fee is paid to the criminals. This modus operandi disrupts legitimate businesses, which may become unavailable until the data is restored. A recent blackmailing strategy adopted by criminals is to leak data online from the infected systems if the ransom is not paid. Besides reputational damage, data leakage might produce further economical losses due to fines imposed by data protection laws. Thus, research on prevention and recovery measures to mitigate the impact of such attacks is needed to adapt existing countermeasures to new strains. In this work, we perform an in-depth analysis of Avaddon, a ransomware offered in the underground economy as an affiliate program business. This has infected and leaked data from at least 23 organizations. Additionally, it runs Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks against victims that do not pay the ransom. We first provide an analysis of the criminal business model from the underground economy. Then, we identify and describe its technical capabilities. We provide empirical evidence of links between this variant and a previous family, suggesting that the same group was behind the development and, possibly, the operation of both campaigns. Finally, we describe a method to decrypt files encrypted with Avaddon in real time. We implement and test the decryptor in a tool that can recover the encrypted data from an infected system, thus mitigating the damage caused by the ransomware. The tool is released open-source so it can be incorporated in existing Antivirus engines

Ethnic minority business in the uk: a review of research and policy development

Part of a series produced to support a ESRC/CRE/DTI/emda workshop on ethnic minority entrepreneurship. This paper comprised a review of research literature on ethnic minority enterprise and an overview of UK policy developments

Cyber Infrastructure Protection: Vol. II

View the Executive SummaryIncreased reliance on the Internet and other networked systems raise the risks of cyber attacks that could harm our nation’s cyber infrastructure. The cyber infrastructure encompasses a number of sectors including: the nation’s mass transit and other transportation systems; banking and financial systems; factories; energy systems and the electric power grid; and telecommunications, which increasingly rely on a complex array of computer networks, including the public Internet. However, many of these systems and networks were not built and designed with security in mind. Therefore, our cyber infrastructure contains many holes, risks, and vulnerabilities that may enable an attacker to cause damage or disrupt cyber infrastructure operations. Threats to cyber infrastructure safety and security come from hackers, terrorists, criminal groups, and sophisticated organized crime groups; even nation-states and foreign intelligence services conduct cyber warfare. Cyber attackers can introduce new viruses, worms, and bots capable of defeating many of our efforts. Costs to the economy from these threats are huge and increasing. Government, business, and academia must therefore work together to understand the threat and develop various modes of fighting cyber attacks, and to establish and enhance a framework to assess the vulnerability of our cyber infrastructure and provide strategic policy directions for the protection of such an infrastructure. This book addresses such questions as: How serious is the cyber threat? What technical and policy-based approaches are best suited to securing telecommunications networks and information systems infrastructure security? What role will government and the private sector play in homeland defense against cyber attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, financial, and logistical systems? What legal impediments exist concerning efforts to defend the nation against cyber attacks, especially in preventive, preemptive, and retaliatory actions?https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1527/thumbnail.jp

The Work-Averse Cyber Attacker Model: Theory and Evidence From Two Million Attack Signatures

The assumption that a cyber attacker will potentially exploit all present vulnerabilities drives most modern cyber risk management practices and the corresponding security investments. We propose a new attacker model, based on dynamic optimization, where we demonstrate that large, initial, fixed costs of exploit development induce attackers to delay implementation and deployment of exploits of vulnerabilities. The theoretical model predicts that mass attackers will preferably i) exploit only one vulnerability per software version, ii) largely include only vulnerabilities requiring low attack complexity, and iii) be slow at trying to weaponize new vulnerabilities. These predictions are empirically validated on a large dataset of observed massed attacks launched against a large collection of information systems. Findings in this paper allow cyber risk managers to better concentrate their efforts for vulnerability management, and set a new theoretical and empirical basis for further research defining attacker (offensive) processes