Symmetry breaking in tournaments

We provide upper bounds for the determining number and the metric dimension of tournaments. A set of vertices S in V(T) is a determining set for a tournament T if every nontrivial automorphism of T moves at least one vertex of S, while S is a resolving set for T if every two distinct vertices in T have different distances to some vertex in S. We show that the minimum size of a determining set for an order n tournament (its determining number) is bounded by n/3, while the minimum size of a resolving set for an order n strong tournament (its metric dimension) is bounded by n/2. Both bounds are optimal.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Symmetry breaking in tournaments

We provide upper bounds for the determining number and the metric dimension of tournaments. A set of vertices S is a determining set for a tournament T if every nontrivial automorphism of T moves at least one vertex of S, while S is a resolving set for T if every two distinct vertices in T have different distances to some vertex in S. We show that the minimum size of a determining set for an order n tournament (its determining number) is bounded by n/3, while the minimum size of a resolving set for an order n strong tournament (its metric dimension) is bounded by n/2. Both bounds are optimal.Postprint (published version

Distinguishing tournaments with small label classes

A d-distinguishing vertex (arc) labeling of a digraph is a vertex (arc) labeling using d labels that is not preserved by any nontrivial automorphism. Let ρ(T) (ρ′(T)) be the minimum size of a label class in a 2-distinguishing vertex (arc) labeling of a tournament T. Gluck's Theorem implies that ρ(T) ≤ ⌊n/2⌋ for any tournament T of order n. We construct a family of tournaments ℌ such that ρ(T) ≥ ⌊n/2⌋ for any tournament of order n in ℌ. Additionally, we prove that ρ′(T) ≤ ⌊7n/36⌋ + 3 for any tournament T of order n and ρ′(T) ≥ ⌈n/6⌉ when T ∈ ℌ and has order n. These results answer some open questions stated by Boutin.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

On the Distinguishing Number of Cyclic Tournaments: Towards the Albertson-Collins Conjecture

A distinguishing $r$-labeling of a digraph $G$ is a mapping $\lambda$ from the set of verticesof $G$ to the set of labels $\{1,\dots,r\}$ such that no nontrivial automorphism of $G$ preserves all the labels.The distinguishing number $D(G)$ of $G$ is then the smallest $r$ for which $G$ admits a distinguishing $r$-labeling.From a result of Gluck (David Gluck, Trivial set-stabilizers in finite permutation groups,{\em Can. J. Math.} 35(1) (1983), 59--67),it follows that $D(T)=2$ for every cyclic tournament~$T$ of (odd) order $2q+1\ge 3$.Let $V(T)=\{0,\dots,2q\}$ for every such tournament.Albertson and Collins conjectured in 1999that the canonical 2-labeling $\lambda^*$ given by$\lambda^*(i)=1$ if and only if $i\le q$ is distinguishing.We prove that whenever one of the subtournaments of $T$ induced by vertices $\{0,\dots,q\}$or $\{q+1,\dots,2q\}$ is rigid, $T$ satisfies Albertson-Collins Conjecture.Using this property, we prove that several classes of cyclic tournaments satisfy Albertson-Collins Conjecture.Moreover, we also prove that every Paley tournament satisfies Albertson-Collins Conjecture

Tournaments with Midterm Reviews

In many tournaments investments are made over time and conducting a review only once at the end, or also at points midway through, is a strategic decision of the tournament designer. If the latter is chosen, then a rule according to which the results of the different reviews are aggregated into a ranking must also be determined. This paper takes a first step in the direction of answering how such rules are optimally designed. A characterization of the optimal aggregation rule is provided for a two-agent two-stage tournament. In particular, we show that treating the two reviews symmetrically may result in an equilibrium effort level that is inferior to the one in which only a final review is conducted. However, treating the two reviews lexicographically by first looking at the final review, and then using the midterm review only as a tie-breaking rule, strictly dominates the option of conducting a final review only. The optimal mechanism falls somewhere in between these two extreme mechanisms. It is shown that the more effective the first-stage effort is in determining the final review’s outcome, the smaller is the weight that should be assigned to the midterm review in determining the agents’ ranking

Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule

Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed