Symbolic Partial-Order Execution for Testing Multi-Threaded Programs

We describe a technique for systematic testing of multi-threaded programs. We combine Quasi-Optimal Partial-Order Reduction, a state-of-the-art technique that tackles path explosion due to interleaving non-determinism, with symbolic execution to handle data non-determinism. Our technique iteratively and exhaustively finds all executions of the program. It represents program executions using partial orders and finds the next execution using an underlying unfolding semantics. We avoid the exploration of redundant program traces using cutoff events. We implemented our technique as an extension of KLEE and evaluated it on a set of large multi-threaded C programs. Our experiments found several previously undiscovered bugs and undefined behaviors in memcached and GNU sort, showing that the new method is capable of finding bugs in industrial-size benchmarks.Comment: Extended version of a paper presented at CAV'2

A Verified Information-Flow Architecture

SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and flexible propagation and combination of tags as instructions are executed. The operating system virtualizes these generic facilities to present an information-flow abstract machine that allows user programs to label sensitive data with rich confidentiality policies. We present a formal, machine-checked model of the key hardware and software mechanisms used to dynamically control information flow in SAFE and an end-to-end proof of noninterference for this model. We use a refinement proof methodology to propagate the noninterference property of the abstract machine down to the concrete machine level. We use an intermediate layer in the refinement chain that factors out the details of the information-flow control policy and devise a code generator for compiling such information-flow policies into low-level monitor code. Finally, we verify the correctness of this generator using a dedicated Hoare logic that abstracts from low-level machine instructions into a reusable set of verified structured code generators

COSMICAH 2005: workshop on verification of COncurrent Systems with dynaMIC Allocated Heaps (a Satellite event of ICALP 2005) - Informal Proceedings

Lisboa Portugal, 10 July 200

Formal Modeling of Connectionism using Concurrency Theory, an Approach Based on Automata and Model Checking

This paper illustrates a framework for applying formal methods techniques, which are symbolic in nature, to specifying and verifying neural networks, which are sub-symbolic in nature. The paper describes a communicating automata [Bowman & Gomez, 2006] model of neural networks. We also implement the model using timed automata [Alur & Dill, 1994] and then undertake a verification of these models using the model checker Uppaal [Pettersson, 2000] in order to evaluate the performance of learning algorithms. This paper also presents discussion of a number of broad issues concerning cognitive neuroscience and the debate as to whether symbolic processing or connectionism is a suitable representation of cognitive systems. Additionally, the issue of integrating symbolic techniques, such as formal methods, with complex neural networks is discussed. We then argue that symbolic verifications may give theoretically well-founded ways to evaluate and justify neural learning systems in the field of both theoretical research and real world applications

Compositional Vulnerability Detection with Insecurity Separation Logic

Memory-safety issues and information leakage are known to be depressingly common. We consider the compositional static detection of these kinds of vulnerabilities in first-order C-like programs. Existing methods often treat one type of vulnerability (e.g. memory-safety) but not the other (e.g. information leakage). Indeed the latter are hyper-safety violations, making them more challenging to detect than the former. Existing leakage detection methods like Relational Symbolic Execution treat only non-interactive programs, avoiding the challenges raised by nondeterminism for reasoning about information leakage. Their implementations also do not treat non-trivial leakage policies like value-dependent classification, which are becoming increasingly common. Finally, being whole-program analyses they cannot be applied compositionally -- to deduce the presence of vulnerabilities in a program by analysing each of its parts -- thereby ruling out the possibility of incremental analysis. In this paper we remedy these shortcomings by presenting Insecurity Separation Logic (InsecSL), an under-approximate relational program logic for soundly detecting information leakage and memory-safety issues in interactive programs. We show how InsecSL can be soundly automated by bi-abduction based symbolic execution. Based on this, we design and implement a top-down, contextual, compositional, inter-procedural analysis for vulnerability detection. We implement our approach in a proof-of-concept tool, Underflow, for analysing C programs, which we demonstrate by applying it to various case studies

Fifty years of Hoare's Logic

We present a history of Hoare's logic.Comment: 79 pages. To appear in Formal Aspects of Computin

Caching, crashing & concurrency - verification under adverse conditions

The formal development of large-scale software systems is a complex and time-consuming effort. Generally, its main goal is to prove the functional correctness of the resulting system. This goal becomes significantly harder to reach when the verification must be performed under adverse conditions. When aiming for a realistic system, the implementation must be compatible with the “real world”: it must work with existing system interfaces, cope with uncontrollable events such as power cuts, and offer competitive performance by using mechanisms like caching or concurrency. The Flashix project is an example of such a development, in which a fully verified file system for flash memory has been developed. The project is a long-term team effort and resulted in a sequential, functionally correct and crash-safe implementation after its first project phase. This thesis continues the work by performing modular extensions to the file system with performance-oriented mechanisms that mainly involve caching and concurrency, always considering crash-safety. As a first contribution, this thesis presents a modular verification methodology for destructive heap algorithms. The approach simplifies the verification by separating reasoning about specifics of heap implementations, like pointer aliasing, from the reasoning about conceptual correctness arguments. The second contribution of this thesis is a novel correctness criterion for crash-safe, cached, and concurrent file systems. A natural criterion for crash-safety is defined in terms of system histories, matching the behavior of fine-grained caches using complex synchronization mechanisms that reorder operations. The third contribution comprises methods for verifying functional correctness and crash-safety of caching mechanisms and concurrency in file systems. A reference implementation for crash-safe caches of high-level data structures is given, and a strategy for proving crash-safety is demonstrated and applied. A compatible concurrent implementation of the top layer of file systems is presented, using a mechanism for the efficient management of fine-grained file locking, and a concurrent version of garbage collection is realized. Both concurrency extensions are proven to be correct by applying atomicity refinement, a methodology for proving linearizability. Finally, this thesis contributes a new iteration of executable code for the Flashix file system. With the efficiency extensions introduced with this thesis, Flashix covers all performance-oriented concepts of realistic file system implementations and achieves competitiveness with state-of-the-art flash file systems