26,883 research outputs found
Reason, causation and compatibility with the phenomena
'Reason, Causation and Compatibility with the Phenomena' strives to give answers to the philosophical problem of the interplay between realism, explanation and experience. This book is a compilation of essays that recollect significant conceptions of rival terms such as determinism and freedom, reason and appearance, power and knowledge. This title discusses the progress made in epistemology and natural philosophy, especially the steps that led from the ancient theory of atomism to the modern quantum theory, and from mathematization to analytic philosophy. Moreover, it provides possible gateways from modern deadlocks of theory either through approaches to consciousness or through historical critique of intellectual authorities.
This work will be of interest to those either researching or studying in colleges and universities, especially in the departments of philosophy, history of science, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and quantum mechanics, history of ideas and culture. Greek and Latin Literature students and instructors may also find this book to be both a fascinating and valuable point of reference
Logical Omnipotence and Two notions of Implicit Belief
The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical omnipotence, which highlights the normative content of the problem of logical omniscience. I introduce two developments of the notion of implicit belief (accessible and stable belief ) and use them in two versions of the most common strategy applied to the problem of logical omnipotence
Fictionalism of Anticipation
A promising recent approach for understanding complex phenomena is recognition of anticipatory behavior of living organisms and social organizations. The anticipatory, predictive action permits learning, novelty seeking, rich experiential existence. I argue that the established frameworks of anticipation, adaptation or learning imply overly passive roles of anticipatory agents, and that a fictionalist standpoint reflects the core of anticipatory behavior better than representational or future references. Cognizing beings enact not just their models of the world, but own make-believe existential agendas as well. Anticipators embody plausible scripts of living, and effectively assume neo-Kantian or pragmatist perspectives of cognition and action. It is instructive to see that anticipatory behavior is not without mundane or loathsome deficiencies. Appreciation of ferally fictionalist anticipation suggests an equivalence of semiosis and anticipation
Hedged Assertion
Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This essay considers the linguistic and normative issues side-by-side. We aim to bring some order and clarity to thinking about hedging, so as to illuminate aspects of interest to both linguists and philosophers. In particular, we consider three broad questions. 1) The structural question: when one hedges, what is the speaker’s commitment weakened from? 2) The functional question: what is the best way to understand how a hedge weakens? And 3) the taxonomic question: are hedged assertions genuine assertions, another speech act, or what
Realism about the Wave Function
A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum
mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of
the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists
about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does
it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would
improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum
mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist
interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories:
ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the \emph{sui
generis} interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic
quantum mechanics.Comment: Penultimate version for Philosophy Compas
Scientific Realism without the Wave-Function: An Example of Naturalized Quantum Metaphysics
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wave-function, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their inter-relations
Credence: A Belief-First Approach
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed
Antimitotic action of cornin as a biologically active polypeptide. I. Biochemical properties of cornin
We succeeded in the extraction of a substance from beef cornea and rabbit muscle, that markedly inhibits mitosis of sea urchin eggs. The substance extracted from beef cornea is non-dialysable and it can be separated into three fractions by DEAE-cellulose column. Although everyone of these fractions has an antimitotic
action, that of fractions II and III is especially marked. These fractions are one of nucleoproteins that have adenine as base. The substance extracted from rabbit muscle is dialysable, and when it is fractionated through DEAE-cellulose column into three fractions, fraction I has no antimitotic effect but fractions II and III have it. Fraction II is one of nucleoproteins that have hypoxanthine
as base. Carnin obtained from beef cornea or from rabbit muscle shows a typical protein wave, but after being treated with gas by passing oxygen through cornin solution the wave height is lowered. Carnin, however, is a very
stable substance when kept dry in a desiccator.</p
On Many-Minds Interpretations of Quantum Theory
This paper is a response to some recent discussions of many-minds
interpretations in the philosophical literature. After an introduction to the
many-minds idea, the complexity of quantum states for macroscopic objects is
stressed. Then it is proposed that a characterization of the physical structure
of observers is a proper goal for physical theory. It is argued that an
observer cannot be defined merely by the instantaneous structure of a brain,
but that the history of the brain's functioning must also be taken into
account. Next the nature of probability in many-minds interpretations is
discussed and it is suggested that only discrete probability models are needed.
The paper concludes with brief comments on issues of actuality and identity
over time.Comment: 16 pages, plain TeX, no macros required. Revised following comments
November 199
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