Clarifying the Dominant Logic Construct by Disentangling and Reassembling its Dimensions

Since its introduction, Prahalad and Bettis's concept of dominant logic has informed a variety of scholarly conversations in management and strategy research. However, scholars have interpreted dominant logic in different ways, emphasizing different aspects, such as managerial mindsets, administrative tools and management functions, as defining elements. Similarly, empirical studies have captured various aspects, such as meanings of entrepreneurs, observable strategic decisions and business model similarity, as indicators of dominant logic. Consequently, the concept lacks analytical clarity, and it is difficult to compare or generalize findings from this diverse set of studies. The aim of this review is to improve conceptual clarity by analysing, comparing and evaluating the existing interpretations and assessments of dominant logic in 94 studies. In the first part of the review, by disentangling the interpretations of the concept, we show that dominant logic consists of four defining dimensions: (i) shared mental models; (ii) values and premises; (iii) organizational practices; and (iv) organizing structures. In the second part, we reassemble dominant logic into an integrative model and theorize about how these dimensions operate in concert to produce a firm's dominant logic. Thus, our main contribution is a clarification and synthesis of the literature, which comes with implications on how future research can conceptualize and operationalize dominant logic more consistently

Quasi-friendly sup-interpretations

In a previous paper, the sup-interpretation method was proposed as a new tool to control memory resources of first order functional programs with pattern matching by static analysis. Basically, a sup-interpretation provides an upper bound on the size of function outputs. In this former work, a criterion, which can be applied to terminating as well as non-terminating programs, was developed in order to bound polynomially the stack frame size. In this paper, we suggest a new criterion which captures more algorithms computing values polynomially bounded in the size of the inputs. Since this work is related to quasi-interpretations, we compare the two notions obtaining two main features. The first one is that, given a program, we have heuristics for finding a sup-interpretation when we consider polynomials of bounded degree. The other one consists in the characterizations of the set of function computable in polynomial time and in polynomial space

A Semantic Basis for Specialising Domain Constraints

This paper formalises an analysis of finite domain programs and the resultant program transformation. The analysis adds low valency (domain) constraints to clauses in order to reduce search. The technique is outlined with a worked example and then formalised using abstract interpretation. Correctness of the analysis and of the transformation is proved

Adaptable transition systems

We present an essential model of adaptable transition systems inspired by white-box approaches to adaptation and based on foundational models of component based systems. The key feature of adaptable transition systems are control propositions, imposing a clear separation between ordinary, functional behaviours and adaptive ones. We instantiate our approach on interface automata yielding adaptable interface automata, but it may be instantiated on other foundational models of component-based systems as well. We discuss how control propositions can be exploited in the specification and analysis of adaptive systems, focusing on various notions proposed in the literature, like adaptability, control loops, and control synthesis

Interconnect research influenced

This article shows that Rent's rule can be viewed as a fundamental law of nature with respect to electronic circuits. As there are many interpretations of the rule, this article will shed some light on the core of Rent's rule and the research that has been built on it

3. Whitehead\u27s Philosophical Synthesis

In Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) we meet a philosopher who was born an Englishman and died an American, and whose thought combined the major recent philosophical contributions of both countries in a radically new and startling metaphysical synthesis. Unlike both Dewey and Russell, he sees in philosophy neither the individual nor the social creation of meaning, but rather adventurous exploration in the discovery of meaning. His approach, like Russell\u27s, is individualistic and, like Dewey\u27s, total rather than partial or limited. He drew both on the English analytical interest in psychology and sociology, while at the same time maintaining his own concern for the latest scientific developments. But, in contradistinction to the interest of Russell and Dewey in method, his philosophy was continually metaphysical. [excerpt