169 research outputs found
Gap-minimal systems of notations and the constructible hierarchy
If a constructibly countable ordinal alpha is a gap ordinal, then the order type of the set of index ordinals smaller than alpha is exactly alpha. The gap ordinals are the only points of discontinuity of a certain ordinal-valued function. The notion of gap minimality for well ordered systems of notations is defined, and the existence of gap-minimal systems of notations of arbitrarily large constructibly countable length is established
Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis
Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are
equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main
philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is
foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for
mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account
of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have
heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this
account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational
approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization
of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended
form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte.
Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be
proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only
-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as
computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some
attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for
foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable
entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not
preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly,
computable entailment is a complete relation, and hence employing it
commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any
foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than
.Comment: Submitted. 41 page
Type-free truth
This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth, to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance.
In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth, fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. In Chapter 4 we discuss some minimal adequacy conditions on a satisfactory theory of truth based on the function that the truth predicate is intended to fulfil on the deflationist account. We cast doubt on the adequacy of some non-classical theories of truth and argue in favor of classical theories of truth.
Part II is devoted to grounded truth. In chapter 5 we introduce a game-theoretic semantics for Kripke’s theory of truth. Strategies in these games can be interpreted as reference-graphs (or dependency-graphs) of the sentences in question. Using that framework, we give a graph-theoretic analysis of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences. In chapter 6 we provide simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness and truth, and analyze the proof-theoretic strength of the resulting theories. These range from conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic to theories that have the full strength of the impredicative system ID1.
Part III investigates the relationship between truth and set-theoretic comprehen- sion. In chapter 7 we canonically associate extensions of the truth predicate with Henkin-models of second-order arithmetic. This relationship will be employed to determine the recursion-theoretic complexity of several theories of grounded truth and to show the consistency of the latter with principles of generalized induction. In chapter 8 it is shown that the sets definable over the standard model of the Tarskian hierarchy are exactly the hyperarithmetical sets. Finally, we try to apply a certain solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes to the case of truth, namely Quine’s idea of stratification. This will yield classical disquotational theories that interpret full second-order arithmetic without set parameters, Z2- (chapter 9). We also indicate a method to recover the parameters.
An appendix provides some background on ordinal notations, recursion theory and graph theory
Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam [Bibliography of Hilary Putnam's Writings]
Bibliography of the writings by Hilary Putnam: 16 books, 198 articles, 10 translations into German (up to 1994)
Mathematical Logic: Proof Theory, Constructive Mathematics
[no abstract available
Quine’s criticism of the “First dogma of empiricism”
Quine’s argumentation is shown to be invalid since its conclusion would need one premise more; such a premise is shown to be false
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